(Photo: Jacek Bartosiak)
On 9th September in Strategy&Future, I presented 14 points (highlighted here in italics) for the Americans to consider during their time on the Wisła in the second half of 2019. This is the third part three of our response to the Pence visit and our analysis of the correlation of American expectations with the interests of Poland.
7. The formula of American alliances is changing. NATO from the collective model is transforming in Europe into a set of bilateral or group mutual assistance, assurance and guarantee systems under a hub & spokes model, in which the USA is the hub and their partners located in an important region from the point of view of American interests like Poland or Romania are spokes. If it is in the interest of the US, the spokes can be connected by bilateral bonds and allied and military interests also directly with each other. Something like an Intermarium slowly emerges from this transformation and our former geopolitical construct. This process will simultaneously change the strategic landscape of Europe and push the Germans out of the former collective perception of the NATO system and make our eastern border an area of powerful geopolitical rivalry with Russia and at some point with China (or maybe now – see Bolton’s last visit to Belarus and Ukraine) – if competition intensifies and the divorce in the economies and the retreat of globalisation continue.
This is beneficial and disadvantageous for Poland at the same time. And here there is a dispute between the factions at home and between allies in NATO.
As a result of this situation, NATO’s cohesion is weakening, but Poland’s role for the US may (although it does not have to) increase. But this is provided that the Americans win the confrontation over Eurasia, while not coming to an agreement with Russia at the expense of Ukraine, and in the event of US geoeconomic support for the region. Americans also have to properly deal with Germany to convince them to side with US, which will not a walk-over. The atomic guarantees on the Eastern Flank countries and Germany’s geopolitical orientation overlap with this. It is worth remembering, regardless of the political resolve in the face of the crisis, that Western Europe does not actually have the military capabilities that are needed for the Eastern Flank challenges.
Further violations of the liberal world order and US involvement in the Pacific will eventually lead to more fierce competition for Poland’s eastern buffer areas of Ukraine and Belarus, and Poland will have to reform its ‘ULB’ (Ukraine-Lithuania-Belarus) doctrine – devised by Juliusz Mieroszewski (1906-1976) and Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000) – and conduct an active policy in the East, unlike how it was after 1991. We also need to look closely at what Germany is doing. The future of Europe depends on the Germans (again!).
8. Poland is expected to play the role of an advanced border to defend world order against Russia’s revisionist policy in the limitrophes (the corridors preventing Russia from influencing Western European policy, i.e. on our Baltic-Black Sea bridge). And even that it will be an advanced insurance position for the entire continental alliance of the interior of Eurasia under the aegis of China and Russia, extending from Shanghai to Brest on the Bug. This results in expectations from Poland of serious arms under the aegis of the USA. This condition may last for several decades. Poland is displaying the main land forces of this area and is the first to guard in the face of the ongoing new generation war (hybrid war) in these areas.
No good news, here. In each scenario, Poland must change its attitude and understand that it is a country on the frontline. This will involve expenses, new operational concepts, modernisation of the armed forces and so-called “active defence” posture, about which we will continue to debate at Strategy&Future. It must also prepare for a war not of a continental nature, but for a limited non-linear war, with various stages of escalation, and on the entire Eastern Front between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.
What is worse, we have to do it both when we are in close alliance with the Americans present in Europe and alone without Americans, assuming that they were not present in Europe. And even with Germany, if European politicians choose a European orientation and consolidate continental Europe into one organism. Then Poland and Germany will deploy Europe’s main ground forces in its eastern bulwark to have any forces shielding Europe from Russia, however strange that may sound in December 2019.
9. In addition, Poland is expected to meet several conditions. First of all, its space will not be communicating for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and thus it will become a barrier for the emerging continental communication. At the same time, our space is to be an area communicating from Western Europe to the countries in the east, emerging in limitrophones from under Russian guardianship. It is also to fulfill the function of a strong frontier and “membrane” through which American policy will be implemented in Eastern Europe (in the buffer areas of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and Moldova, etc.), but also towards Germany. As in the past, American policy towards the whole of continental Europe was implemented through Great Britain, for which Washington – depending on its choice – “hid” or through which it participated in trials on the continent.
We already meet all the above expectations. We should remember, however, a warning not to be just a thoughtless tool for the policy of the maritime power that enters and exits the fray, and changes alliances flexibly, as history has proved. Americans have not always been on the Vistula, they have been in Western Europe only since World War II. Poland, however, have always been in Europe and will be in it forever. We will not change our position or relocate our interests. We stay put. And global maritime power can “shift” its interests and strategic interest flexibly.
10. Poland, Intermarium/Three Seas and other concepts emerging between the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea on the north-south axis are to create constructs that, if necessary, should more or less balance German influence on the continent. This would happen if, after Brexit, the European Union turned from the Atlantic towards an open continental policy and building the economic core/the core of the continent based on Germany with the invitation to cooperate with Russia or China, but without the Anglo-Saxons and their economic and financial influence. Poland would then be a barrier to strategic transfers of the continental project. In this spirit, we should read support for north-south communication, energy policy and distribution of American gas on the Three Seas and Ukraine from the Polish Baltic ports.
The Belt and Road Initiative may ultimately mean the end of the recycling of money earned by the US financial system and a push of funds into the construction of Mackinder’s construction infrastructure to the Chinese core, through which raw materials, simple products and energy will be delivered. Belt and Road does not make much sense in Eurasia if the flows are to be financed in the future in US dollars.
The crises in Asia from 1997, 2008, 2013 showed that American banks are reluctant to finance trade or financial holes in Asia, and empire building is done on your own dime.
There will be several turning points that will show advantages in global financial and capital competition:
a) if in the long run yuan bonds give better rates of return than in US bonds,
b) if it turns out on the technology front that the supply chain of the most modern technologies is in Asia and investors will place their money there and not as traditionally – in America. In this regard, the US advantage is traditionally based on the ability to organise and finance the global supply chain, but physically it is located mainly in Asia. It is also worth remembering that in the 21st century, non-material values – e.g. data sent via optical fibre cable – are a significant and growing value, which strengthens the relatively weaker continent in volumes compared to the world ocean,
c) when Russia, Germany and Saudi Arabia cease to use the dollar in settlements of energy commodities,
d) if a Saudi-Chinese oil consortium is created,
e) Germany will join the continental project with its own independent diplomacy and its own game in Eurasia, which will aim to provide access for the Germans to Russia and everything that is north of the Himalayas and then also in the south; To this end, Germany must come to an agreement with Russia and China.
Poland will then be a blocking barrier.
At that time, two parties will fully develop in Poland: ‘Independence’ for self-reliance supported by the United States and ‘continental’ focused on close integration of the emerging new version of European empire.
11. In the technological war that is just beginning between the US and China, the allies are to be on the US side, even if they incur material losses (or lose potential material benefits). 5G and signing the declaration in this matter in Warsaw is a good example.
Yes, this may be difficult, especially if China successfully introduces new technologies such as 5G and artificial intelligence. It will be a problem for the whole world. We only need to look at how they choose European and, above all, German economies, with which we are associated and not make decisions too quickly, because we may lose access to key technologies and new economic cycles.
12. Poland is to support American political influence, implement military and defence cooperation, and facilitate access to American investment funds. Cooperation in the field of energy from the USA is becoming increasingly important, although all this without special “over-market” conditions, i.e. without a specific geo-economic support plan dictated by a strategic need in the style of the Marshall plan or the assistance provided to Japan and South Korea in the 20th century. Here, Trump’s America First approach and the functioning model of the US economy other than after World War II and the division of labour in the 21st century in the world structurally do not help Americans.
Americans do not want to accept a new Marshall Plan. This is a real challenge for Poland, how to take advantage of separating the supply chain of the global economy so that some of the new parts reach Poland.
13. The Polish Armed Forces are to modernise and to be enriched with new equipment, preferably in the USA, but only to increase military capabilities complementing American capabilities. This is what Australia has been doing for example since the 1970s (although it is beginning to be the subject of serious debate on the antipodes). It is therefore about preparing for coalition wars and always with the US, even if we were to take the first blow ourselves, before the Americans come to the rescue. The US refuses to implement our own concepts for the modernisation of the Polish armed forces, in particular to acquire independent combat capability with escalation potential (in the triad: own recognition, goal targeting and kinetic impact), our own strategic signaling towards Russia and independent policy towards our east.
We need to prepare our own operational concept that will answer the challenge of the moment. It should apply only to the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium War Theater.
14. Solidarity with the US is expected to compete for the dominant narrative, social and political model, and the desired social contract, including tax and financial solutions. Pence’s visit alone gave tangible evidence of this.
At the slogan level, this is of course fine. In specific technological, tax and economic solutions, we must be guided by our own interest, because the real fight for the world is not about human rights or great narratives, but about who works for whom and who holds a higher place in the global division of labour. The point is for us to be promoted in this division, not just to work cheaply. Then we will have more money and technology to organize our lives and more time outside work. To put it simply – this is the fight for Eurasia.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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