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Introduction
The canon of the strategic theory is full of interesting and unique concepts that were introduced many years earlier than they were implemented in the operational models of modern warfare. However, since it first emerged as an independent field of scientific discussion, its most difficult challenge might be to develop strategic theoretical patterns and concepts for the future wars in Outer Space. Specifically, in our Solar System because it will require centuries until humanity reaches the areas beyond the Kuiper belt. It seems that we are on the doorstep of the future historical stage of the Age of Discovery, but this time it is going to involve our Solar System with its planets, satellites, etc., just as European naval and merchant fleets eventually established a sophisticated system of colonies and the system of strategic control points (choke points) which were and still are attached to the maritime strategies of the Western countries. As James Clay Moltz writes,
“The crux of most military approaches has been the notion that the space environment presents generically similar challenges as a ‘medium’ in which to consider the deployment and operation of military forces. Given its similar function as a global commons, the sea and naval power analogies have been used most frequently. Space and sea are linked in terms of the large extra-territorial regions involved, the long lines of communications, and the presence of perceived strategic choke points.”[1]
Quite an important weakness of such scientific extrapolations, this writer notes, is that they are not able to capture space’s particular physical environment, which can change the theory when it eventually faces reality.
Nevertheless, everything confirms that humanity will do their best to try to integrate previous experiences into the new environments. The prominent strategist Colin Gray wrote that we can find a great deal of research – and sophisticated research – on space policy, space technology, antisatellite weapons, space-based weapons, but “…no body of writing which attempts to explain what space power is and how it will work as a pervasive, albeit technologically dynamic, influence on strategic history in ways complementary to land, sea, and air power.”[2]
Astropolitics: Colonization and Expansion
Let’s maybe start by taking a step back to fully appreciate the fact that human history is amazing. Humanity, civilization – and especially European civilization – has been conducting omnidirectional expansion and colonization since the very beginning of human political history. Once, a Russian historian Sergey Soloviev stated that “Russian history is the history of a country which is constantly colonizing.” Descendants of Europeans colonized all continents and their heritage was visible everywhere, in every corner of our Earth. Even if countries call for their own authenticity and originality, they merely imitate the European historical matrix in order to be a true “historical nation”. External expansion is the most important element of every civilization success. When this process comes to a halt, we witness the reverse process, when a civilization or great power shrinks in its ability to project power and maintain social cohesion. Thus, the main conclusion is that in order to survive, civilizations must expand and colonize other terrains or in other words, conduct spatial expansion.
Human history knows two main types of colonization. The first and the oldest type of colonization and expansion is when nations, people and tribes move from one terrain to another. After a certain evolution, world history named this type of colonization in its political manifestation “Tellurocracy”. It was noticed that colonization had a political and cultural dimension, which defies the future of the terrain. Alternatively to Tellurocracy (power of land), world history knows the specific form of expansion and colonization known as the Thalassocracy (power of sea). Tellurocracy traditionally expanded into the mainland and always aimed to control the core of the continent. In the case of Eurasia, two empires particularly used this pattern – Russia and the Mongolian Empire.
Thalassocracy is an opposite form of expansion and consequently colonization. It aims to establish control over the choke points of the World Ocean and the coastlines of all continents. The political and cultural dimension of Thalassocracy is different from Tellurocracy. The process of expansion and colonization under Thalassocracy is based upon overwhelming use of naval fleets. The vessel or ship is the main instrument of colonization under Thalassocracy. Exactly this instrument has permitted the Europeans and their descendants to reach the Northern and Southern Poles and colonize all the continents of Planet Earth. To make a simple comparison, we can see that neither Russia nor the Mongolian Empire was as successful in colonization as the small European nations. The ship was the main advantage that Europeans had against Eurasia. The strategic mobility of the vessels allowed them to establish human interaction with the far-reaching regions of the world, which was impossible for the Tellurocracies.
As well as sea and land, there is one additional “zone” which humankind “colonized” only in the XX century. It would be impossible to speak about the next historical step of humanity in space without this “zone”. Striving for the expansion into the air “zone”, humans created the aircrafts that made a true revolution in human-to-human interaction. Most importantly, it led to a revolution in modern warfare. The drone revolution which we are facing currently is the next historical stage of this revolution.
Nevertheless, air forces have not become as traditional an element for politics as naval forces. The aircraft in modern warfare is only an additional element of war. Certainly, the XX century and especially the current rivalry between the West and the Russian Federation since 2014 have demonstrated that aircraft can be a real element of politics. The brightest example is the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane in 1960 during the Cold War. More recent examples include the Russian Sukhoi Su-24 shot down in 2015 by Turkey, the American B-1B conducting flights over the NATO’s Eastern European allies and member-states in June 2020, the constant violation of NATO countries’ airspace by Russian warplanes and American surveillance of Russian A2/AD zones in Crimea or Kaliningrad. Notwithstanding this, warplanes are not able to conduct a genuine political function as are naval forces, namely the projection of power in different corners of the world. It’s been evident since the times of Ancient Greece that one vessel with warriors and settlers is able to project power over far-reaching areas. The Greek expansion into the Mediterranean or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov was possible with the effective combination of naval forces used in a way that combined two functions: military and demographical (bringing settlers to the terra incognita). All colonization since then was done with the use of naval forces and civil vessels. The entire colonial system since the XV century is a great tribute to the naval forces. They are capable of conducting strategic and diplomatic tasks independently and remotely from the metropolis. The naval force is an autonomous military and diplomatic entity of the country’s which aims to defend national interests in remote areas. Moreover, the lion’s share of global trade is done by merchant fleets that are bringing goods all around the world. Control of strategic flows and supply chains is the main thing that Western naval forces have been doing since the Age of Discovery and it seems that such strategic functions are going to be extrapolated to Space someday. However, the nature of Space is such that it will likely combine the rules of air and naval operations.
[1] James Clay Moltz, “Space and Strategy: from theory to policy” in (Edit. Eligar Sadeh)“Space Strategy in 21st Century: Theory and Policy”, Rutledge, London, 2013. p.28
[2] Gray S. Collin, “The Influence of Space Power upon the History,” Comparative Strategy, 15(4), 1996, p. 305
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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