Soviet missile ICBM RT-23UTTH on a mobile train platform, Museum in Petersburg (photo: Wikipedia)
Despite – and perhaps precisely – because of the revolutionary nature and the momentum of change, the reform has not been fully completed. For example, the professionalisation of the service has not been fully implemented, and there are still some significant shortcomings and disadvantages left over from the old system, largely due to the demographic problems of the state and the quality of service candidates.
The reform, of course, aroused the enormous resistance in the military establishment. For this reason, in 2012, the unpopular Serdyukov, after playing the role of a “bumper” in the reform process, had to leave on a wave of criticism, replaced by Sergei Szoygu, who loosened the reforms in its most unpopular elements, but left the essence of the reform. To this, great salary increases were introduced in the army from 2012, which also restored the rank and social respect of the service. Random inspections of the combat readiness of units throughout the state as well as snap exercises and checking the time of exit from the barracks, which the Russians are screwing into place with respectable results, have become the showcase of the Minister of Shoygu, with the result that the Russian army achieved high strategic mobility on the internal lines of its huge continental empire.
The General Staff prepares strategic and operational plans, proposes equipment, location and use of the armed forces, and exercises broadly understood control of the Russian armed forces. General Valery Gerasimov, the experienced and respected commander and strategist, has been chief of the General Staff for many years, the brain of Russian actions on the western anti-access/area denial (A2AD) wall erected between the Gulf of Riga and the Middle East, who reports to the president and the head of the Ministry of Defence.
As a result of the changes, the Russian armed forces are now able to conduct combat operations in regional conflicts, which was proved by the actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. In this war, the Russian army was able to deploy over 40,000 troops to the Ukrainian border during just a few days. In 1999, it took Russia three weeks to transfer 40,000 troops to Chechnya, gathered from units spread all over the country.
An ambitious modernisation and purchase plan for equipment was announced in 2010, amounting to USD 700 billion over 15 years. Its goal was not to peer the potential with the US armed forces or with the American capability to project power in Eurasia. The goal was for Russia to gain an advantage over any opponents on its periphery, including all the armies of the NATO countries bordering Russia, with the most important frontline state of the North Atlantic Alliance – Poland at the forefront.
From the point of view of the great strategy, the reforms after 2008 are to serve not to resist or conduct a mass land attack in the direction of Europe or China, but to a “new generation war” on its own periphery. In this spirit, the Russian army trains in training grounds, as evidenced by a series of Zapad exercises and other cycles of army exercises, which have been widely reported in recent years.
In February 2013, the “Gerasimov doctrine” saw the light of day, elements of which were also discussed quite extensively in Russian military literature regarding the methods of new generation warfare, including for the achievement of a given political goal and geopolitical solutions favourable to Russia, all available military and non-military means combining into one type of purpose-oriented activity, in fact of a force nature, but below the level of open conflict or on its border. In Europe, this set of new generation warfare methods is often called “hybrid war”. This is an important component of Russian policy pursuing the aspirations of playing the role of a dominant regional factor in the emerging multipolar world, which would enable Moscow to regain the status of a regional power in Eurasia that Russia has had since the tsarist times.
Land forces of the new Russian army are to be organized ultimately into 40 brigades and 8 maneuvering divisions. The reform abolished the regiments and replaced them with brigades, it was also supposed to eliminate the vast majority of divisions. Anyway, such solutions had already been tested in Soviet times, even in the Afghanistan brigades and battalion tactical groups that were assembled – with quite good operational results. In the new Russian army, the battalion tactical groups operating within the brigades are composed of professional and contracted soldiers, while the rest of the brigade are recruit-based structures, so both components train separately.
After the dismissal of Serdiukov, it was decided after 2013 that several significant divisions would remain in the structure. Even later, in 2016, after analyzing the experience of the Ukrainian war, it was decided that an additional four new divisions would be formed in the western and southern military districts. In addition to this, a very important decision was made to begin the formation of the 1st Guards Tank Army just behind the Smolensk Gate and another army in the central military district.
The idea of forming a new type of division popped out after the Ukrainian war, when it was recognised that larger units were – despite the “heaviness” of their structure and command – needed to break the enemy’s forces. So, it follows that in the European land theatre of war, where large spaces and maneuver dominate, the “old” mingles with the “new”. It will be interesting to see how US land forces react to this, as currently they have weaker structures for symmetrical war with the new land army of the Russian Federation.
The army is made up of armored division, a mechanised division, an armored brigade, a strong accompanying artillery, air defense systems, a separate units of engineers, chemical sub-units, its own communication services, organic intelligence and reconnaissance, and its own logistics services. Her independent role and striking strength testify to the apparent intention to use her to perform deep strikes penetrating the opponent’s forces in the rear, so as to encircle and destroy as well as penetrate the rear areas and close the encircled opponent, in accordance with the Soviet/Russian doctrine of performing great flanking-encircling maneuvers, which we know from the end of World War II and the Soviet operational maneuvering groups and assault armies from the time of Marshal Ogarkov.
Jelnia in Russia, near Smoleńsk, here is the garrison of components of the 1. Guards Tank Army (photo: Wikipedia)
The great pride of Russia and the basis of its regional projection of strength are airborne troops (Воздушно-десантные войска, Vozduszno-diesantnyje Vojska, ВДВ, VDV) consisting of four divisions (98 and 106 Guardian descent, 7th Guards ), four brigades (11, 31, 56 and 83) and one (45) Spetsnaz brigade (although generally broadly understood forces and supporting facilities of Spetsnaz may have as many as 20-30 thousand personnel). Airborne troops are the Russian equivalent of the American rapid response forces of the 1980s and 1990s, only that they were intended for operations in the former post-Soviet space, capable of rapid invasion or quick response. Unlike in the Western armies, including the American (where 173 units of the airborne brigade have no heavy equipment), Russian units are very “heavy” and have tanks as well as the heavy IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles) and tracked vehicles required in the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium terrain.
The Russians do not have modern aviation by Western standards, but it is completely sufficient to defeat opponents on their periphery, including perhaps also Turkey. The integrated air defence system of Russia is very modern and as one of the few “industries” it has not neglected and has been developing continuously despite the years of Yeltsin’s sadness from the 1990s.
The Russian fleet with its command in St. Petersburg has four separate Fleets: the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet, between 15% and 25% of the number of ships from Soviet times, and the average age of the ship is 20-25 years. Added to this is a separate component of the closed sea – the so-called Caspian Flotilla. Traditionally, the backbone of the Russian and Soviet fleets closed in the marginal seas of the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic were and are submarines, but 75% of the 61 submarines in service are already over 20 years old.
The base of the most powerful of the Russian fleets – the Northern Fleet – is located in Severomorsk in the Kola Bay, which is the only ice-free place with access from the Atlantic. It consists of seven or eight (depending on various sources) nuclear submarine carriers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the only atomic cruiser and the only Russian aircraft carrier. Nuclear ballistic missile carriers can reach targets in the US, theoretically firing them even from their own wharf. They are protected by submarine hunting impact vessels and submarines with maneuvering rockets, of which there are 16 in the Northern Fleet, and by conventional submarines (6 units in the Northern Fleet).
The Pacific fleet with bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky includes both nuclear submarines carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as conventional diesel-powered submarines (9 pieces) intended for the coastal waters of the North Pacific. A new class of Kalina conventional submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP), which allows for a long-lasting immersion of quieter and smaller conventional ships, is expected to enter service after 2020. The Pacific Fleet also has a large number of destroyers sailing on patrols throughout the Western Pacific (Udaloy-class).
Compared to the Soviet times, the Baltic Fleet is going through a process of degradation after losing ports in the Baltic Republics. The largest war port is Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad Oblast, controlling the actions of the Polish Navy right at its main approach to the Gulf of Gdansk, and the port of St. Petersburg. The Black Sea Fleet had similar problems since 1991 due to the loss of Ukraine and Crimea. After the annexation of the peninsula and Ukraine’s restriction of access to the sea, Moscow is implementing plans to strengthen naval forces in this basin.
The Caspian Flotilla dominates completely in its closed drainage basin, having, in particular, been equipped with modern Kalibr long-range cruise missiles with striking capabilities against all of Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, which was effectively demonstrated in October 2015 by striking Syria. The Kalibr system is an excellent weapon because it can be fired even from relatively small mobile naval platforms, such as corvettes capable of sailing also in green waters, and at the same time has up to 2.5 thousand kilometers of range, with relatively low rocket detection. Most of the Caspian Flotilla is stationed at the base in Makhachkala, as the traditional port of Astrakhan has difficult access to the water due to the Volga Delta.
The Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons since 1949 and was the second country after the USA to have weapons of mass destruction of this kind. Throughout the Cold War, the nuclear rivalry between the two superpowers continued, both in terms of the number of warheads and their means of delivery, the number of warheads in the rockets, the directions of possible attacks, and homing locations – especially land-based near the enemy’s borders (Cuba, West Germany and Turkey). In 2010, the US-Russia agreement called “NEW START” limited the number of Russia’s nuclear warheads gradually to 1,735 warheads, but de facto only applies to strategic warheads; with basically no restrictions on tactical. Depending on sources, Russia has either 2,700 or 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. In practice, the treaty will allow the modernisation and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal, and by the way Russia has almost succeeded in replacing the nuclear arsenal from Soviet times with a new or significantly modernised one. In 2021, warheads from Soviet times are expected to constitute only 2% of nuclear forces. From the triad of strategic means of transport (intercontinental rockets, submarines, strategic bombers), ballistic ground-to-ground missiles from the Soviet era make up only half of the current number and are to leave service in 2022. The new missiles in service are SS-27 Topol M, with the new RS-24 Jars and RS-26 Rubież joining the line. The SS-28 missiles with maneuvering warheads under development are expected to be able – according to the Russians – to avoid US missile defence. FR nuclear missile forces are half in silos above ground and on rail launchers on land. In March 2018, President Putin announced that Russia has new missiles with completely new capabilities, including allegedly nuclear-powered cruise missiles with virtually unlimited range, and a hypersonic missile. Time will tell if Russia really truly develops such abilities and possesses them. The second of the strategic triad are 10 submarines of ballistic missile carriers (SSBN) of the Dolgorukiy class. Russia plans to complete the launch of new missiles for submarines designated SS-N-32 Bullava, each with six warheads separately maneuvering (reentry vehicles). Moscow is also modernising the content of the triad element: the strategic bomb fleet – Tu-160 and Tu-95MS. The first bomber is to be re-opened on the production line, and the second will introduce new versions to the line. The declared works on the new PAK DA bomber are underway.
In general, it can be said that there is no doubt that there has been a significant conventional advantage of the United States since the collapse of the Soviet empire, of course in the world’s seas and oceans, as well as in Eurasia considered as a whole (though no longer in specific regions). So after 1991, a weakened Russia as a mere shadow of the Soviet Union, relied even more on nuclear forces to maintain its superpower status by having a nuclear “leverage” to push its interests.
Along with the new realities that arose after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow abandoned the Soviet policy of no-first-use (by the way intensively used as a propaganda tool during the Cold War). However, the United States never declared its own no-first-use policy because it was feared in Washington that such a declaration would not be sufficient to protect and at the same time maintain in an alliance with the US endangered states in Rimland Eurasia that could be perceived by the prevailing Soviet or Chinese (or other) from their own neighbourhood, if they suspected that the Americans would not respond with a nuclear weapon to every attack on an American ally. Hence, the Americans kept the Soviets and their other opponents in Eurasia uncertain as to whether they would be the first to use nuclear weapons in response to any aggression against this or that American ally.
The notion of “survival” in the context of Russia, its geography, disintegrative tendencies and historically labile power systems is dangerously fluid. Strategic games and simulations suggest that if Russia is threatened by the destruction of its forces in a large operation in a given theatre or operational direction, which can be seen as threatening the survival of Russia – i.e. the survival of the state apparatus and the given power system, then this would lead to the use of nuclear weapons under the so-called “theory of escalate to deescalate “.
This theory began to appear in military magazines in Russia in the late 1990s. Then ideas emerged to use a new kind of low-power tactical warhead to create a de-escalating effect in the conflict. Several effects are achieved in this way: it is a precision weapon system in which the Russians have traditionally been weaker than Americans, but equally effectively it leads to the elimination of goals, “by the way” allowing its user to obtain the psychological effect of “escalating dominance” (the impression of strength, which determines the ability to set rules and control the escalation process, having ever stronger arguments at its disposal, if someone tried to face it) mainly in the conventional conflict in the west and southwest of the country.
Russia can then count on achieving victory in the conflict by using low-power nuclear weapons on an operational scale, or to intimidate, in particular, a state that has no nuclear weapons and operates as part of a larger alliance. The interests of the other countries of the alliance are then separated from the interests of the country against which such weapons are used, imposing a solution to the conflict that is favourable to Russia, even if peaceful, which in itself changes the balance of power in the region, at the same time transforming the architecture of the region in line with Russian expectations.
This would indicate that in the event of a conflict with China or NATO, the Russians would opt for nuclear strikes ending conventional war, assuming that the opponent would accept a loss or concession to Russia instead of risking further nuclear escalation. It must be admitted, however, that the latest versions of this Russian doctrine no longer speak of the de-escalating use of nuclear weapons. Although this may only be a “cover” for the United States not to modernise its own nuclear tactical weapons, as announced by the new Washington administration. The current National Security Strategy of December 31, 2015 signed by Putin in this context is also much more antagonistic, as it directly accuses the United States of “instigating instability” and threatening Russia’s interests, and mentions the never-ending role of force as a factor in international relations.
In the Russian understanding, this is a dynamic state – an active action, which is in opposition to a passive state, which, of course, is active before the conflict, throughout the course of geopolitical rivalry, and even an already open conflict. It is then expressed in a coordinated package of political, diplomatic, military, scientific and technological and all other undertakings aimed at ensuring the desired “stability” in competition. That is, Russian deterrence is to provide strategic “stability” favourable to Russia and its geopolitical interests. In other words – the ideal is when the opponent cannot gain an advantage not contested by the other. Of course, thinking about “deterrence” and “stability” beyond the aspect of the great nuclear war between Moscow and Washington, the Russians are currently thinking primarily about rivalry with Americans and their influences and contesting the American ability to project power in Eurasia, including the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium. In the future, this may change if China’s military power increases on Russia’s southern perimeter, in which case China would become a direct rival and in view of China’s ability to project strength, Moscow try to enforce “deterrence”. Accordingly, the Russians are very sensitive to strategic stability perceived in this way.
Despite the exercise of nuclear strikes during military exercises, Russian procedures and practices do not define in a way known to others what is the loss threshold or escalation threshold that would trigger the use of nuclear weapons by the Russians.
Thus, Russia with this strategic attitude gains a lot of room for political and power maneuver, especially towards neighbouring countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Ukraine and Poland come to mind in this sense first. Especially Poland as a NATO country, but not having its own nuclear weapon, being the centre of gravity of the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance, with an unequal interest in relation to Germany or France in the event of a de-escalating use or threat of nuclear weapons being used by Russia in Polish territory, which would be the operational basis, gravity and the great logistics centre of the North Atlantic Alliance in the event of a war between Russia and NATO on the eastern flank.
This is the potential main opponent of the Polish Armed Forces which may come true both in the event of the Thucydides trap (the war in the Western Pacific of the United States with China, where Russia, due to its geopolitical location and the order revision policy, will take an active position, as it did successively in 1939 and 1941 at the time of the revision of the order) as well as in the case of the Kindelberger trap, when as a result of the possible withdrawal of US power from the CEE and the collapse of the current world order, a security vacuum will arise, and Russia will try taking advantage of the situation to seize buffer areas behind its western perimeter (take control of the Baltic States and connect Russia with the land corridor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, close full control of the territory of Belarus to the Bug and Brest, or overthrow the government in Kiev and introduce Russian troops into Ukraine all the way to Lviv and the Przemyśl Gate), which would directly violate (especially in the absence of NATO guarantee and in the absence of the US) the security foreground and sense of Poland’s security status radiating from its eastern buffer areas. That will change the grand strategy of Poland as it did in 1918-1921 because of the extremely vital national interest at stake.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
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