Northern European Plain and its river lines forming the barriers and corridors for force maneuvers and defensive positions
While a single Russian army was to attack Warsaw from the south side of the Bug River, having its left flank secured by a single corps along the north bank of the Wieprz River, three Russian armies would capture the right bank of the Vistula River downstream from Warsaw and, crossing the Vistula near Włoclawek, were to seize Warsaw from the northwest. With 24 divisions in four armies under the command of Tukachevsky, the Bolsheviks intended to duplicate the 1831 Imperial Russian maneuver of Ivan Paskevich, who had crossed the Vistula at Toruń and reached Warsaw from the west almost unopposed to crush the Poles. The terrain today still favors the possibility of a rapid advance along the Brėst – Warsaw axis, but the Pilica and Wieprz tributaries to the Vistula south of Warsaw also still constitute significant barriers that would both support a counterattack against such an attack upon Warsaw from the east, as well as provide a significant barrier to any attack upon Warsaw from the south.
In 1920, the German territory of East Prussia to Poland’s north meant that Tukachevsky planned to isolate the Polish Army from being resupplied via Gdańsk – the only port open to shipments of arms and ammunition – by driving west as far as Grudziadz.
Today, with Russian forces stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast and, thereby, able to attack Warsaw from the northwest, the attack from the east only has to traverse half the distance that Tukachevsky had planned to cover. To keep Polish forces fixed in front of Warsaw south of the Bug River it is entirely possible that the Russians might move forces westward along the South side of the Bug as did Russian General Nikolai Sollohub with the 16th Army in 1920. If this option was executed, within this Tactical Direction south of the Bug, one could expect the Russians to attempt to force the Poles to split their forces along three axes: 1) the line Biała Podlaska – Miedzyrzec Podlaski – Siedlce – Warsaw, more-or-less along the 1920 axis; 2) the line Biała Podlaska – Miedzyrzec Podlaski – Łuków – Góra Kalwaria direction; and 3) the Biała Podlaska – Miedzyrzec Podlaski – Dęblin – Kozienice direction. The last point on this Tactical Direction south of the Bug at which the rail lines of all three directions meet is at Łuków, some ninety kilometers from the Belarus border.
The town, however, has a number of institutional buildings that easily could be turned into fortifications, so it too could become a hard point around which to organize a general defensive plan. Although Radzyń Podlaski is not sitting on a rail line, it does dominate a road junction and retaining control of the city could prevent the Russians from turning it into a defensive position during a Polish counterattack. Further south-west on this same axis, the Tyśmienica River (a tributary to the Wieprz River) and one of its tributaries, the Bystrzyca, create a string of water barriers in front of Kock. Another 45 kilometers westward, the city of Dęblin, with its road and rail bridges over the Vistula, would be a critical river-crossing point to fortify. As was demonstrated during the January 2017 HEGEMON Simulation in Warsaw, however, even if the Russians managed to cross the Vistula at Dęblin, turning north to close on Warsaw from the south would be no easy task. During the Operational-Strategic Simulation, Polish side managed to defeat Russian forces at the Pilica River, which is a significant barrier because of the swampy terrain along the river.
The central axis within the Brėst – Warsaw Tactical Direction would ride the back of the direct rail line west from Brėst, crossing the Vistula River near Góra Kalwaria with both rail and road bridges. The city of Góra Kalwaria, with its population of 11,000 residents, sits high overlooking the western bank of the Vistula River, providing a dominant defensive position to oppose a river-crossing from the east.
While it would be foolish to state unequivocally that the Russians wouldn’t attempt to repeat what General Sollohub attempted in 1920 with the 16th Army, the simulations suggested that the result would likely be similar.
Instead, it could be aimed at drawing off enough Polish forces south of the Bug River to allow Russian forces to advance quickly along the north side of the Bug to the Narew River.
Success to the south side of the Bug River might also draw Polish/NATO reserves way from defense of the bridges over the Vistula River downstream from Warsaw.
If one divides contemporary Poland into geographic quadrants along a general north to south line from Gdańsk to Lódź and along a general west to east line from Poznań to Warszawa (Warsaw) — the Wisła (Vistula) and Bug Rivers form barriers that could serve as secure shoulders for operational arms of encirclement south from Kaliningrad and west from Belarus. The convergence of the two rivers twenty kilometers to the north of Warsaw means that the Polish capital would be outside occupied territory, but within the range of Russian artillery. Holding a substantial portion of Polish ground forces and the nation’s political center hostage would certainly improve Moscow’s negotiating position for terminating the conflict on favorable terms.
An encirclement operation employing the Vistula and Bug Rivers to secure its western and southern front of encirclement would depend upon controlling or destroying the bridges over the rivers. Although a risky operation given the current balance of forces between Russian and NATO, encirclement is the traditional operation of preference for the General Staff. So-called battles of penetration that usually amount to a twenty-four hour operation and involve moving as deep as 50 kilometers into an enemy’s defensive depth, are expensive – usually costing up to one-half of all losses suffered in the encirclement operation. The goal is to fight only one battle of penetration and destroy the defending force before it can withdraw to reestablish the defensive line.
This photograph, looking northeast on Route 19 in front of Kock, gives an accurate impression of the complexity of a series of water barriers surrounding the village of some 3,500 people as well as along Route 48 connecting Kock to Dęblin that would make off-road maneuver challenging on this axis.
The Route 48 bridge over the Vistula River at Dęblin. The rail bridge at Dęblin can be seen in the background.
The Pilica River, a left-bank tributary of the Vistula River, poses a significant challenge in front of Warka, a city with a population of more than 11,000 on high ground behind the river when approached from the south. The Pilica has a series of “backwaters” (as seen in this photograph) that are not part of the main flow of the river that could result in a river “crossing” depositing a force not on the other side of the river, but on a peninsula or even an island. The terrain could provide ample opportunity for “disintegrating” a river-crossing operation into a series of small-scale engagements leaving attacking forces fragmented and the commander unable to maneuver his forces to affect a preplanned operation.
The bridges over the Vistula River at Góra Kalwaria, looking up-river (i.e., left bank is on the right side in the photo). Note how low the Vistula was in June 2017. For all intents and purposes, the island over which the rail bridge passes on the left side of the photograph is no longer an island. At the time the photograph was taken, the major barrier was no longer the river, but the flood-control dikes on either side of the river.
THE EASTERN (BUG) ARM OF ENCIRCLEMENT
Białystok would be the initial operational objective for the eastern arm of encirclement. While the city itself only lies slightly deeper that the 50 kilometer depth of the tactical zone of engagement, the city dominates this axis. There are only three main axes within the tactical zone: 1) Route 19 between Grodno and Białystok; 2) Route 65, which is the shortest route between the Belarus border and Białystok; and 3) Routes 66 and 19 from the direction of Brest. On the northern-most route, initially open terrain along the rail line from Belarus makes a movement to the south toward Sokółka relatively easy, with only a single small stream to cross. The relatively open terrain on the approach to Sokółka directly from the East provides maneuver room to a depth of some 20 kilometers from the Belarus border. Furthermore, the first ten kilometers or so southwest from Sokółka towards Białystok consists of rolling terrain interspersed with the occasional wooded area. However, for the next twenty kilometers or so the terrain toward Sokółka is heavily wooded, and with swampy terrain making off-road maneuver challenging. The route directly west from Belarus towards Białystok has to traverse wooded terrain that would be relatively easy to defend with troops familiar with the terrain. Either way – from the northwest or west – as one moves closer to Białystok, the terrain gets move heavily wooded and occasionally swampy sufficient to make off-road maneuver challenging.
Bialystok is a rail junction controlling rail moving in five directions. In this role alone, Bialystok is critical – providing access in two directions from the east as well as in three directions further into the depth of Poland. Should Sokółka (population of nearly 19,000) rail yard be captured by the Russians, it would undoubtedly serve as a logistical hub for the entire Bug River operational arm of encirclement.
The terrain from Brest, Belarus is much more open terrain than the swampy and forested terrain laying along the Belarusian border west of Białystok. As with the northerly axes, the southern axis enjoys both road and rail to support movement into the depth of Polish defenses.
An attack from the direction of Brest, Belarus, would easily be the most threatening to the defense of Białystok because this axis would contain parallel high-speed road and rail transit, and would come at the city from the most open terrain.
Once encircled, the defenders at Białystok would find it difficult because the terrain west from the city does not favor the rapid movement that would facilitate withdrawal. Behind Białystok, the city of Ostrów Mazowiecka would be key to preventing the encirclement from being closed in this arm of the encirclement. If Russian forces would gain control of Ostrów Mazowiecka, they would be able to move in all directions against the Narew river line. The left flank of this arm of encirclement would also count on seizing and holding the road bridges over the Bug River – seven of them – as well as the one ferry landing and three rail bridges – between the Belarus border and the confluence of the Bug and Narew Rivers to protect the forces moving along this operational axis from counterattack by Polish forces operating south of the Bug River.
The Narew River drains the swamps that run along the Polish-Belarus border. It should be noted that the low and swampy terrain in these photographs were taken in June 2015, after what was considered to be a very dry winter.
The first of three bridges needed to secure the rear of Russian forces attacking Białystok from the south.
Route 62 actually crosses the Narew River twice – making it the second and the seventh of the seven road bridges on the left flank of the Russian encirclement operation
Route 63 is the third bridge from the Belarusian border; securing it could make the relief of Białystok from the south in a timely manner difficult.
Seizing the bridges over the Bug River at Brok and Małkinia Górna-Treblinka is made easier by the open terrain for the north-east.
What makes the bridge at Małkinia Górna-Treblinka (Route 677) over the Bug River
– the fourth bridge – so critical for the Russian General Staff is the opportunity to cut
the parallel rail line to E67/Route 8 to Białystok.
Seizing the bridge over the Bug River at Brok not only secures the left flank of the encirclement arm, but also isolates Ostrów Mazowiecka from relief from across the left bank of the Bug.
The sixth bridge over the Bug River is the E67 Bridge East of Wyszków over the Bug River. While there is not much in the way of built-up areas around the bridge, its approach on the left bank – south side of the river – is nearly impossible. Destroying this new highway bridge to the east of Wyszków would probably be a priority to insure against the rapid movement of Polish forces north to prevent the closing of encirclement from the east.
The Route 62 bridge at Wyszków, the seventh road bridge over the Bug River (photograph taken from the right bank – west side of river – upon which the city itself stands). The Wyszków City Bridge over the Bug River would probably be of greater interest to capture for the Russians because of the fact that the Poles might not be willing to attack for fear of civilian casualties in the city. Wyszków could provide the Russians with a “fortified” point on the Bug River line that could suggest the threat of attacking Warsaw from the north.
S&F Hero: Military Art: Part 2 – Polish War Theater (Podcast)
Autor
Dr. Phillip A. Petersen
President of the New Generation Warfare Centre (NGWC). From October 1991 through the December 2017 at The Potomac Foundation. In this capacity, he co-authored the Baltic Security Net Assessment for the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. The Baltic Security Net Assessment marked a culmination of Dr. Petersen’s unique educational and career experience along with a determination to provide operational-strategic war-fighters with an operational-tactical guide on necessary demands to make from military intelligence resources. Having worked with Andrew Marshall during his time at the Defense Intelligence Agency and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and having been taught the importance of terrain by German General and former Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Central Europe Franz-Joseph Schulze, Dr. Petersen was able to fuse terrain analysis of the Baltic States with the revolutionary wargaming work of Mr. Edmund Bitinas. The result produced a Baltic Security Net Assessment that focused on questions relevant to practical problem solving within NATO’s contemporary military infrastructure.
Having predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union, he came to Potomac in anticipation of conducting a three-year interview project on Security Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics. Visiting all fifteen of the former Soviet republics, fifteen of the regions of the Russian Federation, and interviewing over 400 senior officials, Dr. Petersen’s research was published in the Journal of European Security. Subsequently, as part of Potomac’s NATO Enlargement Initiative, Dr. Petersen conducted multiple tours for U.S. Congressional Staff Delegations to Eastern Europe to promote an increase in NATO membership.
Dr. Petersen’s received his Masters at Western Michigan University with his thesis on Systemic Adaptation: Can The Soviet System Accommodate The "Democratic Movement"? He later received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois with his dissertation on Images As Defense Policy Determinants In The Soviet-American Military Relationship Since 1945. Dr. Petersen served for fifteen years as a United States Army officer, as an intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and as a policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at the National Defense University. He has authored some eighty publications on international security issues, believing that it is the responsibility of each generation to insure that the next generation is sufficiently educated on the errors of the past to make its own, original mistakes.
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