(wikipedia.org)
Regardless of whether the ongoing changes in the world’s climate are man-induced, the reality of their occurrence is a fact. The aggravation of weather patterns in recent years and its consequences for human and natural systems have been solidly documented,[1] thus allowing researchers to improve the still imperfect probabilistic models[2] of the evolving climate trajectories[3]. This, in turn, allows us to map out the taxonomy of the likely consequences of climate change.[4]
Among the many facets of climate change, the most politically tangible dimension in which its effects will unfold is geopolitics. While the threat of climate change will tangle the sovereign realm unevenly, with some states bracing for impact as we speak and others living in denial of the threat to world order, the changing climate is likely to produce tremendous challenges to the international order.[5] It is its dual amplifying quality that makes climate change so important for policy analysis; a warming climate can multiply the impact of existing threats and vulnerabilities in indigenous environments, and at the same time render these local threats potentially more global in nature.
As the most important effects of climate on conflict and governance are indirect and are reflected in various effects over time, the relationship between climate change and international security is not yet well understood. Lasting climate changes in turn will generate a whole range of different impacts on the planet and its systems. Their effects are costly[6]and diffuse, exacerbating stresses to the critical resources[7] that directly concern national and global security, including water[8], food (crops[9] and fish[10] in particular), as well as energy systems[11]. In consequence, climate change adds further stress onto the already heated geostrategic landscape.[12] As the impacts of changes in climate and our understanding of them have increased[13], a growing body of research demonstrates that climate change is both a direct threat to international security and a “threat multiplier”[14] for the global security landscape. Cumulatively, these risks can significantly challenge a world based on an international system of cooperating sovereign states.[15] This challenge is widely seen as contributing to increased state fragility.[16] An understanding of how climate change may affect political[17], socioeconomic[18] and environmental conditions[19] depends in part on the understanding of the progressing climate change as well as on its projected possible trajectories, and entails the identification and analysis of the effects of rising and extreme temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and extreme weather on resources and livelihoods and security.[20]
Historically, theorists of geopolitics have been divided among those who view the physical world as static, seeing the physical conditions of geography as a given (Mackinder[21]; see also Ratzel[22]) and those who consider them to be dynamic, and therefore susceptible to changes relevant to human action (Spykman[23], see also Reclus[24]). Given the role of climate change as a risk multiplier and the new interdependencies between different sources of risk[25] and the resulting need to include them in the international security analysis[26], it is that latter “dynamic” view which appears more pertinent today.
The perception of climate change as a threat to the international order is rising steadily among military[27] and intelligence communities[28]. The United States is particularly well aware of the myriad ways in which the changing climate is likely to undermine the projection powers of its military[29], although other global[30] and regional[31] powers are not lagging much behind. In fact, one may even be inclined to think that the proposition that climate change poses a threat for international security has amassed greater support than the claim that climate change is human-driven. All in all, the debate on how security planning should best accommodate both the certainty of climate change and the uncertainty about the kind and extent of its consequences points to the urgency of such accommodation, although the discussion continues as to the means that must be employed.
Accordingly, it is now claimed that the fact that the aggravation of weather patterns and other climate changes may not (yet) be forecasted with precision shall not decrease the need for phenomena[32] such as climate exposure[33], climate risk[34] and climate stressors[35] to be factored into security planning. In particular, these notions should find their permanent place in security parlance and thinking whenever the following three spheres are concerned.
First, the impact of climate change must be included in the assessments of the viability of global supply chains. Climate change endangers the network of global supply chains via a number of identifiable systematic risks[36]. From the geopolitical standpoint, the gravest of these risks concentrate around a handful of the world’s key maritime chokeholds[37], although other sea hubs of regional significance will also be affected[38]. Climate change can also increase the possibility of tensions between major powers over zones subject to competing territorial claims, which could have important implications for the world order.[39]
Second, climate considerations must be included in both contemporary and prospective geopolitical analysis. Climate change will alter not only the conditions of natural systems such as ecosystems, habitats and animal species, but also the conditions of social systems, i.e. societies and how they interact with each other. In the context of geopolitical debates and future threats, it is necessary to examine how the changing character of some of the fundamental elements of geography can affect both internal and international politics.[40]Because changes in climate manifest themselves unevenly across the globe, with even mild climatic variations expected to portend significant consequences in the medium to long run, no region can afford not to include climate change in its strategic and security planning.[41]Moreover, states should beware of what might be referred to as the “butterfly effect”[42], present when the effects of climate change unfold in far-flung places and have an indirect but consequential bearing on the power balance and the regional security landscape in other parts of the world.[43]
Third, the impact of climate change on power projection and military operability cannot be underestimated. Climate change is likely to affect power projection of major powers in a variety of ways. As a consequence, the military must keep track of climate change in terms of planning and adaptation efforts, in accordance with the environments in which it operates.[44] While militaries have always had to cope with the weather, climate change is altering their operational environment in ways thus far unseen.[45] With regard to the United States alone, the rising sea levels[46] threatening its military installations[47] and military readiness[48], the changing weather complicating operational logistics[49] and the military’s priorities[50], combined with the reassessment of strategic priorities, may limit the American foreign presence or assistance lent to its allies, for example in Eastern Europe. Oftentimes climate change not only acts as a threat multiplier in theatres of operations, but has direct implications for military capabilities as it entails domestic calls for assistance from civil actors. In some cases, it can even directly affect military capabilities and strength, given that extreme weather and floods place a considerable additional burden on its overall capacity to act.[51]The extent to which countries’ military capabilities are affected by climate change depends on how they respond and whether they integrate climate change impacts into their defence strategies and policies, particularly in risk assessment, early warning, surveillance and operational preparations. The need for “adjusting and recalibrating the equipment, training, interoperability, and infrastructure” will only continue to rise.[52]
The consequences of climate change are materializing in the above-mentioned spheres with an ever-increasing intensity. As such, they are destined to become a significant factor shaping the global balance of powers and the broader international order. It is therefore crucial to distinguish between this phenomenon of occurring and justly expected climate changes from the question of whether the occurrence of such changes is due to human-driven actions, and if so, how they could be mitigated.[53] Adopting such a distinction is crucial insofar as it allows us to appropriately contextualize the variety of threats which climate change presents for the dynamics of the international order regardless of their raison d’être. On the individual plane, factoring in climate change into a state’s strategic and security planning allows for better preparation in case its effects affect directly or indirectly that state’s security and other interests[54], including through abrupt[55], “black swan” events[56] or human-derived efforts destined to counter such effects[57]. Satellites and drones provide new ways to monitor global changes quickly and efficiently, as the earth observation is rapidly becoming a tool of national and international security importance.[58] In the accelerating global reshuffle, climate resilience may well come to be the factor tipping the balance of power in favor of those state(s) which developed an appropriate climate strategy, so as to allow them to cash in on the geopolitical rearrangement against other states which had neglected the seriousness of the threat-multiplying feature of climate change.
[1] National Centers for Environmental Information, Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, (2020). Available at: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions. The United States alone has experienced at least 265 such extreme weather events since 1980 in which overall damages were above USD $1 billion – for
a total cost approaching $2 trillion. At the global level, similar estimates are more difficult to quantify, but weather extremes are more frequent and devastating each year in climates thus far labelled as temperate, where infrastructure and response capabilities are less developed.
[2] U.S. Global Change Research Program, National Climate Assessment (2014). Available at: https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report.
[3] See IPCC, Climate Models and Their Evaluation (2007). Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg1-chapter8-1.pdfl; A. Buis, Study Confirms Climate Models are Getting Future Warming Projections Right, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (9 January 2020), Available at: https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2943/study-confirms-climate-models-are-getting-future-warming-projections-right/.
[4] For a brief, documented overview of selected climate changes most likely to affect geopolitics see P. Haldén, Geopolitics in the changing geography of the Baltic Sea Region: the challenges of climate change, Global Affairs, vol. 4 (2018), p. 538-539. Approximate quotation:
“A warmer climate generates five main direct effects : (i) increased volatility in all weather systems, which makes them more chaotic and unpredictable, thus rendering agriculture and horticulture and more difficult; (ii) increased mean temperatures which are likely to sabotage a wide range of ecosystems, including the habitats and bodies of a large number of species; (iii) inducing shifts in precipitation patterns, leading to droughts and floods that upset ecosystems and human societies; (iv) an increased mean temperatures cause the polar ice caps to melt, thus decreasing the Earth’s capacity to reflect sunlight, the so-called albedo effect, which in turn makes the atmosphere even warmer, thus exacerbating global warming; (v) increased temperatures melt the huge belt of permafrost covering much of northern Russia and Canada, thus increasing the risk of collapse of large infrastructure like houses or roads, in the affected areas, and releasing vast quantities of methane – a far more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide – into the atmosphere that furthermore exacerbates global warming.” Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502621?needAccess=true
[5] Supra 4, p. 543: “In concrete terms, we can imagine that climate change effects could, under certain domestic and international circumstances, lead to expansionist state behaviour, perhaps even inter-state conflict. If climate change causes enough damage to valuable land, e.g. agricultural land or land suited to large industries, that cannot be compensated through the world economy, e.g. through imports or outsourcing, then the possession and acquisition of land would once more become a valuable resource, perhaps so valuable that it is worth fighting for. This would, in theoretical terms, amount to impacts that exceed the buffering capacity of a society in such a way that interpretative choices are narrowed down into a particular framework and geopolitical antagonism may result.”
[6] See P. Watkiss, J. Troeltzsch, K. McGlade (ed.), The Economic Cost of Climate Change in Europe: Synthesis Report on State of Knowledge and Key Research Gaps, Policy brief by the COACCH project (2018). Available at: https://www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/publication/2018/2811-coacch-review-synthesis-updated-june-2018.pdf. In Europe alone, high-level scenarios of warming are expected to cost the EU economy over €700 billion annually by the 2080s.
[7] See National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (2012), p. (iv). Available at: https://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf.
In the near-term future, population and economic growth are expected to significantly increase pressure on resources. Global demand for food, water and energy is projected to increase by approximately 35%, 40% and 50% respectively, by 2030 as compared to 2012.
[8] See Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Clingendael), Planetary Security Initiative, Ready for take-off? Military responses to climate change, Report (2020), p. 6. Available at: https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/PSI_Ready_for_takeoff.pdf. See also IPCC, Climate Change and Land, IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems (2019). Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/; J. Selby, The geopolitics of water in the Middle East: fantasies and realities, Third World Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2005), pp. 329-349. Available at: http://users.sussex.ac.uk/~js208/thirdworldquarterly.pdf; A. Sorg, T. Bolch, M. Stoffel, O. Solomina, M. Beniston, Climate change impacts on glaciers and runoff in Tien Shan (Central Asia), Nature Climate Change 2, no. 10 (2012): 725-731. Available at (restricted access): https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1592; D. Viviroli, H. Dürr, B. Messerli, M. Meybeck and R. Weingartner, Mountains of the world, water towers for humanity: Typology, mapping, and global significance, Water resources research 43(7) (2007). Available at: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2006WR005653; D. Viviroli, B. Messerli, B. Schädler and R. Weingartner, Water towers in a changing world, Mountains and climate change: From understanding to action (2009). Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/i2869e/i2869e00.pdf; UNESCO, Mountains as the water towers of the world (2014). Available at:
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/SDGs_and_mountains_water_EN.pdf; UNESCO, Our global water towers. Ensuring ecosystem services from mountains under climate change, Policy Brief (2014). Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000230850.
Boutros Boutros Ghali, at the time the Secretary General of the United Nations, once famously stated that the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics. Had Ghali lived today, he might have said the same about any other region. Rising temperatures accelerate evaporation rates, desertification as well as soil degradation, leading to droughts and heatwaves occurring more often, with greater intensity and threatening freshwater supplies by saltwater intrusion. As a result, water availability and agricultural production are declining worldwide. In several barren areas, such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Mali militant groups have already taken advantage of the stress surrounding natural resources to gain support or recruit new fighters. Another set of problems concerns natural water towers. For example, two billion people depend on water originating on the Tibetan Plateau, and distributed via rivers regulated by an ever-increasing number of geopolitically consequential dams, most of them built by China. Hundreds of millions more rely on drinking water from major global water towers, such as the massive Andes, Rockies, Tien Shan, Caucasus and Alps, as well as the Ethiopian and Guinean Highlands. In each case, as explained by Oxford University scholar T. Sternberg: “climate change affects glaciers, water resources and runoff. If it were only a matter of harnessing water from a nation’s territorial mountain, the issue would be structural; the complication comes when water flows through several states. Riparian nations stress natural, human and economic rights to water that crosses their realm, yet without physical control, states remain vulnerable to upstream users. This gives a hegemonic dynamic to control of transboundary water towers with significant implications for national and regional security.”
[9] See S. Tushar, K. A. Cherkauer, Impacts of future climate change on soil frost in the midwestern United States, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 115 (2010). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1029/2009JD012188.61; J. Lenne, Climate change, crop plant diseases and future food production, World Agriculture. (2018). Available at: http://www.world-agriculture.net/article/climate-change-crop-plant-diseases-and-future-food-production;
C. A. Deutsh et al., Increase in crop losses to insect pests in a warming climate, Science (2018). Available at: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6405/916.editor-summary; Chapter on Extreme Weather in National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2014). Available at: https://nca2014.global-change.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather; The State of Food and Agriculture: Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016). Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6030e.pdf; Climate Change and Food Security: A Framework Document, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2008). Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/k2595e/k2595e00.htm; M. McElroy, D. J. Baker, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security, Harvard University Center for the Environment (2012), p. 12. Available at: https://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/climate_extremes_report_2012-12-04.pdf; E. Winkler, How the climate crisis could become a food crisis overnight, The Washington Post (2017). Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/how-the-climate-crisis-could-become-a-food-crisis-overnight/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e9f324e6c009.
Global food security depends on the reliability and continuity of production of four crops: maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans. Together with many other foods, they are the staples of the global food system – a complex and highly dynamic web of transfers and interactions. Its diverse impact on the stability of the local, regional and global food system will continue to go far beyond its direct effects on agricultural production, affecting both food availability and the resilience of basic ecosystems. The effects of climate on food systems, reaching well beyond the impact on agricultural production, include disruption to planting and harvesting due to poor weather conditions, deterioration of soil quality, exhaustion of fossil aquifers, accelerated freeze-thaw cycles in spring and autumn, greater risk of spread of agricultural pests and diseases, as well as damaged shipping infrastructure due to flooding. Changes in the length and stability of the world’s growing seasons, altered regularity of rainfall patterns with the resulting droughts, floods or seasonal changes are already affecting agricultural production. For example, due to high temperatures and reduced rainfall, in 2010 Russia suffered reduced grain production in the southern parts of the country, resulting in a surge in world wheat prices. Russia then banned exports in response to national food security concerns. This decision put even greater upward pressure on global food prices, with severe shocks being felt in particular in the regions dependent on wheat imports. As a result, climate stress in Russia contributed to increased unrest in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt in early 2011.
[10] I. Azzam, The Dispute Between France and Brazil over Lobster Fishing in the Atlantic. International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008)13(4): p. 1453-1459; British Sea Fishing, The Cherbourg Dispute (2017), Available at: http://britishseafishing.co.uk/the-cherbourg-dispute/; HM Government, Cod Wars, N. Archives (2017). Available at: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/cod-wars.htm; S. Soroos, The Turbot War: Resolution of an International Fishery Dispute, in Conflict and the Environment(1997), p. 235-252;
Piroddi et al., Historical changes of the Mediterranean Sea ecosystem: modelling the role and impact of primary productivity and fisheries changes over time Scientific Reports 7 (2017). Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/srep44491; M. Petty, Vietnam protesters denounce China on anniversary of navy battle, Thomson Reuters (2016). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-vietnam/vietnam-protesters-denounce-china-on-anniversary-of-navy-battle-idUSKCN0WG0C9;
Pham, The Use or Threat of Force in the South China Sea Disputes Since 1945: A Timeline (2016). Available at (restricted access): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303361821_The_Use_or_Threat_of_Force_in_the_South_China_Sea_Disputes_Since_1945_A_Timeline;
DuBois King, Climate Change and Vietnamese Fisheries: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention, in C. Werrell and F. Femia (ed.), The U.S. Asia-Pacific Rebalance, National Security and Climate Change, Center for Climate and Security, 2015), pp. 55–63. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/ccs_us_asia_pacific-rebalance_national-security-and-climate-change.pdf; W. N. Adger et al., Human Security, in IPCC Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 755–91. Available at: https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/20276/WGIIAR5-Chap12_HumanSecurity.pdf?sequence=1; K. M. Brander, Global fish production and climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 50 (2007). Available at: https://www.pnas.org/content/104/50/19709; W. L. Cheung, R. A. Watson, D. Pauly, Signature of ocean warming in global fisheries catch, Nature 497, no. 7449 (2013). Available at (restricted access): https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12156; T. Wheeler, J. Von Braun, Climate change impacts on global food security, Science 341 (2013). Available at (restricted access): https://science.sciencemag.org/content/341/6145/508; A. Doumbouya, O. T. Camara,
J. Mamie, J. F. Intchama, A. Jarra, S. Ceesay, A. Guèye et al., Assessing the effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of illegal fishing: the case of West Africa. Frontiers in Marine Science 4 (2017). Available at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050/full; A. Jacobs, China’s Appetite Pushes Fisheries to the Brink, The New York Times (30 April 2017). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/chinas-appetite-pushes-fisheries-to-the-brink.html?_r=0
With almost one-third of world’s fish stocks overfished and marine populations reduced by almost 50% since 1970, fisheries face risks from the Arctic, to the South China Sea, and to the Great Lakes region in Africa. At the same time, the rise of an international, rules-based fishing order has, on occasion, been sorely tested in more direct ways. That was the case during the 1952-1976‘Cod Wars’ between Britain and Iceland, the climax of which was the latter’s threat to leave NATO which, had it materialized, would have exposed Europe to Soviet submarines operating in the GUIK gap. Other disputes have also occurred between France and Brazil (the so-called ‘Lobster Wars’ in the early 1960s); in 1993 between France and Britain (the ‘Cherbourg Incident’); and in 1996 between Canada and Spain (the ‘Turbot War’). The Mediterranean, which has already lost over 30% of its marine mammals and 40% of its fish population due to overfishing has likewise led to many disputes, including between the EU and Morocco, Spain and the UK, or Turkey and Greece. However, it is the South China Sea which has been the scene of the most worrying developments as of late. Increasingly warm waters drive fish stocks to migrate northward into colder, often contested waters. As the populations of small nations bordering the sea, such as Vietnam, are highly dependent on its fish stocks as a major source of protein, fishing fleets are likely to venture farther north, and with greater frequency, into zones that are subject to competing claims between their nation of origin, particularly China. Vietnam and China have repeatedly clashed over fishing rights in the past, including in 1964 and 2005 when skirmishes have left many Vietnamese crewmen dead. Climatic factors present new and unprecedented risks to fisheries, including rising sea temperatures, ocean acidification, rising sea levels and changes in surface and deep currents. These changes may well stir up conflicts as states find it necessary to exploit declining fish stocks extending beyond sovereign Exclusive Economic Zones (200 nautical miles) and traditional fishing grounds.
[11] United States Army War College, Implications of Climate Change for the U.S. Army, Report (2019), p. 17. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/07/implications-of-climate-change-for-us-army_army-war-college_2019.pdf.
Power plants, transmission infrastructure and distribution system components are becoming increasingly vulnerable to a variety of risks. In the United States alone, power transformers are on average over 40 years old and 70% of transmission lines are 25 years old or older. In most countries, power grids are susceptible to falling victims of cyber, physical and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, space weather and other natural events, such as climate change stressors.
[12] M. McElroy, D. J. Baker, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Center for the Environment (2012). Available at: https://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/climate_extremes_report_2012-12-04.pdf
; W. Neil Adger et al., Human Security, IPCC Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (2014), pp. 755–791. Available at: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap12_FINAL.pdf;
M. Cronin (ed.), Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, Center for New American Security (2012); E. Rosenberg, D. Titley, and A. Wiker, Arctic 2015 and Beyond: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership in the High North, Policy Brief, Center for New American Security (2014).
[13] See S. M. Hsiang, M. Burke, E. Miguel, Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict, Science 341 (2013), pp. 1212 – 1226. Available at: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/341/6151/1235367;
B. S. Levy, V. W. Sidel, J. A. Patz, Climate Change and Collective Violence, Annu. Rev. Public Health (2017), pp. 241–57. Available at: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031816-044232;
[14] U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (2014), p.8. Therein the DoD describes climate change as a “threat multiplier that will aggravate stressors abroad, such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.” Available at: https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; U.S. Department of Defence, National Security Implications Of Climate-Related Risks And A Changing Climate, Report (2015), p.8. Available at: https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-implications-of-climate-change.pdf; CNA Military Advisory Board Report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (2007), p.6. Available at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf; Environment and Energy Study Institute, The national security impacts of climate change, Issue Brief, (2017), p. 3-4. Available at: https://www.eesi.org/files/IssueBrief_Climate_Change_Security_Implications.pdf; Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Clingendael), Planetary Security Initiative, Ready for take-off? Military responses to climate change, Report (2020), p. 92. Available at: https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/PSI_Ready_for_takeoff.pdf; Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (2011). Available at: http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/China-Defense-White-Paper_2010_English-Chinese_Annotated.pdf.
China has acknowledged the threat to security resulting from climate change already in its Military’s 2010 official White Paper. While China’s becoming the world’s largest polluter and gas emitter was concomitant to its extraordinary growth, China is now arguably the most consistently committed to combating global warming of all the world powers.
[15] C. E. Werrell, F. Femia, Climate Change, The Erosion of State Sovereignty, and World Order, Brown Journal of International Affairs (2018), pp. 221-222. Available at: http://bjwa.brown.edu/22-2/climate-change-the-erosion-of-state-sovereignty-and-world-order/
[16] IMCCS Expert Group, The World Climate and Security Report (2020), pp. 11-12. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/world-climate-security-report-2020_2_13-1.pdf; C. Werell, F. Femia, The Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent. A Climate Security Governance Framework for the 21st Century, Council for Strategic Risks, The Center for Climate Security (2019), p. 6. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/the-responsibility-to-prepare-and-prevent_a-climate-security-governance-framework-for-the-21st-century_2019_10.pdf; Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security (2013), p.31: “The more severe effects of climate change, in particular the increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters, compounded by competition over scarce natural resources, may contribute to instability and tension around the globe, especially in fragile states”. Available at: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2013-01/apo-nid33996.pdf
[17] M. McElroy, D. J. Baker, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Center for the Environment (2012), p. 11. Available at: https://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/climate_extremes_report_2012-12-04.pdf: “Multipliers of political instability threats: Political instability, in the form of coups, civil war, and other forms of internal political violence constitutes a major U.S. national security threat for which strong possible connections to climate stress have been identified.”
[18] Ibid., p. 5.; J. Vivekananda, N. Bhatiya, Coastal Megacities vs. the Sea: Climate and Security in Urban Spaces in C. E. Werrell, F. Femia (ed.), The New Geostrategic Landscape of the Anthropocene, The Center for Climate and Security (2017), p. 59. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/epicenters-of-climate-and-security_the-new-geostrategic-landscape-of-the-anthropocene_2017_06_091.pdf.
An important societal implication of global warming in the short term is not that parts of the earth will experience higher temperatures, increased precipitation and more droughts, but that extremes are likely to become more frequent and widespread. An anomaly that previously had a probability of occurrence once in 100-years may, for instance, be now expected to occur every 10 or 30 years. Similarly important implication for the society is the often-ignored question of the effects of even small-scale climate change, due for example to disasters or resource security, which are likely to manifest themselves following climate-induced disruptions to deliver services, economic losses and unemployment, failure to effectively manage migration or the increasingly marginalized communities.
[19] Government Office for Science, The Future of Food and Farming (2011). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-of-food-and-farming; Government Office for Science, Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (2011). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-global-environmental-change-future-challenges-and-opportunities;
Government Office for Science, Future Flooding (2004). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-flooding
The above studies, commissioned by the government of the United Kingdom, reveal the various social, technological and economic dimensions of interaction in which climate change is connected to the global food and agricultural system, the international migration patterns and how it drives flood risks, pointing to the need to approach the physics of climate change not in isolation, but in a holistic manner.
[20] See The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), Climate Change and Security in Eastern Europe: Republic of Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine. Regional Assessment(2017). Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/355496.pdf. The ENVSEC report provides a handy definition of what an assessment of the effects of climate change should comprise in order to increase their understanding: “The assessment of the effects of climate change on vulnerability focuses on security implications, and identifies how the hazards related to climate change, in combination with other cumulative pressures, may affect the environmental, socioeconomic and political conditions, and how these changed conditions may affect security and stability within and across borders. This assessment necessarily includes a consideration of the climate change adaptation capacity and resilience of governments, institutions and key sectors. It also examines how climate change and the other pressures play out in socioeconomic and environmental terms at the local, national and regional levels.”
[21] H. J. Mackinder, The geographical pivot of history, The Geographical Journal, 23 (1904), p. 421–437.
[22] F. Ratzel, Politische Geographie oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehres und des Krieges (1903, 2nd ed.).
[23] N. J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace Harcourt, Brace and Company (1944), p. 23.
Spykman’s perception of the role of geography and its functions was more nuanced than that of many other geopoliticians. Spykman emphasized the relevance of the dynamics in geopolitical regions of the world, which are likewise determined by factors other than geography. Accordingly, he saw the progressing political, environmental and technological developments against the backdrop of the essentially static geography as possessing significant bearing for relations between nations. Although climatic considerations were central to his geopolitical thinking, they seem to have been forgotten. In his own words, “[t]he geographic location of a state in the world is of basic importance in defining its problems of security. It conditions and influences all other factors for the reason that world locations determines the climatic zone and thereby the economic structure, and regional location determines potential enemies and perhaps even the limits of a state’s role in a system of collective security.”
[24] E. Reclus, Nouvelle geographie universelle la terre et les hommes, Librairie Hachette (1885).
[25] See C. Parthemore, J. Nolan (ed.), Report One: A Framework for Understanding and Managing the Intersection of Climate Change, Nuclear Affairs, and Security, Working Group on Climate, Nuclear, and Security Affairs, The Center for Climate and Security (2017). Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/working-group-on-climate-nuclear-and-security-affairs_report-one_2017_11_151.pdf; C. Parthemore, J. Nolan (ed.), Report Two: A Clear Path for Reducing Complex Threats, Working Group on Climate, Nuclear, and Security Affairs, The Center for Climate and Security (2018). Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/working-group-on-climate-nuclear-security-affairs-report-two_2018_05.pdf; C. Parthemore, A. Rezzonico, Increasing Concern over Climate and Security Trends in Nuclear Weapon Capable States, Report from the 3rd Convening of the Working Group on Climate, Nuclear, and Security Affairs, (2019). Available at: https://councilonstrategicrisk.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/increasing-concern-over-climate-and-security-trends-in-nuclear-weapon-capable-states_briefer-2_2019_03_07.pdf; A. Rezzonico, Climate Change and Nuclear Developments: A Growing Security Nexus, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 39, Number 2 (2019) pp. 139-147. Available at: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/751653/pdf. One vital dimension in which climate change acts as a threat multiplier for global security is its intersection with the risks associated with nuclear technology. For example, many nuclear reactors continue to be built along coastlines, such as in Egypt, thus increasing the risk of extreme climate impacts on their existing or planned nuclear facilities and on their territory. Similarly, a changing geostrategic nuclear supplier market could have a negative influence on safety and security if not managed properly. The need to secure nuclear materials from malicious actors becomes all the more urgent as climate impacts put governments’ capabilities under severe strain. Globally, improving crisis prevention and response where nuclear programmes are located will require climate change and stronger nuclear safety nets than they are currently.
[26] D. King, D. Schrag, Z. Dadi, Q. Ye, A. Ghosh, Climate Change: A Risk Assessment, Centre for Science and Policy (2015), p. 24. Available at:
http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/1/climate-change–a-risk-assessment-v11.pdf
[27] IMCCS Expert Group, The World Climate and Security Report (2020), p. 7. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/world-climate-security-report-2020_2_13-1.pdf. The IMCCS Expert Group administered a survey in December 2019 to assess the perceptions of climate security risks in the coming decades among a select group of 56 security and military experts and practitioners from across the globe. The top three findings from this survey were: (i) 2020-2040: Rapidly increasing risks to global security: 100% of the climate security risks assessed will increase in the next twenty years (2020-2040) – most to significant or higher levels for global security; (ii) 2030: Significant or higher risks to global security from water stress. 93% of the security and military respondents perceived that climate change effects on water security will present significant or higher risks to global security in ten years (2030), and 91% perceived those risks as severe or catastrophic in twenty years (2040); (iii) 2040: A confluence of significant risks to global security. Most of the security and military respondents perceive that climate change effects on the following phenomena will present a significant or higher risk to global security in twenty years (2040): Water security (98% of respondents); Forced displacement and scale and tempo of natural disasters (96%); Food security (94%); Conflict within nations (86%); Conflict between nations (79%).
[28] National Intelligence Council, Implications for US National Security of Anticipated Climate Change, Report (2016). Available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Implications_for_US_National_Security_of_Anticipated_Climate_Change.pdf; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, Report (2017). Available at:
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf; House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing on National Security Implications of Climate Change (5 June 2019 2019). Video available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCheD2L-zDY. The U.S. intelligence reports predict severe climate change effects unfolding over the next years, including projected occurrence of more extreme weather and stresses natural systems such as oceans, lakes, rivers, ground water, reefs, and forests. Climate change is labelled as a long-term force that will alter temperatures, precipitation and extreme weather events in various regions of the world, impacting agriculture and water supply, especially in fragile and failing states. Sea level rise, extreme coastal events and localized air pollution will likewise affect migration patterns and infrastructure investments.
[29] T. P. Kelly, Global Climate Change Implications for the Untied States Navy, The U.S. Naval War College (1990). Available at: http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf. The US Navy was most likely the first to have started pondering the impact of climate change on the military. Illustrative of the military’s climate concerns was the 2016 speech by the U.S. Air Force General Ron Keys (ret.): “[W]e have 19 bases that we consider jewels in our crown of capability that are going to be affected by sea level rise. And it doesn’t have to rise eight feet. It only has to rise a couple of inches, and a good nor’easter pulls in, and all of a sudden we’re under water. If you look at Langley Air Force Base where our Raptors reside, it’s only seven feet above mean sea level right now. The problem is the land is subsiding, sea level is rising, the currents are changing. We could, in about fifteen years, have 100 days of tidal flooding. Which means with just the normal high tide, we lose access to certain parts of our base… We need to start considering, what can we do? Now I can build a moat, or a barrier around Langley Air Force Base, but the problem is a lot of my people live in Newport News, live in Hampton. A lot of my electricity comes in from outside. My fuel comes in from outside. So at some point we get to the point: ‘I’ve got to move to higher ground.’ And we have started talking about that because that’s going to be a bloodletting when we tell the Congressman from Virginia that we’re picking up Langley Air Force Base and we’re going to Oklahoma. That’s not going to play well. So we need to start talking about that.” Available at: https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/07/07/general-keys-the-military-thinks-climate-change-is-serious/
[30] Supra, 15.
[31] See Canada’s Defence Policy (2019), pp. 50-52. Available at: http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf; Strategy for Australia’s National Security (2017), pp. 31, 40. Available at: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2013-01/apo-nid33996.pdf; German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr White Paper (2016), p. 42. Available at: https://www.gmfus.org/publications/white-paper-german-security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr; HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015), pp. 66-67. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf; Italy’s Ministry of Defence, White Paper for International Security and Defence (2015), pp. 24-25. Available at: http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/07_Luglio/White%20book.pdf; France’s Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale (2013), pp. 46, 50. Available at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/politique-de-defense/le-livre-blanc-2013/le-livre-blanc-2013.
[32] Governmental, non-governmental and academic institutions use a variety of climate terms to refer to similar phenomena. The climate terms used below correspond to U.S. government guidelines.
[33] IPCC Report (2014), p. 123: “The presence of people, livelihoods, species or ecosystems, environmental functions, services, and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected” by climate change and variability as a function of their location.
[34] USAID (2017), p. 24: “The potential for negative consequences due to changing climatic conditions where the outcome is uncertain”.
[35] USAID (2017), p. 25 “A climate factor that can affect the functioning of a system. For example, rising temperatures and greater rainfall variability may affect agricultural productivity, with implications for food security”.
[36] C. E. Werrell, F. Femia (ed.), Note from Editors, in The New Geostrategic Landscape of the Anthropocene, The Center for Climate and Security (2017), p. 5. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/epicenters-of-climate-and-security_the-new-geostrategic-landscape-of-the-anthropocene_2017_06_091.pdf. “A systemic risk is a risk to a component or components of a system that, due to the critical nature of the components, can significantly disrupt (and sometimes collapse) the whole system that depends on it. In this report, an “epicenter” is defined as a category of systemic risk, or simply a collection of systemic risks with similar characteristics – a kind of “super-systemic risk.” For example, the Strait of Malacca is a major maritime trade route connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans that is critical for global trade and security. Risks to freedom of navigation through the Strait of Malacca, or broader risks to the stability of the Strait, can therefore be described as a systemic risk to global trade and global security. However, there is more than one critical maritime trade route in the world. The Strait of Hormuz, the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits and the Arctic Northwest Passage are just a few of these critical nodes in the global trade system. Many of these straits will face disruptions as a result of a changing climate. Together, these straits present a category of systemic risks to global trade and security, and are therefore considered an “epicenter” of climate and security.”
[37] Ibid.
[38] For the Baltic Sea, see: B. Hünicke, E. Zorita, T. Soomere, K. S. Madsen, M. Johansson, Ü. Suursaar, Recent change – sea level and wind waves in the BACC II Author Team (Ed.), Second assessment of climate change for the Baltic Sea basin (2015), pp. 155–185. Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16006-1.pdf; T. A. Łabuz, Environmental Impacts—Coastal Erosion and Coastline Changes, in: The BACC II Author Team (ed.) Second Assessment of Climate Change for the Baltic Sea Basin. Regional Climate Studies(2015), pp. 381-396. Available at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-16006-1_20; T. A. Łabuz, Coastal response to climatic changes: Discussion with emphasis on southern Baltic Sea, Landform Analysis 21 (2012), pp. 43-55. Available at: http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BUJ8-0026-0062; K. Rotnicki, R.K. Borówka, Impact of a future sea level rise in the Polish Baltic coastal zone, in: J.G. Titus, R. Wedge, N. Psuty, J. Fanscher (ed.), Changing Climate and the Coast (1990), pp. 247-264; D. Paprotny, P. Terefenko, New estimates of potential impacts of sea level rise and coastal floods in Poland, Nat Hazards 85 (2017), pp. 1249–1277. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-016-2619-z#citeas; See also V. Lahtvee, Adapting to the changing climate, EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (3 October 2019). Available at: https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/news-room/highlights-blog/item/78-adapting-to-the-changing-climate; For the Black Sea, see: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (project coordinator), Climate Change and Security in Eastern Europe – Regional Assessment Report (2017), p. 48. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/355496.pdf; National Intelligence Council, Russia: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030. A Commissioned Research Report (2009). Available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/climate2030_russia.pdf
The consequences of the rising level of the Baltic Sea will differ along its coastline, with the lowland areas and densely populated regions being more exposed. Climate models predict that the Baltic Sea will rise by about 30 cm, with the largest increase of sea level present in the Bothnian Bay in summer, and in the Gulf of Finland in winter. The Vistula Spit is bordered by lowland depressions and the mouth of the largest southern Baltic river, creating a typical sandy deltaic coast in Gdańsk Bay. Low-lying areas of 3m above mean sea level or less are vulnerable to sea-level rise and are at risk of flooding, overwash or ground water soaking. As the Baltic Sea region is highly industrialized and populated, it is also particularly vulnerable to this and other climate changes, such as salinization of coastal areas and soils. The Black Sea, in turn, is expected to face similar problems, leading to the deterioration of conditions in the Azov and Black Sea regions, the Crimean Peninsula, and deltas of big rivers and basins such as the Belgorod-Dnistrovski, Odesa, Ochakiv, Kherson, Skadovsk, Armiansk, Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia, Kerch, Melitopol, Berdiansk or Mariupol. Catastrophic floods, bank erosion, flooding of settlements and recreation zones of the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Danube and the Pripyat and their tributaries will touch the livelihoods of the people living and working there. The level of the Black Sea has been rising since the 1920s, and the rate of rise has increased considerably since the 1980s (rising currently by a rate of appr. 2 cm per year). This phenomenon will impact Russia’s main hot-water port complex in Novorossisk, which serves as its primary exporting hub for dry cargoes, crude oil and refined petroleum products. It will likewise affect Russia’s main Black Sea military base at Sevastopol in Ukraine. Beyond the Black Sea region, the rising sea levels endanger Russian deep-water port of Murmansk in the Atlantic basin, its Pacific ports, including Vladivostok. Extreme weather events – floods, torrential rains, high winds, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc. – are expected to have a significant impact on the Russian economy and its population. Main urban centres in Russia are expected to see periods of drought combined with heat waves. In such circumstances, the risk of heat-related illness or disease could increase importantly.
[39]See P. M. Cronin, ed., Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, Center for New American Security (2012). Available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf; E. Rosenberg, D. Titley, and A. Wiker, Arctic 2015 and Beyond: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership in the High North, Center for New American Security, Policy Brief (2014). Available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_ArcticHighNorth_policybrief_RosenbergTitleyWiker.pdf?mtime=20160906080459; M. DuBois King, Climate Change and Vietnamese Fisheries: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention, in The U.S. Asia-Pacific Rebalance, National Security and Climate Change” ed. C. Werrell and F. Femia, Center for Climate and Security (2015), pp. 55–63. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/ccs_us_asia_pacific-rebalance_national-security-and-climate-change.pdf ; U. Friedman, The Arctic: Where the U.S. and Russia Could Square Off Next, Atlantic Monthly (28 March 2014). Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/the-arctic-where-the-us-and-russia-could-square-off-next/359543/; Rear Adm. T. C. Gallaudet, Charting The Arctic: Security, Economic, and Resource Opportunities, Joint Subcommittee Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats and Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere (17 November 2015). Available at: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2015/11/charting-arctic-security-economic-and-resource-opportunities.
Two clear examples of this disputed zone/climate change nexus are the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The first one is the South China Sea and the challenges to fishing present there, as explained above (Supra, 11). The second example concerns the Arctic Ocean passages, which are only expected to gain in relevance. The faster-than-expected melting of the ice in the Arctic by itself is having a huge effect on the Arctic security landscape. With the likelihood of interaction between Arctic nations raising, the likelihood of increased tensions between the major powers increases. In this regard it is worth noting that following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, every NATO member state has suspended all forms of military cooperation with Russia, including in the previously apolitical zone of “military cooperation” in the Arctic. While the current probability of conflict in the Arctic is low, the rapidly changing physical and geopolitical parameters of that region render its future increasingly uncertain.
[40] C. Werell, F. Femia, The Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent. A Climate Security Governance Framework for the 21st Century, Council for Strategic Risks, The Center for Climate Security (2019), p. 24: “Had, for example, the scattered reports of drought and mass displacement of people in Syria during that time period been fed into an institution committed to warning of these trends, the country’s political instability might have been foreseen and, possibly, mitigated. Creating institutional centers to collect and interpret information, using the best analytical tools available, and then regularly delivering recommendations for action to decision-makers would go a long way in increasing preparedness for such eventualities and strengthen efforts for conflict prevention. Such institutions could also be utilized to facilitate optimal information-to-policy action streams to ensure both timely and adequate responses to climate security projections.” Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/the-responsibility-to-prepare-and-prevent_a-climate-security-governance-framework-for-the-21st-century_2019_10.pdf.
[41] For instance, the Baltic Sea region is not counted among the regions of the world that are likely to experience the harshest effects of climate change. However, it will be affected by changes in average temperatures, extreme variations in precipitation, sea level rise and storm surges. Just as consequential for the policymakers in the region may be the socio-political expectations about and interpretations of what climate change is and how it should be addressed locally and regionally.
[42] Cambridge Dictionary defines the butterfly effect as follows: “a situation in which an action or change that does not seem important has a very large effect, especially in other places or around the world”. Available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/butterfly-effect
[43] R. Cho, What the U.S. Military is Doing About Climate Change, Columbia University Earth Institute (20 September 2017). Available at: https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2017/09/20/what-the-u-s-military-is-doing-about-climate-change/. “Extreme weather will necessitate more maintenance and repair for runways and roads, infrastructure and equipment. It will also result in more need for the U.S. military’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief around the world because climate change will worsen problems of hunger and poverty in vulnerable populations. Food and water shortages, more disease, damaged infrastructure, power outages and displaced people will intensify competition for resources and increase tensions, creating new risks to U.S. interests that the military will have to protect.”
[44] See U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), Risk Quantification for Sustaining Coastal Military Installation Assets and Mission Capabilities Retrieved November 30, 2016, Available at: https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Program-Areas/Resource-Conservation-and-Resiliency/Infrastructure-Resiliency/Vulnerability-and-Impact-Assessment/RC-1701/RC-1701/(language)/eng-US,%20andBeeler; C. Beeler, What it might take to protect the world’s biggest naval base from rising seas (2016). Available, PRI The World. Available at: http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-23/what-it-might-take-protect-worlds-biggest-naval-base-rising-seas. Responding to disasters and extreme weather events will require reliable access to coastal support facilities, which must be able to withstand the growing effects of climate change, and of the rising seas in particular. This has already created problems, as in the case of the U.S. Navy base in Norfolk, the world’s largest. Old piers are partially submerged every few months, forcing the built-in service channels to close and making it increasingly more difficult to moor ships there, thus delaying maintenance work and potentially reducing operational readiness.
[45] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Report on effects of a changing climate to the Department of Defense (2019). For example, the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) already includes drought and desertification as a threat multiplier in its operational planning, while the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) takes flooding and earthquake-induced tsunamis into account as factors for instability. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF
[46] R. Keys. et al., Military Expert Panel Report, Sea Level Rise and the U.S. Military’s Mission, The Center for Climate and Security, (2016), https://climateandsecurity.org/militaryexpertpanel/; Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, US Department of Defense, Assessing Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Military Installations: Policy Implications, (2013) p. 22: “…operations affecting mission readiness for a majority of installation personnel are likely to be deemed critical. Failure pathways should be evaluated critically. Climate change may reveal new vulnerabilities not previously considered. At a strategic level, a similar analysis of the criticality of assets to mission accomplishment can be conducted [emphasis added]. This will help the military Services and DoD to focus vulnerability and impact assessments on the highest priority assets.”
[47] Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, Assessing Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Military Installations: Policy Implications. US Department of Defense (2013); The Center for Climate and Security, Military Expert Panel Report. Sea Level Rise And The U.S. Military’s Mission (2016), p. 20. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/center-for-climate-and-security_military-expert-panel-report2.pdf. The already foreseen expenditures needed to protect U.S. military installations from rising sea levels and other nefarious effects of climate change will weigh heavily on the Pentagon’s budget. Rising sea levels alone can also affect military readiness by causing the loss of outdoor training days or training, especially with regard to testing areas which are difficult or costly to replicate: amphibious assault training facilities, landing beaches, coastal components of maneuver corridors, airfields etc.
Zak, A ground zero forgotten: The Marshall Islands, once a U.S. nuclear test site, face oblivion again, The Washington Post (27 November 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/11/27/a-ground-zero-forgotten/; USGS website, http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/climate-change/lowLat.html; S. Waldman, Key Missile Defense Installation Will Be Uninhabitable in Less Than 20 Years, Scientific American (1 March 2018). Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/key-missile-defense-installation-will-be-uninhabitable-in-less-than-20-years/. Numerous strategically important facilities outside the United States are also exposed to rising sea levels. The Marshall Islands in the Pacific, for example, are home to the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, the primary component of the U.S. Strategic Command and one of the Defense Department’s primary missile testing facilities. It is from there that the United States prepares for the possibility of nuclear attacks because it allows for the immediate detection of any missile launch from Asia. Because of its location, it also serves as a strategic territorial bulwark at a time when the Chinese military is increasing in strength and extending the reach of its force projection. The Marshall Islands are experiencing the increasingly intense effects of storms and rising sea levels, both exacerbated by global warming, and various studies suggest that they could become uninhabitable in just a few decades.
[48] Hampton Roads Transportation Planning Organization, Hampton Roads Military Transportation Needs Study, Roadways Serving the Military and Sea Level Rise/Storm Surge(2013), http://www.hrtpo.org/uploads/docs/Roadways%20Serving%20the%20Military%20&%20Sea%20Level%20Rise-Storm%20Surge%20Report.pdf
Flooding impacts on transportation networks can impede operations that require cargo and personnel to be moved quickly and safely.
[49] United States Army War College, Implications of Climate Change for the U.S. Army, Report (2019), p. 13. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/07/implications-of-climate-change-for-us-army_army-war-college_2019.pdf. As saltwater intrudes into coastal areas and weather patterns evolve, freshwater supplies diminish. For expeditionary warfare, this entails the need for the military to secure more water while operating in ever-hotter places. The ubiquity of enemy sensors and their deep strike capabilities will further aggravate the battlefield conditions, making it necessary to move water stocks faster and more efficiently.
[50] Recurrent and increasingly more powerful natural disasters are also likely to require greater humanitarian efforts on the part of the military, thus limiting its overall capacity.
[51] P. Haldén Geopolitics in the changing geography of the Baltic Sea Region: the challenges of climate change, Global Affairs, vol. 4 (2018), p. 546. “One example would be Russia itself: if the country becomes weakened by climate change effects such as the destruction of agricultural land or devastation of the country’s Arctic regions, then we can imagine a “pause” in militarization as the country deals with urgent domestic economic and political problems. Alternatively, more aggressive policies may be pursued by the Russian leadership to deflect domestic tensions and to compensate for the country’s weaknesses.” Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502621?needAccess=true
[52] C. Werell, F. Femia, The Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent. A Climate Security Governance Framework for the 21st Century, Council for Strategic Risks, The Center for Climate Security (2019), p. 6. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/the-responsibility-to-prepare-and-prevent_a-climate-security-governance-framework-for-the-21st-century_2019_10.pdf.
[53] One dimension of this distinction is the differentiation between climate mitigation and adaptation measures which, regrettably, continue to be confused in the public debate.
[54] S. Fetzek, L. van Schaik, Europe’s Responsibility to Prepare: Managing climate security risks in a changing world, The Center for Climate and Security, in parternship with Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Clingendael) and the Planetary Security Initiative (2018), p. 14. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/europes-responsibility-to-prepare_managing-climate-security-risks-in-a-changing-world_2018_6.pdf. Large-scale climate security alert systems that identify long, medium and short-term risks and include clear “triggers” for emergency action should allow to ensure that foreseeable events are addressed faster and more effectively. Such capacity is crucial when anticipating low-probability, high-impact risks and establishing governance capacity to prepare for “unknown unknowns” or “black swans” that are difficult or impossible to predict accurately.
[55] R. B. Alley, J. Marotzke, W. D. Nordhaus, J. T. Overpeck, D. M. Peteet, R. A. Pielke, R. T. Pierrehumbert et al. Abrupt climate change, Science 299, no. 5615 (2003). Available at (restricted access): https://science.sciencemag.org/content/299/5615/2005.full; M. Berkelhammer, A. Sinha, L. Stott, H. Cheng, F. S. R. Pausata, K. Yoshimura. An abrupt shift in the Indian monsoon 4000 years ago, Climates, landscapes, and civilizations (2013), pp. 75-88. Available at: https://www.geo.umass.edu/climate/papers2/Berkelhammer_GM_2012.pdf; C. M. Briggs, Environmental change, strategic foresight, and impacts on military power,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College 40, no. 3 (2010). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235193881_Environmental_Change_Strategic_Foresight_and_Impacts_on_Military_Power; C. M. Briggs, Foresight Tools & Early Warning Systems: Vulnerability Assessments for abrupt and Non-Linear Climate Risks, in C. E. Werrell, F. Femia (ed.), The New Geostrategic Landscape of The Anthropocene, The Center for Climate and Security (2017), pp. 115-121. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/epicenters-of-climate-and-security_the-new-geostrategic-landscape-of-the-anthropocene_2017_06_091.pdf. Abrupt climate change means non-linear behaviour of complex systems, where gradual, linear changes are no longer the norm. Broadly speaking, global climate models fail to take into account non-linear weather patterns, given that global average air temperature suggests
a linear, i.e. monotonic, connection between increasing greenhouse gas concentrations and warming of the atmosphere. While this is correct from the geological standpoint, such an approach tends to focus excessively on air temperature to the detriment of other components of the climate system such as water, precipitation or melting ice which can reveal their potency in the event of sudden changes in the critical dynamics of climate systems. These components, such as monsoon rains and ocean currents, may become less stable before suddenly moving to a completely different level of stability. For example, the Caribbean monsoon may simply not happen for a year rather than evolve gradually over time.
[56] N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of Highly Improbable Fragility, New York: Random House (2007). See also A. A. Hill, Black Swan, Red Beard: Recognizing the Unexpected, United States Army War College War Room (22 June 2017). Available at: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/black_swan_red_beard/. The now famous term “black swan” event was coined by Nicholas Nassim Taleb and refers to surprises of a particular importance and magnitude. Its main characteristics are: “rarity, extreme impact and retrospective (but not prospective) predictability”. In recent years, the concept of the black swan has been often employed in the political, military and financial circles, although Taleb also refers to the “grey swan” as an improbable and important event that is at the limit of predictability. Historically, the “fog of war”, the “unknown unknowns” and the “black swan events” have at times led to political instability and collapse of otherwise seemingly steady systems of government. Only subsequently such events are recognized as the logical outcomes of a given set of facts and circumstances. The inability or unwillingness of societies to recognize change and prepare adequately for it seems to be one of the common challenges of governance across time and space in human history. The effects of climate change may rightly be expected to count among the most significant black swans of the future.
[57] The Royal Society, Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty, Report (2009). Available at: https://royalsociety.org/~/media/royal_society_content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf; Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs (2018). Access at: https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/programs/ccgg
The Economist, What if geoengineering goes rogue? (6 July 2019). Available at: https://www.economist.com/the-world-if/2019/07/06/what-if-geoengineering-goes-rogue; Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Clingendael), Planetary Security Initiative, Ready for take-off? Military responses to climate change, Report (2020), pp. 13-14. Available at: https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/PSI_Ready_for_takeoff.pdf. Geoengineering refers to the deliberate and large-scale intervention in the earth’s atmosphere and stratosphere to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. Actions could focus either on the removal of GHGs or on the management of solar radiation. Although it is a new field, geoengineering presents a significant potential safety risk and there remains an incomplete understanding of its consequences, no consistent means of tracking its use by state and non-state actors, and no established international standards to govern its use or misuse. Some unilaterally deployed geoengineering solutions, particularly in the absence of international standards to regulate their use, could also lead to new and unpredictable disruptions to the climate, water, food and energy systems, further undermining the security environment even more than anticipated.
[58] S. O’Sullivan, Capturing Climate and Security Risks Through Satellites and Earth Observing Technologies, in C. E. Werrell, F. Femia (ed.), The New Geostrategic Landscape of The Anthropocene, The Center for Climate and Security (2017), p. 132. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/epicenters-of-climate-and-security_the-new-geostrategic-landscape-of-the-anthropocene_2017_06_091.pdf. Military planning is essentially based on certain assumptions about recurring weather phenomena. Satellite data now provide new methods for identifying water flow and vegetation density, recording changes over time, and providing insight into national hydrological regimes. Satellites and Earth observation technologies count among the most effective means of observing the world’s climatic and geographical evolution, and should be used in the future as a key tool for informing decision-making by policy-makers, as well as other key stakeholders.
Autor
Maciej Bukowski
International disputes lawyer, graduate of École de Droit de la Sorbonne and Cornell Law School.
Strategy&Future
Trwa ładowanie...