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The result of this approach was our reluctance to take any actions in the east, creating old and so familiar instruments for political leverage on the elites of new buffer states, which could be considered imperial, or might be specifically associated with the Polish imperial past of the rule in the east, and – by the way – with an old, “nasty” world, full of violence from powers stronger than Poland, a world that after 1991 was supposed to depart forever into the history textbooks.
On this occasion, we cautiously took care of the independent posture of the new states elites in the East more than our Western partners cared about ours during the socially-painful transformation and our years of chasing the West.
It was so because Western policy instruments did not reach there or were not effective, and therefore Western countries had to reckon with Poland in this region.
In his characteristically brusque manner, Piłsudski assessed a Polish policy towards the West which would not implement the above recommendations. In this case it would have to be obedient and secondary in all directions to the wishes of the Western powers of that time, depriving the country of its will and forcing it to accept the will of powers from outside the region.
Jerzy Giedroyć, in the same vein, railed against Polish governments after the turning point of 1989/91 for failing to implement the plan of building influence and for an overall misunderstanding of the significance of potential Polish influence in Belarus, Ukraine or Lithuania, of the importance of Poland for the West, in line with Piłsudski’s thinking, which turns out to be equally relevant in 2020. Despite the “end of history” and the conviction amongst our elites that after the collapse of the Soviets, this kind of (geopolitical) thinking in terms of space and building leverage instruments had become an anachronism under the new circumstances – the short-lived triumph of the model of liberal democracy and modernity. It all seemed world’s away from Adolf Bocheński’s pre-war reflections on the need for a Polish Monroe doctrine in our part of Europe.
It is ridiculous that Macron does this without having any significant instruments of political leverage in the region. He just got used (like others) to the idea that Poland, sticking to its “strategic restraint,” has nothing to say on the matters of the region.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Without Poland’s consent, neither France, nor even Germany, nor anyone else will be able to agree on any important matter concerning our part of the old continent, in particular regarding security. For example, Poland can arm Ukraine fuelling further struggle of Ukrainians against Russia, or supply Belarus with raw materials and necessary consumer products.
This is not megalomania. These are facts.
In order for it to reach others, there will be a lot of daily work to do for our diplomacy, the armed forces and the broadly understood administration, as well as expert circles, and thus playing a new status game for its role in Europe, including non-European powers: US, China and Turkey, which have interests in our region of the world.
It is therefore time to review the grand strategy of Poland and to communicate it at various levels. Without this, in the new balance (if there is one – as Macron claims) we will not count, and we can’t rely on the old order to serve our interests as it did. Even if the Americans remain in Europe, there will be a new balance. Actually, it’s already happening and we must play the game.
Below is a preliminary plan to review Poland’s grand strategy in the east, in points.
1. Communicating to European allies and partners (especially Germany and France) that Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania and the Baltic States are the zone of the direct, vital interests of Poland and that the Polish state will protect its interests, and not counting with us will be punished and sanctioned in various ways available to Poland.
– Contrary to some people’s concerns, there are many of these ways, because cooperation in the framework of the European Union gives a lot of political instruments, not to mention the key location of Poland, which communicates countries in the East to the Atlantic rimlands. It is impossible to miss Poland on transport and trade routes to these countries from the west of the continent; It is impossible without Poland’s participation (in the case of Warsaw’s firm stance) to stabilise security issues in Ukraine and ensure the stabilisation of Belarus and to guarantee the independence of the Baltic States. No Normandy Format, Minsk Protocol or rotation of NATO troops in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will change this truth (only a firm attitude of Warsaw would be needed).
– of course you need a catalogue of interests that we want to communicate; this is yet to come.
– these would certainly include all agreements with powers from outside the region: 17+1, the Three Seas Initiative, European policies towards the East, agreements between Western powers, China and Turkey with Russia about our region; key investments in infrastructure affecting strategic flows and communication, Nord Stream, all transmission and storage infrastructure for energy; Ukrainian, Romanian and Baltic ports; railway infrastructure (especially in the case of Ukraine); the acquisition of important technologies (Motor Sich); legal regulations affecting the accumulation and the work of capital – like changes in land-trading rules and external capital investment in Ukraine and Belarus.
Our economic area and our capital must be present in the east, it’s natural, and currently blocked by bad oligarchic practices and the advantage of Western capital with political support from their governments. The forced liberalisation of land-trading in Ukraine is very important to us as a power in agricultural production. We should be the first to benefit from it and not the Germans, the Americans or the Israelis.
We have natural advantages, we need the support of large politics and the pressure of our politicians using the instruments to have at least a level playing field with others.
All of the above should be the subject of recognition and protection of the intelligence services of the Polish state to protect the above interests, including offensive intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and the creation of networks of connections and influences controlled by Warsaw.
2. China is coming to Europe through the Eurasian land masses, Turkey, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, probably also through Russia. It should be communicated to Beijing that they will not have any chance to invest in Poland if all political, economic and investment activities in Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic States in the Baltic area, Romania and the Danube Valley will not be consulted with Warsaw, because due to our location controlling strategic flows (along with Ukraine) on the east-west axis from Asia to Europe, investments related to strategic flows are not neutral for Poland’s vested interests. For example, we may lose on them – like Nord Stream, or a railway connection from Ukraine to Slovakia, or the Belt and Road through the Danube Valley bypassing Poland. Despite all this, Beijing needs Poland. There is no other way for large volumes than through Poland. If, of course, they want to really become more independent in transport from the World Ocean controlled by US Navy. We have nothing to lose in communicating with Beijing on this issue, especially since there is no real inward investment and we play on the side of the USA in the new era of great power competition in Eurasia.
3. An immediate start needs to be made on preparing the operational concept for the Polish armed forces for a limited war in our part of Europe (and therefore not full-scale, continental), non-linear (and therefore not NATO versus Russia), perhaps completely independent (and therefore without NATO and the USA, this can happen) as part of a new generation war (not only kinetic, but multi-domain, information, situational awareness system recognition and strategic signaling capabilities), as part of an active defence, including on a strategic foreground (stretching from the Gulf of Riga to Odessa and Constanta and to the Dnieper and the Daugava), with fires impact on the whole area as part of the ongoing revolution in military affairs, i.e., to put it more concisely – to build our own A2AD anti-access capabilities against Russia’s A2AD in our security area . In this way, we will become a factor in the Intermarium, which must be reckoned with, and our politicians will receive an instrument of political leverage, thanks to which they will be able to pursue other goals – investment or regulatory in the east.
4. Prepare a policy narrative where we will share a community of fate (both regarding the past but also for the future) and the interests of the Intermarium nations in opposition to the Russian narrative.
5. Money, money, money – to support Polish investments in the east by private business, by banks, by state-owned companies, creating funds for the purchase of enterprises in financial difficulties (e.g. Motor Sich), land purchases, dual-use technologies that have a chance to create their own supply chain or technological leaps. Belarus and Ukraine have a lot to offer here. Creating financial mechanisms to acquire scientists, knowledge and competences. This is what the Americans did after the war for Donbass, reaching for scientists from Ukraine; the Turks are doing it now as we idly watch.
6. The development of the Solidarity Transport Hub and the likes/other projects increasing the region’s connectivity towards the Polish centre, which is the gravitational area for Kaliningrad, Grodno, Vilnius, Brest, Lida, Baranowicz, Lviv; that is, connections with Poland for the flow of people and goods (and thus knowledge, information, data and innovation, entrepreneurship); at a later stage, a connection via western Ukraine to Constanta and Bucharest by highway and high-speed rail – the internal communication line of the Intermarium.
7. Investments of the Polish banking sector in the east – loans, guarantees, insurance, stock purchases.
8. If the international system continues to fall apart and the US presence or NATO functionality could not be guaranteed – an alliance with Ukraine and mutual security guarantees should be considered, although this is a HUGE risk, but we can live to see the times soon, that only we and Ukraine will be the only real regional deterrent against Russian domination.
9. Energy infrastructure connecting the entire area: reverse-flow pipelines, connections, warehouses, strategic flows from Świnoujście, Gdańsk, and other Polish ports, digital Three Seas and Intermarium, digital highway.
It is striking that the above postulates and the need to revise the strategy towards the East are just as necessary regardless of whether we choose the independence (New Atlantic) option of orienting ourselves towards the US and building our role in the region or continental EU consolidation and thus building the continental European empire. Both options mean that Poland should be reckoned with and the eastern buffer zone in both options will be paramount for the vital interests of the Polish state, both in supporting the US presence in Eurasia and suppressing the pressure of Russia and China, as well as in consolidating the European empire, where we will be the strongest eastern state foreground. Geography in both situations will force us to control the foreground of our own security from the Gulf of Riga through Belarus to Ukraine to the Black Sea and the Romanian ports.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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