The Status Game

On the contrary, there are subjects of networks of foreign and domestic conditions, interest groups and pressure groups, in a network of tensions arising from them that cause them to behave in a specific, predictable and often probable way, and all this in order to reach for “agency” embedded to the leadership positions at “the very top”.

And once the leadership positions are seized to keep them – and at almost all costs – to maintain the agency. Here kicks in the so-called “Distribution of Respect” which determines what behaviours lead to leadership in a given political entity.

This applies especially to small and medium-sized countries as opposed to major powers. In other words, this applies in particular to countries dependent in terms of security or economics on a foreign power. A power may even be formally friendly or even allied, but this does not change its natural care for its own interests and the widest possible control of the “agency” of a weaker and dependent entity in order to service the interests of the dominant power.

Unfortunately, this has too often happened in the history of Poland in the last 300 years. Our geographical location did not make it any easier for leaders to conduct the country’s affairs properly. Such was the case during the reign of King Stanisław August Poniatowski or the era of reforms of the Great Sejm, with first attempts being made (backed by Russia) – to pursue a new policy, and then briefly – backed by Prussia – major reforms related to the Constitution of May 3. Or in the Napoleonic era, when we tried to build the state and its international position based on Napoleonic France. Or in the communist Poland, when the political regime imposed and underpinned by the Soviet Union found support for its “power and authority” in Moscow.

 

When thinking about independent state and implementing in your decisions a program of building your own power, you should be daily and invariably careful not to fall into dependence – even on close allies, because it may be that – imperceptibly – we are not pursuing our own policy, but some part of the larger game of stronger, friendly power, becoming the subject of the grander game or a pawn per procura, especially when it comes to vital issues for security in the region.

 

This rule did not change from the beginning of civilization until the 21st century, and the leaders of Poland should remember that.

The above phenomenon of subordination of national interests begins when the “sourcing of the distribution of respect” and the perception of the power of a given politician or party tends to be “situated” in foreign capitals, and the position in their own political environment in a subordinate state begins to depend on the assessment of that man (or woman, of course), his environment and views by foreign decision-makers or foreign influential persons in power relations in the capital of the dominant power. Or – which is clearly harmful – even by the ambassador of a foreign power, who has the opportunity to manipulate politics and personnel in the country in which he fulfills his ambassadorial mission.

It all translates into the assessment of the “strength and significance” of that particular person by his always-perceptive-in-such-matters domestic political colleagues – after all, in this competitive environment, ready to interrupt him on his way to the summit or throw him from it – by plotting, conspiracies, betrayals, lies, intrigues and slander, the range of possibilities is indeed limitless; as soon as they feel that the “weight” (power, or “agency”) of a given leader is not supported by the source of strength (I call it for the purpose of this argument: “the reconstitution of the distribution of respect”), which is in that case the dominant foreign power.

 

Enjoying external “support”, such a politician – as if he (or she) were a natural “authority” greater than other domestic politicians – achieves a higher position in the status game, but with the granting of an external power which enjoys greater status than that of the country he should represent and serve. The “authority” built in this way is a hard currency in the political “trade”, like money, knowledge or real professional achievements in other types of relationships between people.

 

Maintaining good relations with the foreign power then begins to play a deciding role in the political career of the national politician. But the foreign power has control over him in return, and over time over the political life of the weaker state.

 

Even worse, politicians with outstanding leadership abilities are intelligent and they capture this “sourcing” (uźródłowienie) themselves and are very often tempted to pursue a policy of building their own personal power against their colleagues and political rivals (the competitive environment!) in the country based on the “distribution of respect” from an external power. This, unfortunately, over time objectifies the policy of the state towards the superpower, causing a divergence of its real interests with the interests of an increasingly dominating power.

 

When this state of affairs lasts long enough, it becomes difficult to push anything through due to disproportions in the “status game”. Because every politician (motivated by the patriotic and rational realisation of his country’s interest) is afraid of a clash with someone who automatically enjoys greater authority in the opinion of his party colleagues, on whom (like in a self-winding terrifying mechanism) the career and status of that patriotic politician depends.

 

Amazingly, but in the game between politicians, it works like the law of gravity or Newton’s third law in physical phenomena.

 

“Content” then goes to the background, and the “form” and “opinion about” dominate, determining the parameters of the status game and its hierarchy. For the sake of order, it should be added that the first victim of such developments is always truth and the pursuit of it. But that’s not what my column is about …

An example of external interference was the attempt of the Habsburgs to influence the policy of a flourishing Polish state during their period of dominance in Europe in the late 16th century. Poland of course had its own needs and aspirations, in other words – interests, but the Habsburgs had a strong party in the country, which pushed Poland towards the implementation of anti-Turkish policy, to the benefit of the Habsburgs’ interests. Meanwhile, first of all, there was a fear on the Vistula over the war with Turkey. Secondly, the anti-Habsburg orientation of King Stefan Batory and Chancellor Jan Zamoyski probably ultimately also had anti-Turkish intentions, because it resulted from competition over the far-flung south-eastern borders of Poland. Bearing in mind that the Turks’ only possibility for expansion into the Poland held lands was a flanking action of the mouth of the Prut and the Dniester, their major progress coming along the Danube Valley, Poland had adequate strategic depth in the face of Turkish ambitions, before expansion would threaten the vital interests of the country.

Therefore, Poland did not have a common identity of interests with the Habsburg Empire, for which stopping Turkey heading to its core home turf was crucial. For this reason, both Batory and Zamoyski wanted to choose the time to deal with Ottoman danger depending on the needs of Poland, and not on the convenience and interests of the Habsburg Empire. The result was a period of tension with the Habsburgs, who intervened in our affairs, putting pressure on elections, i.e. the choice of a king, and tense relations between the later King Zygmunt III Vasa and the old Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, which culminated – with various additional reasons, including the open dissatisfaction of the nobility with the policy of Zygmunt III after the death of Zamoyski – in open conflict. Zebrzydowski’s Rebel from 1606-1607, and thus a de facto civil war in the country.

In extreme cases, the phenomenon of building one’s political position in the country based on an external power as described above ended in Poland with a Targowica [ed. – the 1792 Confederation which opposed Poland’s written constitution of 1791 and sold the country’s interest to Russians] or with the installation of supporters favourable to the Soviets by Soviet tanks in 1944-45, i.e. the loss of independence.

Major powers have a long tradition of manipulating others and thus creating influence in a subordinate state. Of course, such subordinated states are easily controlled from the outside, and this is a clinical example of a state located within the zone of imperial influence of a foreign power. This has happened to Poland not once and not twice – and every day one should check against all powers, including allies, whether such dependence has arisen, because with it the country becomes the object of the game of others, in time passively and dangerously. This applies to economic interests and security, often of course both at the same time.

 

However, especially in the area of security, this is particularly dangerous, because in the game for strategic balance, constantly sought by the major powers, and yet so variable, the subordinate country is counted in the camp of its patron, although it does not know it, or does not want to be counted, or it does not have to be comfortable at the moment or in a given matter. Especially when the patron is far away and the threat is near.

 

Finally, it should be remembered that, in particular, cooperation in the military-armaments field makes the recipient geopolitically very dependent on the donor, because he creates influences, creates the “leverage” (instrument of pressure) of the donor over the sense of security in the recipient, what’s more – it gives the opportunity to control it through daily giving subtly to understand who depends on whom, by securing the supply of spare parts and additions to the supplied military equipment, training, various financial and assistance programs, from which it is very easy to get addicted. Such a situation allows the donor of security and military assistance to easily build influence and play the status game of national politicians through the previously described giving (or depriving him) of his own authority.

This can be dangerous and should not overshadow the overall potential of the policy resulting from the geopolitical situation and the adopted geostrategy of the country, which most often create more instruments for building power than just the above military assistance from the donor. It should not obscure the decision regarding the general development of the country, trade policy, technological and infrastructural development.

 

An obvious example of such addiction was the strategic situation of the communist Poland during the Cold War. One could venture to say that the public sympathised openly with the West, and certainly did not want a nuclear war, and if such a war broke out, as a result of the Soviet patronage and the key geographical location of Poland, the country would be subject to devastating nuclear strikes by the US and NATO.

 

Geopolitical conditions as well as internal frictions and interest groups outline the field of play of a given leader. It is always very small, very often extremely small and hopelessly limited. And it is in this way that great leaders are born – understanding the narrow muzzle of reality, they can act in these limitations, cut down space and using their limited room for maneuver, make decisions. All this to strengthen the power and prosperity of the country and nation, to which they are faithful and to whom they serve.

In this way they change history – thus signing themselves into her annals and testifying to the power of the human spirit.

 

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

 

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