(kremlin.ru)
For several centuries the main site of geopolitical tension between the two great power rivals was the current territories of Ukraine. Over time the arenas of confrontation and wars switched to the Balkans and the Caucasus. Only for a short period in the XVIII century was Russia able to establish a naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea. This was part of Russia’s grand strategy against the Ottoman Empire which was summarized as a continuous attempt to “scorch the Ottoman Empire from four ends” (Поджечь Турцию с четырех концов). Another part of this strategy was the Greek Plan that envisaged the mobilisation of support amongst Christian nations against the Ottomans.
The most crucial war between Russia and Turkey was the war from 1774-1798 that ended with the most disadvantageous of agreements for the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which made Russia a Black Sea power and controlling possessor of Crimea. It was at the same time a symbolic and historical turning point, from which the Ottoman Empire was never able to recover and Russian expansion split in those two main directions mentioned earlier, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Catherine the Great was against this approach because of Russia’s deep engagement in Poland, but when she decided to answer to Ottomans she optimistically stated that the Russians would “undertake such a bell-ringing to the Turks, who never would have expected such actions from us!” In a closed meeting (now it would be called a “Security Council”) discussions took place regarding the situation on the frontline between Turkey and Russia. Russian leadership pointed out that Russia had tried to settle all the outstanding issues between the two nations diplomatically. It was true such preparation for war had never taken place before in Russian history. In a secret document, they planned to destroy the Ottoman Empire as a state. Catherine the Great suggested that “the Turks had awoken a sleeping cat.” Eventually, the idea that Turkey was the “Sick man of Europe” was introduced into European politics by Nicolas I in 1853.
Along with these belligerent relations, major efforts were directed towards establishing favorable relations between the two great powers. However, this was not in the interests of Western powers. Soviet Russia between 1918 and 1938 (i.e. until the death of Ataturk) maintained cordial relations with Turkey. The Montreux Convention of 1936 was actually the result of Russian-Turkish diplomatic collaboration. Between 1945 and 1963, relations were again quite aggressive and belligerent but the Cyprus problem brought Turkey to very warm relationships with Moscow throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s normal relations were resumed but both sides still supported separatists. Turkey supported the Chechens against Russia and Russia in return partially supported Kurdish separatism. At the same time economic pragmatism prevailed between the two countries.
In recent years, Turkey has not accepted the fact of the Russian presence in Syria since 2015 and as result we have witnessed dramatic incidents that brought the two powers to the verge of a real war. But the position of Erdogan in Europe and relations with the U.S. pushed Erdogan for a restoration of relations with Russia. The final straw was a pro-Western coup in 2016 that brought Turkey even closer to Russia. The Axis-agreements in Astana and Sochi between Iran, Russia and Turkey were the first peace treaties since the end of Cold War were undertaken without the West by non-Western countries. In addition to political and diplomatic ties, Russia imposed the strategy of “conditionality” towards Turkey: nuclear plant, economic cooperation, military deals (s-400) and the “Turkish Stream.”
Now we are witnessing the final phase of the Syrian drama which is approaching its end and it has both positive and negative scenarios. There may be a final phase that will turn into the next Russian-Turkish war or at least to a proxy war that is actually already ongoing. Alas, we cannot exclude such a scenario, which I will return to later. The most realistic scenario – and one which Ankara has actually reiterated many times – is that Assad’s forces will be pushed to the previous frontiers which were agreed in the Sochi agreement. Erdogan has promised to do something with the concentration of jihadists in the Idlib zone, but what he could actually do with them is the most interesting question. Of course Turkey sent many of them to Libya but the concentration in numbers of jihadists does not allow Turkey to evacuate them all to Northern Africa, neither will Ankara bring them to Turkey. Thus, the only option is to keep the refugees and jihadists in this de-escalation zone. In such a scenario, Turkey would be following in the steps of Israel in the Golan Heights and the endpoint may similarly be the actual occupation and eventual annexation of these territories. No European power, nor the U.S., will be able to push Turkey from these territories after this operation. Ankara lost many martyred soldiers during this still-unfinished operation.
New and highly disturbing trends are emerging in the European continent regarding the desire of some European nations for the reassessment and revision of current borders. A recent Pew Research Center survey shows that startling numbers of Europeans are not satisfied with their nation’s borders. According to the data, 67% of Hungarians replied in the affirmative, as did 60% of Greeks, 58% of both Bulgarians and Turks, 53% of Russians and 48% of Poles. All these nations represent old Eastern European rivalries and the borders after WWII have not satisfied them. Russia, which has dreamed for almost three hundred years about having stable access to the Middle East, finally achieved its goal and would like to stabilize its geopolitical gains but she did not count on having to compete with Turkey in the regional power vacuum. The Misak-ı Millî (National Pact) from 1920 envisaged that the territories inhabited by a Turkish majority are the homeland of the Turkish nation. The frontiers of those territorial demands reached up to northern Syria and Northern Iraq.
Both Russia and Turkey are each behaving quite similarly, according to their own individual geopolitical concerns. First, they think that the borders do not represent genuine ethnic areas of their countries. Second, they react correspondingly according to their threat feelings (if we take the realist school); both see the creation of proxy regimes in the space between them and their rivals as an element of defense. For Russia. this is Donbas and the pro-Russian proxies; in the case of Turkey, it is international jihadist groups, Sunni Arabs and the Turkic ethnic communities around its southern borders both in Iraq and Syria. Finally for Turkey and for those communities and refugees in Turkey, it is a chance to use them for changing the ethnic landscape of Northern Syria and Iraq, which is populated by Kurds. Actually, it is possible to say that the future of Northern Syria has two directions. One is to become new frozen conflict in the Greater Middle East (if we look on the map we can see that all the areas of frozen conflict are located on former territories of the Ottoman Empire: Transnistria, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia). The second path is to attain the same status as the Golden Heights. It seems that either way, the destiny of Syria is to be a country torn apart by regional players.
One important factor which should be discussed here is the geopolitical consequences of this operation if we close our eyes on the Russian dimension. When Nasser’s Egypt appeared on the global political map, one of his most important regional geopolitical principles was the struggle against the regional hegemony of Turkey, which had controlled the Near East for centuries. This was a continuation of the foreign policy of Muhammad Ali Pasha, who challenged the core of the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor. Only Russian interference prevented his military success. However, contemporary Turkish geopolitical ambitions during recent years extend beyond Syria or Russia. They are in the Persian Gulf, which is very irritating for Saudi Arabia and its allies. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s ambitions are highly alarming to Greece, Cyprus and especially Egypt, which supports Khalifa Haftar in Libya against the UN recognized government in Tripoli. Cairo regards the military presence of Turkey in Northern Africa as a threat to its national interests and for many Arab countries, the rise of Turkey is a highly disturbing factor. Nevertheless, Turkey is trying to find its place or even restore its historically rightful place on the geopolitical landscape of the Near and Middle East. Another question is this – would the rest of the countries in the region be able to provide a stable balance of power? Turkey’s concentration of huge forces in the Idlib zone is on the one hand a demonstration of power and readiness to resist but on the other hand, it provides a great temptation to attack the Syrian Army beyond the frontier that was agreed in 2018 and go for instance to Aleppo or even Damascus. This inevitably puts the Turkish Army on a collision course with Russian and Iranian military groups, but such scenarios are very dangerous for the entire region and definitely for Europe. However, many hawks would like to see such developments in the Levant.
Russia’s warfare and strategy in Syria has changed since the unprecedented success within recent years when she helped the Assad regime restore control over major parts of the country. And it is still unclear why she decided to support Damascus in its ‘adventure’ to the Idlib area.
Even when there were direct signs that Turkey was concentrating forces in the Hatay province, Russia vehemently continued its support of the Syrian Army. Yes, the success of the Syrian Army was bright and sprightful. They almost reached the province’s capital but logically Turkey intervened and halted the strategic advance of the Syrians. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria is to establish peace in the country with global and national implications. Global implications are to show to the world that she is able to “clean up” the mess after Western powers whilst on a local level, the aim is to secure its permanent military and civic presence in Syria. In Syria, Russia have applied a multitasked and multidimensional strategy which consists of several ingredients: maneuverability, operability and flexibility of the means; the ends were the same – secure its presence in the country. The tactics of warfare are highly dependent on other elements of Russia’s grand strategy in Syria, namely: diplomatic (with elements of old secret diplomacy and probably even territorial concessions), political, economic and element of PMCs. The sophisticated strategy had one special feature, which is not to engage the land force into any local conflict. The main pillar is the Air Forces, with elements of high-tech military technologies and high-value weapons which Russia are testing in the battleground. As in the case of Donbas, Russia has a sophisticated system of proxy forces on the ground additionally to PMCs. Thus, in all three elements (maneuverability, operability and flexibility) Russia depends on its assessment of a correlation of forces, regional and global, and if one element of strategy for example military is exhausted she immediately applies diplomatic means or proxy elements.
Notwithstanding all the above mentioned factors, a direct Russian-Turkish confrontation remains possible because it looks as though Russia may have made a strategic miscalculation over Turkey. It is against Putin’s tactics to endanger geopolitical gains. If Turkey was to go beyond the Sochi-agreed frontline we would definitely say that a miscalculation has occurred and the following consequences of the situation will be uncertain. However, within a couple days Putin and Erdogan reportedly have to meet again (if some provocation or strategic fault does not occur in Syria) and Putin is more likely give the Idlib zone up to Ankara. Many experts would likely regard it as defeat of Russia, but Russia’s aim is to secure its territorial gains in a restored Syria, especially in the Syrian Levant (Latakia-Tartus-Homs-Damascus).
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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