Bayraktar TB2 Runway (wikimedia.org)
Introduction
The beginning of 2020 almost brought Russia and Turkey to direct kinetic war. The reason for this was initially a successful Syrian offensive against Turkish-backed rebel forces. This success forced Turkey to enter a war against the Syrian Army and from 27 February until 5 March we witnessed an active phase of hostilities in the Idlib Province. Russia and Turkey were coming to this confrontation well-experienced in the use of UAVs and EMS warfare technologies. Both Turkey and Russia demonstrated their excellence at this warfare domain against the local rebellion groups in Syria and Turkey (against Kurds), but neither Russia nor Turkey or other countries had the experience of an almost direct clash against a peer competitor. It was truly a transformational confrontation and will definitely be added into the military handbooks and manuals. The drones in this full-scale military operation were not merely an element of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) but an instrument of combat, fully integrated into the operational strategy of three countries – Syria, Russia and Turkey. In Idlib, Russia and Syria learned the hard truth of how important drones are in modern warfare and duly employed at massive levels the use of EMS warfare against Turkish drones.
Russia’s Role: defense and observation
The drone strikes against the Russian Khmeimim airbase in 2018-2019 were the first of its kind against a great military power in history. The next chapter for the future theory of drone warfare, both in terms of drone use by insurgents and drones being a crucial element of modern war between states, occurred in 2020 in the Idlib Province.
All in all, Turkey entered the ranks of UAVs powers independently and now uses combat drones as an important instrument in protecting its national interests throughout the entire Middle East.
Turkish sources indicate that their radio-electronic jamming system allowed them to undertake all necessary tasks during the conflict with the Syrian Army, despite the closure of the airspace over Idlib by the Russian and Syrian government forces. According to the Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar, in just one night, the army destroyed more than 200 targets, five helicopters, 23 tanks, 23 artillery pieces, “Buk” and “Pantsir” anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as 309 Syrian soldiers. Turkish operations in Idlib involved the most modern operational-tactical drones “Bayraktar TB2” and multi-purpose “TAI Anka.”[1] It was their massive use that ensured the unprecedented success of the Turkish army and it was a message not only to Russia, but to the Western allies and more importantly, to the regional powers with whom Turkey is competing for regional hegemony that Turkey made great leaps in this new war domain. Turkish drones were doing what Russian UAVs are still not capable of, destroying targets immediately after detecting them.
Concurrently, in Moscow, some experts provided their own version of the conflict and of course, this reflected the Russian narrative.[2] In Idlib, they admitted, Turkey achieved some success, but it was not a “strategic success” and the rest was merely Turkish victory rhetoric. The “air phase” of the Idlib confrontation lasted around two days and was only one part of the conflict. Neither the Russians nor the Syrians expected the Turkish Army’s presence in the zone. That by itself was a key factor that altered the entire battlefield. Two days of Russian and Syrian embarrassment allowed Turkey to achieve some tactical success. But when Syrians and Russians adjusted to the factor of Turks fighting actively on the side of the rebels in the battlefield and in the Syrian airspace, they balanced Turkey’s drone superiority by their air defense systems. The nature of Turkish success on the first day of using drones was based on their more powerful EMS warfare systems that worked directly from Turkish territory and covered the area of Idlib.
The Turkish system of EMS warfare enabled Ankara to listen to the Syrian Army telephones, allowing them to detect the coordinates of the Syrians. After, they transmitted locations to the drones “TAI Anka” that relayed data to the combat drone “Bayraktar TB2” for target elimination. However, Russian specialists explain this success by the fact that the Syrians did not know how to run EMS warfare – they instead naively used their cell phones. The immediate remedy of the Syrian Army and its local allies was primitive but effective, i.e. terminating the use of cell phones and anything that allows others to detect their location. Orders were subsequently issued on paper and neither Turkish drones nor EMS warfare could identify the Syrians.
Importantly, Western specialists completely disagree with such an assessment. For instance, the Institute of the Study of War indicated that Turkey’s destruction of Russian-provided anti-aircraft systems damaged Russia’s reputation and could reduce its subsequent arms sales. Turkish drones, likely using electronic jamming technology, evaded the attack and destroyed at least three Russian-made state of the art “Pantsir-S1” air-defense systems.[3] The Turkish specialist wrote that this was possible because Turkey carried out very serious electronic warfare and deployed radar electronic attack systems including KORAL (with an effective range of some 200km which is exactly enough for Idlib zone) to intercept and deceive radar systems in Syria.[4] Although, the type of “Pantsir-S1” systems in use by the Syrian Army are not arguably the most advanced.
Regarding the Russian-made Syrian “Pantsir-S1” systems, Turkish sources claim to have succeeded in destroying eight “Pantsir-S1” of the Syrian army (old versions). The Russian Ministry of Defense refuted these numbers and stated that in Syria two of them were damaged, out of four actually installed in Idlib. This was the first time Turkey had managed to command the airspace over such a large area using drone swarms.[5] According to the Russian version, the main target of the Turkish combat drones was the heavy weaponry[6] of the Syrian Army and they did it quite successfully. The psychological effect of this strike was particularly important. Due to the ability of drones to sneak into the Syrian army rears and to destroy people and machines without any direct participation in the battlefield, the continuous drone strikes from the air led to a situation where Syrian reservists abandoned equipment and fled from positions.[7] The first “Pantsir-S1” were deployed to Idlib by Syria on March 1, and these systems shot down around ten Turkish drones just within one day. The delivery of air-defense-systems according to the Russian experts stabilized the balance in the battlefield and permitted the Syrian Army to regain the strategic city of Saraqib. However, Turkish specialists are persisting that their drones are capable of destroying these systems and, as evidence, they emphasized that the drones had destroyed a “Pantsir-S1” at very close range, when the system had not detected the Turkish drones.[8] The fog of war and information warfare apparently remain as vital as in the times of Clausewitz.
TAI-ANKA-UAV-FAR14-3659 (wikimedia.org)
Turkey’s Role: offense and elaboration of strategy of drone attacks
Turkey is experiencing a golden age in the development of its military industry. In 2016, Turkey’s President of Defense Industries İsmail Demir, stated during his stay in the U.S., “I don’t want to be sarcastic, but I would like to thank [the U.S. government] for any of the projects that were not approved of by the U.S. because this forced us to develop our own systems,” Demir quipped, adding that Turkey no longer wanted U.S.-made combat drones.[9]Thanks to restrictive measures on drone technology of the West towards Turkey, it became the leading state with combat drones that have proved their effectiveness in many combats across the Middle East. Some experts are even calling Turkey a “drone superpower”[10] but it is too early for such a claim nevertheless the direction is certain.
Neither Israel nor the United States wanted to share technologies with Turkey, but this actually worked to Turkish advantage.[11] Recently, on YouTube during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, Turkey presented a unique documentary “AKINCI”[12] about the Turkish UAV industry. The main message is that the country has reached the highest technological stage and is able to compete at the world level with other players of the UAV market.
During the conflict of February-March (Operation Spring Shield), Turkish drones were operating almost everywhere in the Greater Idlib zones and had reached the deep rear of the Syrian Army. The penetration into the Syrian rear had serious psychological and military consequences. The Syrians spotted them in Hama and Aleppo, territories under Syrian Government control. Turkey used the drones in the operation “Olive Branch” in 2018, but it was the first time at such a scale and against a foreign country that has such a powerful backer as Russia.
In Idlib, the Turkish Army involved new drones for the first time and used its Turkish-made ANKA-S and Bayraktar-TB2 with intensity. The drones for Turkey were not only a strategic or tactical component during the Idlib hostilities. There was also an element of the use of the so-called “sniper” tactic from the air – to liquidate the targeted groups of an enemy or a specific person. For example, Turkish drones reportedly liquidated two Syrian brigade generals and colonels in Aleppo and the representatives of Hezbollah and one Iranian militia.[13]
Furthermore, Turkey actively promoted itself as a country which for the first time in a real battle had used sophisticated small drones in the so-called “swarm” tactic against the Assad regime forces.[14] Turkish officials described a new type of a drone attack as a military innovation that demonstrated Ankara’s technological prowess on the battlefield. It was the first time the country had commanded air space over such a large area using drone swarms. These swarms of remotely-controlled drones by the series destroyed Syrian bases and chemical warfare depots, as well as missile-defense systems.[15]
The strategic success of Turkey in Idlib is undeniable; they managed to stop the operation of the Syrian Army against the rebels and even pushed them back. Some bold specialists provided quite interesting characteristics that Turkey is now “a robust drone power with new technologies, concepts, and a burgeoning military-strategic cultural character prioritizing unmanned systems in fighting wars.”[16] Russia had to intervene in the conflict both militarily and diplomatically in order to stop Turkey’s impressive advance.
MQ-9 Reaper (wikimedia.org)
Russia thinks from a different angle. This angle represents a long-lasting strategy towards the improvement of relations with Turkey and a direct confrontation with Turkey was not in Moscow’s plans. Nevertheless, it was in its interest to allow the Turkish-Syrian clash in the Idlib, as it was an invaluable experience to see a NATO country in action and especially NATO’s drone strategy and tactics in a real-time battle. This was a process of in-depth evaluation, observation and reflection. Moscow didn’t interfere too much with the conflict and enjoyed it, as a theoretician, by making valuable notes from their observations and giving Turkey the freedom of action to see what a NATO-member country is capable of. Strikingly, pro-Iranian Al-Akbar and the Syrians blamed the Russians that they had intentionally left the airspace and this had allowed Turkey to launch a full scale drone attack against the Syrian Army.[17] The Russian experts raised quite an interesting possibility that actually the use of drones had been allowed by Russia as result of Turkish-Russian agreement during intensive negotiations in Ankara and Moscow. [18]
[1] https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/02/28/turkey-has-destroyed-missile-systems-dozens-of-tanks-and-five-helicopters-in-idlib/
[2] https://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2020/03/11/629955.html
[3] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-commits-idlib
[4] https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkeys-drone-use-puts-forward-new-military-doctrine-3513352
[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-01/turkey-s-killer-drone-swarm-poses-syria-air-challenge-to-putin
[6] Middle East Report N°213 – Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, International Crisis Group // https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/213-silencing-guns-syrias-idlib
[7] Военно-Промышленный Курьер (ВПК) 3-9 Марта, №8 (821), 2020 p.5
[8] https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/sihalar-idlib-harekatini-tarihe-gecirdi-bu-inanilir-gibi-degil-tanksavar-kullanmaya-kalksaniz-aylar-surer-3527623
[9] https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-drones/turkeys-effective-drone-campaign-over-syrias-idlib
[10] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/turkey-middle-easts-newest-drone-super-power-142242
[11] https://www.insider.com/turkey-drones-syria-russia-wont-confront-directly-2020-3
[12] https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-defence/turkey-drone-documentary-premiers-muslim-holiday
[13] https://www.indyturk.com/node/139296/haber/t%C3%BCrkiye-siha-ile-vurdu-suriyeli-2-general-ile-l%C3%BCbnan-hizbullah%C4%B1-milisleri
[14] TGRT Haber TV 1 March 2020 “Yeni Üretilen Sürü İHA’lar da İdlib’de” // https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLx6LWV6Az8
[15] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-01/turkey-s-killer-drone-swarm-poses-syria-air-challenge-to-putin
[16] https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys-drone-blitz-over-idlib/
[17] https://al-akhbar.com/Syria/284961
[18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/turkish-drones-game-changer-idlib-200302182621318.html?utm_source=website&utm_medium=article_page&utm_campaign=read_more_links
Wing Loong II side view, Dubai Air Show 2017 (wikipedia.org)
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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