(wikimedia.org)
Let me begin by saying that personally, I doubt there was ever a realistic chance of Fort Trump – understood as permanent basing of US troops in significant numbers – materializing. What’s more probable is some sort of prepositioning arrangement (APS, army prepositioned stock), like the one that is currently under construction in Powidz (central Poland), creating a surge capacity. Which is not to say more US troops will not end up stationed in Poland on a rotational basis; yesterday Politico reported, that Duda will meet Trump in Washington next Wednesday, with one of the reported topics being relocation of troops. On a side note, there was a lot of semantics involved in characterizing the presence of US assets in Poland; US Ambassador in Poland Georgette Mosbacher referred to it as “continuous” or “enduring” – but not permanent. With 9,500 US personnel being withdrawn from Germany, the likelihood of them ending up in Poland remains substantial.
Polish media, at least those supportive of the current government, discarded the recent Reuters report as biased, or even the result of a misinformation campaign. So did high ranking members of the Presidential Palace, as well as ambassador Mosbacher, who called the reporting “fake news”, adding that negotiations are on track.
What is certain, however, is that the supposed stumbling blocks in the project that the article mentions are interesting in the context of a broader US strategy vis a vis its allies, and structural pressures these alliances are subject to – chief of which can be summarized briefly by a question: “who’s paying for all this?”.
In June 2019, when the “Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Regarding U.S. Force Posture in Poland” was signed during President Duda’s visit to DC, Polish authorities suggested that part of the cost of the building proposed “Fort Trump” was to be covered by Poland. The Reuters report states that this has since been deemed to be insufficient by the US.
If true, this would bear some similarity to the still unconcluded negotiations over who bears the cost of stationing 28,000 US servicemen in South Korea. The Trump administration is adamant that Seoul significantly increases its share of the financial burden; this comes on top of the South Koreans covering nearly 90% of the $10b tab for the Camp Humphreys base. And it mirrors the seeming belief of the current DC administration, that the US does not need to “show the money”, that the role it plays as a security guarantor will be sufficient to keep old allies within its camp during its showdown with China.
This attitude has already fallen flat with the Germans, who are clearly beginning to distance themselves from the US and its rivalry with China. The danger is same may apply to plans such as the EPN (Economic Prosperity Network), and others thrown around by the DC administration as a counter to Chinese economic expansion. So far, it would appear that the US has been largely OK with the dichotomy between the US provided security and prosperity made in China. Nothing exemplifies this better than the question of 5G, and Huawei’s participation in the build-out of 5G networks across the globe.
The problem is that unless the US offers a viable alternative to Chinese economic expansion, even if the said alternative would not be equal to that presented by Beijing, it is unlikely to succeed in its efforts. One example often mentioned by pundits, and members of the Trump administration alike would be to create a US-made – or at least US-owned alternative to Huawei’s products. While US-based companies will not be able to develop complete 5G ecosystems quickly enough to challenge Huawei’s preponderance, they could – with the Federal government’s support – go for a shortcut by acquiring one of the European companies (either Nokia, or Ericsson), and providing its products to allies on a commercial basis. This idea was floated by the current US Attorney General, William Barr; much like the plan of buying Greenland from Denmark, this far less outlandish effort has also failed to take off. As a result, the US lacks this pivotal technology, as its companies and government are unwilling to dish out the capex necessary to develop it. It is also unwilling, or unable to spend the money to circumvent the issue.
Worse still, this state of affairs is unlikely to change anytime soon; in the coming months, the attention of the US will be focused inwards. Both the ongoing pandemic and the shock it caused to the US economy, as well as the social unrest rocking American society are likely to become central to deliberations of the US establishment – not military bases in remote locations. Then an intense election campaign will begin, lasting at least until November. Should Trump lose – and judging by the polls, this is a realistic scenario – the liminal period shall begin, lasting until Biden’s inauguration on January 20th. This means that the United States will find itself in a state of inertia, lasting anywhere from 5 to 7 months.
Then there is the question of where the base should be located.
Apparently, the Poles would like to see US troops stationed “close to the Belarussian border”, which means east of the Vistula river. This is important, because – should a war at NATO’s eastern flank erupt – US troops would be closer to the area of operations (this being the Baltic States), and these troops would likely be involved in combat in the early stages, drawing the United States into war; this alone would hopefully serve to deter the Kremlin from making a move on the Baltics or Poland in the first place. It would mean that the US would have skin in the game from the get-go. If the report is true, this is what US stakeholders want to avoid, and what the Poles want.
Just like South Korea and Japan are “a cornerstone and a lynchpin” – as put by a Hudson Institute report – of the US in the Indo-Pacific, Poland is a cornerstone and a lynchpin of US power projection in Eastern Europe. No military counter to Russian aggression can happen unless Poland gets its hands dirty. Should the Kremlin commence military operations in the Baltics it will be down to Poland to step up. Moreover, Polish forces would likely have to go at it principally alone. Both infrastructural limitations, and Russian A2/AD measures would mean that allied reinforcements arriving by land, air and by sea would be severely limited. This would mean that the Polish forces would have to face Russians in combat around the Suwałki Corridor and in the Baltics, investing significant resources in their defence, while simultaneously creating an opening for the Russians to strike Westwards through the territory of Belarus.
Some argue that the current force posture and dislocation of US and NATO forces in the Baltic States is insufficient numerically and is stationed in the wrong places, thus being more of a token involvement than a real fighting force. Current places of dislocation of US/NATO assets in the Baltics are such that these units could very realistically be routed by the Russians, should they commence military ops there; this is because the goal of the Russian forces would likely be not invading and occupying the entirety of the Baltic states, capital cities included, but rather:
Current force posture of US troops in the Baltic states is such that none of the above mentioned Russian military objectives could be foiled, unless Poland commits its forces in defence of the Baltics immediately, effectively fighting alone, and creating a tremendous liability by opening up the Belarussian theater far and wide for the Russians to exploit; the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army is placed conveniently on this operational direction. The distance between the Belarussian border city of Brest and Warsaw is under 150km along a flat terrain very conducive for offensive operations. Placing US assets in Poland, in the right place, on a permanent basis, could alter the calculations of the Russian General Staff.
There are a number of concerns Poles may have when it comes to US posture in CEE, chief of which is the fact that the US clearly – and correctly – considers the Western Pacific to be its primary area of interest. The issue we have is that the US will revert to (continuing along?) the traditional ways of maritime powers, shying away from putting the boots on the ground, and tangling itself in uncomfortable alliances and permanent arrangements. This is understandable, as it could get locked into scenarios that are not conducive to attaining its long term political goals, chief of which could be prying Russia away from its cooperation with the Chinese (as stipulated by many, including prominent members of the Republican establishment, e.g. the likes of Pat Buchanan). Granted, there are a number of serious hurdles to this scenario, perhaps making this untenable, but hurdles are not something that should (or could) make a statesman rest easy at night. Rational as this course of action may be for the US, however, it would be a deal-breaker for Warsaw.
Autor
Albert Świdziński
Director of Analysis at Strategy&Future.
Strategy&Future
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