On the view from central Eurasia

Darmowy! · 0 · 25.09.2019

(Photo: Jacek Bartosiak)

I listened carefully to his comments evaluating the initiative and perceptions of a tense strategic situation arising as a result of the newly-commencing rivalry between America and China over who sets global economic rules and regulates strategic flows in Eurasia. A few comments particularly caught my attention and I thought I would share them with you.

First of all, the role of China appears as the role of a ‘muscular giant’ with very strong and consistent leadership pursuing permanent goals.

This is a different perspective than the one we’re used to in Europe given the internal situation in China and Western media reports related to pressure on the Chinese economy or due to recent reports about the ongoing protests and riots in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta. Obvious as it sounds, it turns out that vantage point has a colossal impact on the judgements we make on any given topic.

I also heard that China’s power over the Belt and Road Initiative is more subtle than Europeans know from their own colonial past, when they dominated the Eurasian coastal zone and Africa.

The influence which China is building in the countries located on the route of the Belt and Road would – according to my interlocutor – not manifest itself in conflict situations, where Beijing imposes its decisions to show everyone who rules – as stronger partners are accustomed to behave. The Chinese, simply through the multitude of connections and the complexity of emerging dependencies, achieve their goals without overt ‘turning point’ conflicts. This toned-down approach is certainly influenced by the potential backlash against Chinese influence from worried weaker partners who would build regional coalitions aimed at balancing China’s political power in one way or another and seek to block Chinese business and investment.

Overall, it returned to my attention that the Chinese or Asian concept of winning is different than in the West. The Western concept (as have it from multiple sources) is focused on a binary win-lose mechanism which produces clear and unquestionable outcomes.

Here it’s clear to see that one side is victorious and the other defeated. And this is not just in matters of war and peace. It is also about conduct in business, with transactions, contracts, and certainly in arrangements that create a new beginning or open a certain process.

Meanwhile, as it was patiently explained to me, the Chinese approach to winning is ‘fluid’ because – according to the Chinese – everything in life overlaps at the same time and as such is unmarked or indeterminate and things in life ‘flow’ like a river current.

This means that victories are also ambiguous. Something can only be considered a real victory only in the long run, and may in fact seem (especially at first) a failure. Victory is something which gradually ‘becomes’ clear with the passage of time. It is not something which can be ‘declared’ or ‘announced’ or ‘recognised’ or ‘demonstrated’.

The concept of failure is therefore also different. This is worth pausing for a moment to think about. With the help of completely different mental maps, we can therefore assess the ongoing competition for dominance in Eurasia. According to the above logic, it can resemble an eternally smooth game with countless numbers that are subject to a constant change of elements, where it is not known whether the game is won or lost, where the cards are never finally marked.

Once we understand the above, it is time to ask what criteria of conduct are followed by the political leadership of the competing powers. In other words, how to do ‘statecraft’ as it’s known in the field of political science, how to handle the affairs of state, especially in a game where the stakes are so high?

If my interlocutor is to be believed, mental maps in China are markedly different than they seem to be here in Europe or in the United States. It’s worth remembering that the Chinese may have a different understanding of the Thucydides trap, a theory famously outlined by Graham Allison. Despite the fact that they talk publicly of that trap (or rather that they wish to avoid one) – what I heard myself on multiple official interactions.

The misunderstanding and miscommunication may lead to strategic miscalculation pertaining to misperception by Beijing and Washington of the other party’s intentions and actions. In time of strategic competition over Eurasia that is always dangerous due to its escalatory potential and the growing risk of strategic blunders.

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.