August 2020. Belarus – a turning point for Poland

(www.pap.pl)

 

In fact, the Belarusian case is currently determining the status of our entire region, its security and future, in particular from the point of view of the ambitions of the European continental project and Russia’s imperial ambitions.

There are two methods of forecasting the events. In my own subjective opinion, these are the wrong method and the effective method.

The wrong method is one that listens only to what politicians say and what their personal relationships are, and thus is based on declarations of intent.

 

Consequently, this method does not predict future events, it is afraid of synthesis and firm predictions. Even though one might know all the names, all the casuistries, the who’s who from which party and which political environment, the method is substantially flawed, because people (and politicians in particular) lie, are often wrong, very often do not understand what is happening, seek to manipulate, to please someone, or simply “go with the flow”. They have their own agenda and pursue their interests, often hidden.

 

Such analysis often resembles gossiping or chatting with an uncle on name day and has little to do with real politics. It is above all “wobbly” if only for the reason that even the most sincere human intentions can be changed overnight while real capabilities and structural forces matter.

The second method – the effective one, is the one that tries to understand those structural forces, the real capabilities (not the intentions) that govern the economy and the state, and therefore its politics. Politicians are only obedient agents of these forces, or their executors, as they must “fit in”. They often begin to understand what their limitations are the day after taking office, having dilemmas at the time, how they will explain it to people who believed them. This is especially true of the people’s tribunes (tribunus plebis), who are brought to power by the impulse of the street. This is the nature of politics — warts and all.

Contrary to the ideas of the average voter, these forces are structural and exert such a powerful influence on decision-makers that they have very little room for maneuver over decision-making freedom. Statesmen are recognised by the fact that, within a narrow field of maneuver, they can change the existing system of structural forces, transforming them so that it better serves the interests of the state, whose interests they are obliged to care for.

Hence, we often think that politicians promise us pie in the sky. They are actually following structural forces. Otherwise, they lose their influence on agency, squandering their political careers, often with a bitter if not brutal end.

 

A country like Belarus also has its own landscape of structural forces that governs it, and Lukashenko has so far successfully balanced them, thus retaining what is commonly referred to as “power”. The real “muscles and tendons” of the state function around the structural forces, which translate into “levers” for the daily agency in politics. Known otherwise, especially in the East as “assets”.

 

Poland does not have essentially important assets in the structural forces in Belarus, so it uses the instrument of “general human values” as a method of drawing Belarus out of the orbit of Russian influence. As morally ambiguous as that sounds, these are the facts. Regardless of what we think about it, the elites of Western powers suspect that we are using the rhetoric of values instrumentally, because we are weak and we have no other assets (leverage), and the Russians are simply convinced of it, as the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently announced.

Arguments “from values” in international politics are only moderately effective if they are effective at all. They work in the case of Belarus – when it comes to impulse, stimulating people, many there probably want to live better and more slowly, and more richly, and without the “Russian knout”.

 

But the “tendons and muscles” of the power don’t work that way. In particular, it is the structural forces of Belarus that determine its social and economic model. This model is shaped by raw materials, financial flows, credit, exports, imports, connectivity with the world and markets, internal and external supply chains, and resulting division of tasks in industry and agriculture. And it is “served” by specific people who have income from it and their own fields of agency.

 

Mackinder called it the “Going Concern.” And the model creating the “relational infrastructure” in our eastern neighbor is geostrategically oriented primarily towards Russia. This gives Russia access to the real assets of Belarusian policy, to the “tendons and muscles” of the state, to the strategic flows generated by the established model, and therefore also to business and secret services that “stick” to the relational infrastructure, seeking income and influence, especially in the East. And it is extremely tight in a country like Belarus.

In addition, there is the Russian language, Russian culture, the Great Patriotic War, mixed marriages and various other “soft” elements of Russia’s influence on our neighbour.

In terms of security, ultimately Russia has a lot of assets through people in the officer corps and in the command system, common military bases and exercises that can become levers of political pressure and even the direct implementation of Russian policy should the need arise.

 

Lukashenko knows this, so when he got scared of the street, he showed beyond any doubt that he wanted to rely on Russia and its military forces to stay in power (and perhaps alive). As Bismarck used to say, every theater ends at 23.00. You can see what geostrategic direction tied and still binds Belarus. And it is not easy to change it, despite the understandable impulse of people who took to the streets of Belarusian cities.

 

Despite having numerous assets, Russia has a problem. In order to implement the integration plan of the post-Soviet space, it would be good not to have an antagonised population against Moscow. Meanwhile, people go out into the streets, and more importantly, the workers of large plants on strike have begun to set up strike committees, which are a real political and driving force, because they concern the real tendons and muscles of the state.

Russia faces a dilemma: how to keep their man in power, which is the guarantor of geostrategic orientation and the unchanging “relational infrastructure” (although not necessarily Lukashenko – there may therefore be a palace coup, where Russia will be an element and guarantor of transformation, and the West, of course, due to the domination of Russian assets will agree to it), keeping their assets and at the same time achieving the goal – to deepen integration over time, but at the same time not to antagonise society.

At the same time, Russia wants the West to recognise Belarus as its zone of privileged influence. Western leaders (at least so far) are largely doing just that. And this gives us an insight into the question of whether the West serves the interests of Poland in the field of eastern policy.

 

The exchanges of views between representatives of the elites of Western Europe and analysts from our part of Europe have been very instructive in recent days. For many in our part of the world, it should be an illustrative lesson to remember that the last 30 years of sunny weather are over and the principles of geopolitics rule in international relations, although we in Central and Eastern Europe instinctively do not like it, because then “the big do what they can and the small what they must”.

 

Unless the small (or middle) powers change their status, about which below.

The countries of the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium act differently to the crisis in Belarus than France and Germany, but they do not have the leverage to enforce their own policies. The only leverage is the impulse of the rebellious Belarusian society. It will sound brutal, but this is not enough.

 

In such matters, the balance of power is decisive and it would have to change for the status of Belarus to change. For Russians, the status of Belarus is too important. In the West, it is believed that Russia would even be ready for war to maintain the status of Belarus, while the West is not ready for it. And the countries of our region are too weak in the eyes of Western Europe, so they do not constitute the subject of international politics, because they are not exporters of security and thus cannot influence the status of Belarus, if a change of this status is not wished by a power ready to go to war for this cause.

 

Not to mention the domination of other Russian assets in Belarus.

This observation should be a turning point for Poland in thinking about:

– our own security in Europe, including in the context of the consolidation of the European project

– about our policy towards the East

– about the strength and status of our region.

 

In the event of a further breaking of the order known to us from the last 30 years and already visible symptoms of the “concert of powers”, which we observe in the performance of Germany and France, manifested in imposing the resolution of the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium affairs in violation of the aspiration to seek unity and consolidation of the Intermarium and the separation of all its elements from Russia, this may lead to the disintegration of the common goals of European policy, because this issue will concern the vital interest of Poland, which will take notice that its interests are not served.

By the way, not only Belarus is being lost, but it looks that Warsaw’s security status is different from that of Paris, which is de facto toothless in our region, and is afraid of a confrontation over Belarus with Russia and its military power. That would be it when it comes to guarantees of security of the consolidating European project.

This should be the final wake-up call in Warsaw that we can only rely on our own armed forces, and especially in the case of the consolidation of the continental project, because any European guarantees will be illusory. With all the reservations and doubts, the American proposition looks better, because the Americans have real armed forces, although they are far away from us and they do not have the centre of gravity here. As far as the Americans are concerned, the Russians are not sure of the control of the escalation ladder in the event of a crisis, it is evident that the Europeans will not have such doubts. The case of Belarus and the way France and Germany treat us show it clearly.

 

The lack of unity in European policy towards our neighbours in the east will push Warsaw on the path of confrontation with the policies of France or Germany in the event of their reluctance to serve the interests of the Intermarium countries or, even worse, their willingness to come to terms with Russia and divide their spheres of influence, which is consistently pursued by Moscow.

 

At the same time, it will encourage powers from outside the region (certainly the US, perhaps China in the future, and also Turkey) to intervene in the matters of the region in order to counter the increasingly active policy of Russia and Germany in the Intermarium, where the growing strategic flows in Eurasia accumulate and there are security tensions.

The price of these tensions between the great powers is most often paid by the frontline nations and peripheral organisms located far from the decision-making centres in Berlin, Moscow, Beijing and Washington. Specifically, Poland and other nations of the region, unless we create an area between the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea, which will not be a security importer, and therefore in the new order that is being created, will not be a clientelist area, dependent on the core of the consolidating Europe in terms of its security. Well, of course, unless we abdicate this ambition – if we decide that we cannot afford our independence

But that’s still not enough. Because what guarantees in terms of security will Germany and France give us vis a vis Russia, if they give way to Russia in Belarus because of Russia’s alleged control of the escalation ladder of the crisis? Russia can also go a step further and take what it demands (for example our subjectivity) or vital interests (for example freedom of communication in the Baltic Sea).

 

One can dream of what would happen if, apart from the rebellious society, we still had assets in “muscles and tendons”. We would then be a party to decide about the future of Belarus. For example, because we are doing great business with Belarus, and it would depend, for example, on Poland for food import or electricity export, access to the sea and river communication network, export of saltpetre or access to our agricultural market for Belarusian tractors.

 

If we still had armed forces capable of shaking Russian certainty as to the control of the escalation ladder, the Western countries would have to sit with us at the table in talks with Russia about the future of Belarus, because then the calculations of our enemies and allies would be completely different. Let us imagine the significance of this when the Belarusian transformation, including the socio-economic model, is to be decided between Russia, France and Germany. In a country where factories and plants are largely state-owned and will therefore be subject to “ownership restructuring”.

So let’s see what is happening with the cracks in the apparatus of power (we can already see the first one), with a potential palace coup and with Russian movements of special services, military, all kinds of little green men, who will be covered under various beautiful and very legal names.

A lot depends on the attitude of the USA (very passive so far), Germany and France. For now, predictably – In Berlin and Paris, they consider Belarus a Russian zone of interest, although business is probably already sending signals to Paris and Berlin that it would like to take part in the Belarusian “transformation” towards a free market. The Americans are also seriously afraid that the Russians may send troops to Minsk, Brest and Grodno, seriously complicating the security situation on NATO’s eastern flank, so they will mitigate Warsaw if we really want to take hard steps.

Let us also be very careful not to be provoked by military demonstrations that Lukashenko provocatively uses to invite Russia to intervene. The Russians will do it out of real fear that Belarus will fall out of their card deck, although this scenario is very inconvenient for them.

Again, the situation would be quite different – if we had our own real army and real political assets in Belarus, because Lukashenko would calculate the whole game differently. But we do not, and therefore must be conservative.

 

However, it cannot be ruled out if some negotiated format of Belarusian transformation is proposed under the supervision of the West (of course France and Germany) and Russia. Poland and the countries of the region must be in it, although Russia will be strongly opposed to it. It will be a test for our politics (and our strength) and for the long-term intentions of the West towards our interests. Failure to invite us will prove that they do want to regulate the area’s affairs themselves, without us. We don’t have to test Russian intentions, we know them.

 

Our attitude will be revisionist and will abandon the “strategic restraint” of the past 30 years. So it will come as a shock to the Western elites. It will resemble a more delicate version of the Monroe doctrine, this time in its Polish edition, a bit like Adolf Bocheński postulated before the war. If only he were alive and saw what was happening in the world now …

For the purposes of further discussion, let us recall Bocheński’s postulates on the Polish doctrine of Monroe. They might come in handy.

They will have to be developed creatively by creating in Poland real instruments of policy in the East, which will enable it to arise and then be bitterly accepted by Germany and France. I bet that it will require breaking French instruments along the way, and generally the status of France as a weaker player in our region.

We just have to choose the place and time of the confrontation with France and absolutely commit to it. Then we will change the status of Poland and the region, and then the time will come to face Russia, which will know by that time what we are doing and that it is dangerous for her.

 

Let us not be under any illusions: our rivalry with Russia in the areas between Poland and Russia was always aimed at establishing an advantage, not good neighbourly relations. Mieroszewski wrote: “It seems that while the Russians have never appreciated Ukrainians and still do not appreciate them, they have always overestimated and still overestimate Poles. They always see us as active or only potential rivals – but always as rivals.

 

Litvinov spoke about the rebuilding of the Polish empire from the 16th and 17th centuries, which seems comical to us, but for Litvinov, unlike us, the 20th century was a sequence of the 16th and 17th centuries, with the same traditional problems, including Polish problems. Like the tsars – Stalin, Litvinov and Brezhnev, they believed that either Poles or Russians could rule in the ULB areas (Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus).

Further Mieroszewski wrote: “The advantage of the Russians was confirmed by HISTORY, which turned our fights and uprisings to ruin. But most Poles do not believe that we can ever gain an advantage over Russia, and the child of this unbelief is the satellite mentality and servility. One can add, unfortunately, firmly established in Poles”.

Mieroszewski’s statement that it was possible to push Russia away from Przemyśl to Smolensk was even more fanciful. And yet after 1991 it de facto happened.

After regaining independence, Józef Piłsudski used to argue that there is room for maneuver for Polish politics in the East, in the implementation of the federal concept and in other activities aimed at building instruments of pressure and political influence.

It is in the eastern buffer zone that the instruments of Western policy do not reach or are not effective, and therefore Western powers must take Poland into account in this region.

In his characteristic and obscene words, Józef Piłsudski assessed Polish policy towards the West. Without our own agenda it would have to be obedient in all directions and secondary to the will of the then Western powers, depriving us of subjectivity and forcing us to accept the will of powers outside our region, which limits our field of security, but also weakens the development prospects of our business and our market and capital penetration.

Summarizing Piłsudki’s recommendation: in the west of the continent, we were nothing, while in the east we were something and this should be guarded.

It is funny that France talks to Russia about our region, without having any significant instruments of leverage in our region. Paris (as others) has become accustomed to Poland simply running on its “strategic restraint” of the last 30 years, while having no real leverage in its policy towards the East.

So we are facing a game with France for status. The status of the entire region. Poland is its leader because of its potential. There is a need for the wise leadership of the Polish state to carry out such an operation and test France, and inflict heavy loss of Paris that will not go unnoticed.

It is critical for the future of Belarus that would be independent of Russia and the self-determination of Belarusian society. And simply a life without the Russian yoke.

 

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak 

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

 

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