Roman Empire (photo: Wikipedia)
Geographic conditions are an important element influencing policy, but they do not determine it. Geography offers opportunities that people either use or they don’t. To use these opportunities, you must still have geographical knowledge. Here the first question arises over whether the ancients understood geography as much as we did. The answer to this question will be negative.
In its early days in ancient Greece, geography did not deal with describing the land as such. For Pythagoreans, who had a great contribution in the development of geography, it was a form of religious inquiry, a search for divinity in the surrounding world.
The ancients had a lot of experience in this area. McCoy, however, distinguishes between the “practical” or “from the horse’s back” approach and the scientific approach to geopolitics that surfaced in the nineteenth century. The first one was the result of practical experience; whereas in the second, theoretical considerations play an important role, which enabled the development of knowledge about the world around us.
A necessary condition for the development of geography, of its perception and its use by leaders, was cartography. A good map is necessary to properly understand the importance of specific places. Let’s not hide it, until modern times it was difficult to get an accurate map. Someone who made great advances in this field in the second century was C.E. Claudius Ptolemy, whose Geography for a good one and a half thousand years was a fundamental work in this field in both the Western world and Islam, but which did not necessarily influence the actions taken by the decision-making centre in Rome.
It is a mistake to assume that the Roman Empire was the result of any plan. The Romans, at least during the republic, did not have any “grand strategy”. The conquest of Italy first and then the entire Mediterranean basin was the result of the spirit of extreme competition prevailing among the elite of the republic. Victory in war was the best way to surpass the achievements of competitors and their own ancestors, and thus gain political and financial capital for career development. Triumph was very important here, being at the same time a manifestation of the power of Rome and the promotion of a victorious leader. Another driving force for conquests was the desire, generally speaking, to improve one’s own well-being.
The Romans liked to be seen as a society of righteous citizens who adhered to international agreements. In this way, the republic engaged in risky and even unnecessary wars in defence of its allies. Conquests carried out in this way were considered to be a perfectly fair compensation for the hardships and costs incurred by Rome. As a result, the expansion of the empire was rather chaotic and more reminiscent of a chess horse movement than a systematic expansion.
The above trends reached their apogee during the late republic, and their best example is the first triumvirate consisting of Pompey the Great, Crassus and Julius Caesar. Illumined by his fame as the conqueror of the East and the slayer of pirates, Pompey seemed to be the most predisposed to becoming an undisputed leader. Hardly anyone appreciated the youngest of the triumvirs – Caesar. He used his governorship of pre-Alpine Gaul (today northern Italy) and decided to come to the aid of allied Gallic tribes pressed by the Helvetii and the Germans. It turned out to be just an excuse to conquer all of Gaul and make propaganda expeditions to the ends of the known world, i.e. to Germany and Britain. Thus, Caesar secured himself political capital in the form of the fame of the conqueror and in seasoned, completely loyal legions. Pompey and Caesar’s successes pushed Crassus to a completely pointless invasion of the Parthian Empire, which ended in his defeat and death at the Battle of Carrhae.
Delenda Carthago!
Carthage was the only exception to this rule. Roman elites were obsessed with this North African city. Cato the Elder went to legend, finishing his every statement, regardless of what it was about, with the words: “Moreover, I consider that Carthage must be destroyed.” The rivalry between the two cities was so advanced in mythology that Virgilius tried to explain its causes in the Roman epic “Eneida”. Interestingly, after the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE, other Punic cities and settlements in North Africa were left alone. Many of them remained independent for up to a hundred or more years.
Generally speaking, the western Mediterranean turned out to be too cramped a space for two powers. The Roman obsession with Carthage dates only to the time of the Second Punic War and the psychosis caused by Hannibal’s victories. Earlier confrontations were more economic. The First Punic War broke out as a result of a combination of numerous alliances and dependencies, and Sicily was the main battlefield. For the Roman republic, which was then a strictly land-based power, the strategic location of the island in the middle of the Mediterranean was of marginal importance. The Romans were just learning to use the sea and agricultural land was much more important to them. Sicily became the first province and also a granary for the growing population of Rome.
Siciliy in 2019 (photo: Albert Świdziński)
Similarly, the partition of Sardinia and Corsica, seized as a result of the mercenary rebellion in Carthage’s service, was not a geopolitical step to close the Tyrrhenian Sea. Both islands were a source of raw materials and good quality wood necessary for fleet construction. There was also the satisfaction of the humiliation of the enemy.
It is worth devoting some space to the provinces. Concepts so obvious to us as Italia, Spain, Galia or even Britain were artificial at the beginning. Like the colonial empires in Africa in the nineteenth century, the Romans completely arbitrarily divided the conquered territories. Traditional tribal and economic divisions had to give way to the convenience of imperial administration. However, Roman rule lasted so long that artificial constructs became something completely natural and fully accepted.
“Varus, give me back my legions!”
Some features of geopolitical thinking and “grand strategy” can be observed since the time of Octavian Augustus. The first emperor decided that the borders of the empire must be based on natural obstacles. In Europe, the Rhine and the Danube became such borders.
Depressed, Augustus banned further expansion. Some historians criticize this interpretation, claiming that the Romans conquered peoples, not lands, and did not necessarily have to perceive a border on the Elbe as much as we do. The fact is that the lands themselves as such at the level of economic development they had then were not always of great value. People were more important, supplying soldiers, paying taxes, tribute, or simply ensuring peace on the border. Nevertheless, after numerous campaigns and reports of merchants who were spies, Roman management had to realize that the Elbe border significantly shortens both the border and communication lines.
The Teutoburg Forest did not mean the end of active policy east of the Rhine. Tiberius and Germanicus quickly avenged the defeat. Germanicus regained legionary eagles and successfully pacified barbaric tribes. Basing the limes on the Elbe seemed possible. Tiberius, however, at the beginning of his reign accepted August’s recommendations. The conquest of Germania was simply unprofitable. The tribes there were no real threat to Rome at the time, and their level of development was so low that the costs of conquest would be much higher than the potential profits from the new province. Thus, economic and social conditions prevented the implementation of a more optimal concept, even if not geopolitical, then military.
It is also worth noting that, despite the halting of the expansion in Germania, the successors of Augustus Tiberius and Claudius systematically “leveled” the borders of the empire, connecting further areas in North Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. The process of searching for optimal boundaries lasted until the end of the 2nd century AD, when all conquests were definitively deemed unprofitable. The empire was completely defensive, especially since the consolidated Persian state of the Sassanid dynasty and the large Germanic tribes formed in the 3rd century AD posed completely new challenges in external policy.
Dacia and Britannia – exceptions confirming the rule
The conquest of Britain initiated by Claudius and the Dacian wars of Trajan were the most important exceptions to the “doctrine of Augustus”. The reasons for both escapades were complex, but similar, and matched earlier patterns. On the one hand, it was about using external conquests in domestic politics. Roman tradition required the ruler to conduct victorious wars, a mechanism similar to that of the times of the republic operated here. Due to the lack of serious revolts or enemy invasions, Claudius and Trajan had to attack someone to gain the right to triumph. However, such a campaign should be serious – plundering German, Berber, or Sarmatian settlements would not bring proper glory.
Serious targets of attack came to their own due to economics, which was also the second reason for the conquest. Britain is rich in deposits of iron and tin, which are also of great importance today. However, there were numerous gold mines in Dacia. In the case of Dacia, there could also be political considerations. United Dacian tribes represented considerable potential and growing ambitions. By conquering Dacia, Trajan eliminated a potential threat on the Danube border.
In both cases, the conquest concerned areas that in today’s parlance can be seen as a “near abroad”. The South of Britain and Dacia were under the overwhelming economic and cultural influence of the empire, and many local leaders sought the status of Rome’s allies and friends. Both newly acquired provinces proved to be problematic. Dacia had to be evacuated in 275 under pressure from the Goths.
Regardless of the outcome of the civil war that began, after that it was necessary to send legions back to defend Britain, which after some time proclaimed their emperor again. This vicious circle was interrupted in 410 by Emperor Honorius, ordering the Britons to “govern themselves”.
Instead of ending
Despite limited geographical knowledge and technical capabilities, and a different perception of geography, the ancient Romans created an empire that survived longer than any subsequent empires. After all, geographical advantages were not alien to them. Naturally created trading centres, located at the intersection of important routes, are themselves asking for “interest” – so to speak. Establishing colonies in places where it was possible to control “unruly natives” was a constant practice, not only of the Romans. However, such activities should be classified as “micro-geostrategy” rather than the “grand strategy” element in the modern sense of the word. Regardless, for five centuries the empire effectively controlled a larger and more diverse area than today’s European Union.
Autor
Paweł Behrendt
Political Science Ph.D. candidate at the University of Vienna, expert at the Boym Institute, the deputy chief-editor of konflikty.pl and a regular contributor to Nowa Konfederacja thinkzine.
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