The dissolution of the Soviet Union left Russia with a strategic problem. For centuries, Russian national security had depended on a buffer that would serve to increase the difficulty of invading Russia. After the collapse, this buffer dissolved into its historicalnations – the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine. The Russian dilemma was that this buffer was essential to Russia’s national security, but it lacked the military force to enforce the status quo ante. Instead, Russia relied on political arrangements with NATO and the United States in which, according to the Russians, it was agreed that no former Soviet state would be admitted into NATO. According to the Americans, however, constant Russian covert interference in these countries mooted this agreement, if indeed it had ever existed at all.
Russia’s Buffers
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, events have not been kind to Russia. The Baltics were integrated into NATO. Ukraine, perhaps the most important buffer state, saw a pro-Russia government overthrown in favor of a pro-West government, while Russia accused the United States of using covert operations to create the uprising and of supporting the new government. From the Russian point of view, not only had Russia lost the buffer integrated under Moscow’s rule, but it was now faced witha group of hostile countries, the Baltic states and Ukraine, all integrated into, at least in a limited sense, the U.S.-dominated Western defense system.
Ukraine is a vast and fragmented country. Its occupation by the United States and NATO would of course threaten Moscow, but it would require a massive effort to create an offensive infrastructure there. Kyiv may be notionally pro-West and eastern Ukraine under the control of Russia-backed forces, but in a practical sense, its vastness creates the buffer the Russians wanted. The United States has no real interest in Ukraine, save that it does not want Russian forces west of the Carpathian Mountains. Russia has a much greater interest in Ukraine, but it is content for now not to see American forces massed opposite Bryansk.
The Baltics represent a similar reality. Taken by the Russians, they would threaten Poland from the north. Manned with major Western forces, they threaten Russia’s northwest. But the Baltics lack strategic depth. This means a U.S. buildup or strike out of Poland would face not only infrastructure problems but also limited maneuver for forces facing tactical missiles and airpower. The loss of the Baltics is painful to Russia on several levels, but a war mounted from or through this region would be complex. Neither side would base a war plan on the Baltics alone.
Thus, as much as we speak of the erosion of Russia’s buffer, we must be aware that it continues to exist in a more ad hoc but still effective way. But there is one country that potentially poses a threat to both Russia and the West: Belarus. Sandwiched between the Baltics to the north and Ukraine to the south, its absorption by the West would turn Smolensk into a border town and bring Moscow within about 300 miles (480 kilometers) of Western forces on militarily acceptable terrain. If absorbed by the Russians, they would share a 150-mile front with Poland. Belarus, unlike Ukraine, is a manageable size for each side to consider a rapid offensive. It also has sufficient strategic depth and terrain to permit maneuver warfare.
Belarus is by far the most strategic country within the current reality. Russia could not tolerate a hostile power next to Smolensk and that close to Moscow. If such a power were to emerge, Russia would have to engage that force. Similarly, Poland could not tolerate a force of any significance on its eastern border, within range of Warsaw. If such a force materialized, Poland would have to act.
Belarus’ Neutrality
For the past 30 years, neither the U.S., which was involved in other regional countries, nor Russia, which was eager not to have the U.S. take excessive advantage of its weakened condition, accepted Belarusian neutrality. Neither particularly liked the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko, nor did either side fully trust the other, but it was understood that shifts in Ukraine and the Baltics could be integrated into the principle of buffer zones between Eastern Europe and Russia. Belarus could not be integrated, and therefore, its neutrality depended on neither side pressing forces into Belarus and a strong political leader, not overtly hostile to either side, staying in control.
The Russians have moved in recent months to press a long-standing idea:that Belarus should integrate with Russia. What the Russians precisely mean by this seems relatively benign, but a benign concept would not be pressed as hard as it has been pressed. Nor would Lukashenko be as openly alarmed as he is, looking for relationships with bordering countries and, in particular, for sources of energy to replace what the Russians have threatened to cut off. The concept of integration needs to be seen as a more far-reaching concept. At the very least, no one should assume that the suggestion is purely benign. Whatever is conceived now, perhaps even sincerely, can be replaced with a new conception, appropriate to a new geography. It is important to note that Belarus is not the only former Soviet republic that Russia is courting for some degree of integration. Uzbekistan is another.
We must therefore see the suggestion of integration of former Soviet republics as having a range of motivations. Vladimir Putin has declared the fall of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical disaster of our time. It is reasonable that a Russian leader might dream of reversing the fall. Interestingly, at the same time that the Belarusian issue came forward, Putin carried out a shakeup of the Russian government and conducted a significant purge of multiple levels of the military, but left the intelligence apparatus apparently intact. It was as if Putin were centralizing power in hands that already held overwhelming and decisive power. A better way to view his actions is that he reconfigured the state to efficiently implement his will, shook up the military because military organizations that see little action tend to ossify, and left the intelligence apparatus intact because since the Okhrana it hasbeen the foundation of the state.
Russia itself is not facing a strategic threat at this moment. The urgency with which the restructuring was carried out could not be out of fear of attack. It could, however, be out of expectation of the need for offensive operations. This is pure speculation, but lacking other explanations, this should be put on the table. The Russians regard Belarus as a major strategic issue, and the integration question arose at the same time as the restructuring happened. This may not be meaningful, but what is certain is that Putin has made integration with Belarus a priority.
The problem that Putin faces is that he cannot afford a military confrontation with the United States, and he cannot be certain how the U.S. would react in the long run. On the other hand, the U.S. cannot afford a military confrontation with Russia at this time. It is unclear what the intelligence services on both sides are hearing and how they are interpreting it, but what is clear is that while Belarus matters to both sides, it matters more to Russia. Thus the Russians might calculate that the risk of American intervention is low.
Poland’s View
This leaves Poland in a difficult position. It cannot block a full-bore Russian attack on Belarus once launched. The temptation would be to move rapidly into Belarus to place Polish forces into a blocking position. But they must have the Americans if not at their side then definitely at their backs, and the U.S. will likely warn the Poles that if they act unilaterally, the U.S. will not support them. Russia and Poland are asymmetric powers. Poland can no more tolerate a Russian-controlled Belarus than the Russians could tolerate a Polish-controlled one. But the Russians needn’t fear a Polish-controlled one, and that would seem to give them military options.
But as the Russians know well, the use of military force carries with it massive uncertainties, and the logic we see here may be faulty. This is the reality of both sides: First, Belarus is of great strategic interest. Second, the primary advantage of holding Belarus is strategic. Third, in spite of that, the risks are too uncertain for decision making. Therefore, each side will probe the other. Poland will probe to see how strong Lukashenko is and buy time. The Americans and Poles will probe to determine Russian intentions, with the Americans trying to generally understand what the Russians are doing. The Russians will probe in Poland to see if there are any factions that could be drawn into disrupting Poland’s political stability.
The latter is the highest risk the Russians will take now, and it may work, depending on Poland’s stability. The Russians have already tried to isolate Poland from Germany, by downplaying Germany’s role in World War II and blaming Poland for it. For Russia, the isolation and political fragmentation of Poland is the strategic key. Paralyzing U.S. reinforcements by creating distractions elsewhere would likely take place as well.
The key to the Polish view of the Belarus situation is internal. If a large faction emerges that sees the Belarus issue as insignificant, Russia could eliminate any risks of acting and even achieve domination of Belarus without military action. If it could isolate Poland from Germany, it would complicate American reinforcements massively. Therefore, Poland must wage political war. Defensively, it must create a polity united on the Belarus question. Offensively, it must leave Russia uncertain of how its military might react to an attack and confused as to the American response. Just as Russia is using political means to open a military door, Poland must use political means to close that door.
Autor
George Friedman
Founder and Chairman of Geopolitical Futures - www.geopoliticalfutures.com
George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.
Dr. Friedman is a New York Times bestselling author and his most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages.
Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media.
For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.
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