The Nuclear Taboo

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(pixabay.com)

 

After the end of the Cold War, the world underwent a profound transformation in this respect and is very much different today, less and more dangerous at the same time.

Less so because, according to the requirements of the New START Treaty, neither the USA nor Russia can have more than 1550 strategic nuclear warheads. More so because new nuclear powers have emerged, drawing the world into a new nuclear era.

 

Over 70 years of not using nuclear weapons have consolidated the “nuclear taboo” – i.e. the belief that the use of nuclear weapons may not be a reasonable objective of the military conflict or even a tool to achieve military-political objectives in war (including limited war in Eurasia).

 

While nuclear weapons have been successfully removed from the post-Soviet republics, which should be regarded as an effective means of reducing proliferation, the “nuclear club” has nevertheless expanded and now includes (at least) India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. If Iran comes to possess nuclear technology, it will probably be followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, then probably Egypt and perhaps the United Arab Emirates.

 

The escalating potential leading to local atomic exchange is now greater than it was during the Cold War, because there are simply more players in the “club”, including those competing with each other, like Pakistan and India; and in future perhaps Iran and Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

 

The potential for escalation is also increased by the fact that there is a predominance of offensive nuclear resources over defences against them, with smaller powers having small arsenals and here the offence can succeed, which may lead to a pre-emptive strike increasing the risk of nuclear exchange. Look no further for an example of such a potential exchange than between Israel and Iran.

Another element increasing the risk of escalation is the difference with the Cold War period expressed in the distance between opponents. It then took about 20-30 minutes to reach the US or Soviet Union, which gave it a good chance to create a fairly effective early warning system, which in turn gave time to a nuclear response, which in itself ensured mutual balancing by the fear of mutual destruction.

Attempts to install missiles in Cuba, Turkey or Europe were seen as potentially neutralising the possibility of retaliation and thus upsetting the balance guaranteed by mutual fear. The installation of Pershing II systems in Europe in 1983 resulted in the Soviets launching a semi-automatic rocket firing system to minimise the risk of retaliation. This system, reminiscent of the mechanism from the famous film by Stanley Kubrick, was called Perimeter.

 

Meanwhile, at more claustrophobic distances between rivals in Eurasia, the flight time of the rocket to the target – in the case of clashes between India and Pakistan, for example – is about 5-6 minutes. In the case of Russian Iskander rockets aimed at Poland from the Kaliningrad District or Belarus, it is even shorter.

 

New nuclear countries are also much smaller territorially than the US or Soviet Union, which may tempt a destructive pre-emptive nuclear attack with relatively small payloads. This is certainly the case with Israel, which in professional jargon is called by some “one bomb country” without the strategic depth to absorb nuclear explosion.

In addition, the neighbors of nuclear countries engaged in the exchange may not know one hundred percent whether the nuclear missile just launched from the mobile system is aimed at them or maybe at someone else. During the Cold War, only Canada was located on route of the US-USSR nuclear exchange. Today things are different: for example, Russia is on the way between China and the US. If Iran and Israel were to conduct such a clash, the missiles would fly over Turkey and Arab countries.

Welcome to the Second Nuclear Era. At Strategy&Future we will monitor how it unfolds and report back to you.

 

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

 

Jacek Bartosiak

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