Europe’s strategic view of Russian A2AD capabilities
To understand A2/AD, you need first need to know about ‘power projection’. This term comes from the field of operational and strategic modern military art and is often used in the literature on the subject and in US military and strategic documents. Power projection consists of conducting military operations and influencing a potential opponent in the whole range of combat capabilities in such a way that he must take into account this impact or even cannot counteract it.
A flagship example of force projection is the operation of an American aircraft carrier combat group in the Asian littoral waters, far away from US continental ports. From aircraft carriers, Americans could carry out any operations far from their home ports, and existing opponents could not counteract it, as they would be defeated.
A2/AD access systems are associated, in particular, with the development of military capabilities which – using new military technologies and at the same time a revolution in the military affairs are intended to provide the Chinese and the Russians with an advantage in their own regions, not only over US allies, but also over the US assets, by limiting or eliminating the possibility of free arrival of Americans with help (power projection) to the areas of the Western Pacific and Central and Eastern Europe, and thus to areas so far away from the continental United States.
With A2/AD anti-access systems, you can also “push” the sea hegemon’s ability to guarantee security to countries deeper in Eurasia and thereby cause the US to lose influence, in particular in countries located in the basins of Europe’s marginal seas: the Baltic and the Black Sea. This weakens the political credibility of the Americans, and thus undermining their influence and thus strengthening the influence of continental powers reaching even into Western Europe itself, and certainly on the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium, in the Danube Valley and throughout Eastern Mediterranean.
The Russians have not only used this as a testing ground for new operational concepts, aviation and precision weapons. The most significant element here is the establishment of a Russian A2/AD anti-access/area denial bubble in the Near East and Levant, primarily using Kalibr and S-300/400/500 systems, which further widens a similar bubble, already established on the Black Sea, centered in the Crimea, as well as bubbles above the Baltic and Belarus.
In fact, the Russians have established the A2AD wall that makes it difficult for US naval power to effectively project power in this area in the event of a war contingency between Russia and one of US allies.
The US and NATO have spent the last decade in asymmetric wars, while the Russians have improved A2/AD anti-access systems and war in a symmetrical battlefield exploiting the specific conditions of the land areas of Eastern Europe. It turns out in this context that NATO troops (including US ground troops) are struggling with the effects of huge operational negligence that has accumulated over 25 years of stagnation in specific areas of the art of military and warfare compared to the capabilities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. This applies, among others, to long- and medium-range artillery, anti-tank assets, armor, UAV employment at tactical level, electronic warfare and the modern integrated air defence system that both Russia and China currently have.
This compels to change with respect to US operational concepts, equipment, dislocation, rotation, and army, navy and air force standing architectures. This is a direct consequence of the development of the Russian and Chinese A2/AD capabilities, making it difficult for US forces to operate close to the enemy in Eurasia where the history is being written.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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