Malacca Strait (pinterest.com)
The direct approach depends on overcoming Chinese A2AD capabilities with the use of the entire spectrum of conventional combat methods, both offensive and defensive, including carrying out large-scale strikes on key targets in mainland China, with the potential consequence of conflict escalation. Initially, the entire AirSea Battle Concept was treated as synonymous with the direct approach, with intermediate options as extra alternatives. Currently, with the expansion of the concept, it is thought that both variants, along with the sub-variants, constitute the entirety of the concept as implemented in training and the operational planning of the armed forces of the United States.
Yet, the dependency of China on raw materials import should not be overstated; barring China from global trade will have a decisive effect. The blockade would not follow the pattern of the blockade employed against Imperial Japan during the Second World War when American submarines attacked merchant ships under Japanese colours everywhere, including close to the shores of Japan. Yet, the submarines would, at least at the beginning of the conflict, be assigned other tasks against the most high-value targets (destroying China’s submarine fleet, striking key targets on land and the destruction of the undersea infrastructure within the First Island Chain: cables censors) and the blockade would not be conducted close to Chinese ports, for fear of China’s potential A2AD capabilities.
Furthermore, instead of the sinking of cargo ships, ships sailing to China would be intercepted and the goods found on the ship would be seized. The use of force would be applied when the circumstances demand. These interception operations would require large numbers of warships – due to the massive scale of commercial traffic.
Admittedly, in the later stages of the conflict, the risk is forecast to diminish, since the Chinese fleet will have been sunk or paralysed earlier. The distant blockade would also require that the Chinese undersea lines of communication and cables be cut, as well as the undersea energy infrastructure, in order to disrupt the energy and strategic flows supply to China.
The second subvariant, defending the First Island Chain (offshore denial, war–at-sea, maritime denial) posits the conduct of war against the transit of Chinese ships within the First Island Chain, minelaying around Chinese ports and preventing China from using its ports and littoral waters along with the effective use of American and allied A2AD capabilities along the First Island Chain, so that Chinese forces and maritime trade would be unable to pass through to the open ocean.
This option envisages the use of Army and Marine Corps units, in what is known as the ‘archipelago defence’. It posits the use of Army and special forces units to support American and allied forces to prevent Chinese sea and air forces from venturing outside the First Island Chain. It encompasses a combined allied network of land, air and sea defences among the dense spread of islands in the first chain. In order to achieve the proper level of synchronization and cooperation, a deep integration of the combat systems of the United States’ allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines is recommended. Here, we expect the growing US pressure on NATO European allies to contribute, as well.
The above concept includes land forces in its AirSea Battle plans, if only for minelaying tasks, conducted from army helicopters or artillery, small barges and other custom maritime units. This allows specialist units greater possibilities in selecting targets and making precision strikes. In the event of an invasion of Taiwan or the islands in the East China Sea, special forces may be tasked with conducting guerrilla warfare. The Army may further prove useful, since they possess rocket artillery, with a range of a couple of hundred kilometres, which may be used to attack targets at sea. The dense network of islands enables the construction of substitute communications based on underground systems and cyberfire cables. In order to accomplish all of the above, the military spending of the allied nations in the region must increase and joint training exercises and combined military operations must be supported. In order to properly safeguard the implementation of the land component of the defence of the first line of islands and to immobilize China’s forces inside the First Island Chain, it would be necessary to consider the deployment of United States land forces in the Philippines and Vietnam or in other Southeast Asian nations.
During the Cold War, the mission of the Japanese Navy was to assist the US Navy in preventing the Soviet Pacific Fleet from reaching the open Pacific Ocean. Consequently, exploiting the favourable conditions of the region’s marine geography, the Japanese expanded their submarine force, installed undersea sensors to detect Soviet activity, perfected techniques for conducting a mining war and above all, they were upgrading their skills in anti-submarine warfare. The geographic layout forced the Russians to funnel their traffic, which in turn, was easy to detect and neutralize. The Soviet Union’s submarine fleet was essentially locked in within the Sea of Japan; similarly, the Japanese expanded the missile defences of the island of Hokkaido, from where it was possible to control the surface vessels’ movements of the Soviet Fleet, attacking surface units from the land using mobile launchers and even positions lying deep inland. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat from this direction diminished, which affected the deployment and capabilities of Japanese forces.
It was believed until recently in Japan that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force would enjoy a significant advantage over the Chinese fleet in quality and organization, and so it was to remain for the foreseeable future. This is not the case anymore.
In recent years, the Chinese fleet has conducted an increasing number of integrated maritime operations to the east of the Japanese archipelago, first penetrating the Ryukyu archipelago barrier, comprising numerous scattered islands that limit China’s access to the open Pacific. In particular, the Japanese are worried by the capabilities of the increasing numbers of Chinese submarines, which has prompted the latest idea from Tokyo, regarding the expansion of their own submarine fleet to at least 22 units and to keep the older types of vessels in service for longer.
In addition, the string of Japanese islands unfolding in the direction of China means that American aircraft carriers, launching warplanes, have all Chinese ports, river estuaries and all maritime lines of communication within their operational range. The Japanese archipelago constitutes not only an anchor of the First Island Chain in the littoral seas of Asia, but its northern part is also the culmination of the Second Island Chain, stretching as far as Papua New Guinea across the open Pacific. As the Chinese fleet, with time, will operate beyond the First Island Chain more often, it will still have to pass the Second Island Chain and its narrow passages, which will result in frequent meeting of ships in times of peace, and in times of war, with extremely intense combat operations.
Geography has situated these two countries – China and Japan – close to one another, with Japan open to the Pacific whilst China is not. China will not be able therefore to fulfil its dream of becoming a seapower without overcoming this obstacle and eliminating the anxiety resulting from the lack of autonomous strategic control of its lines of communication.
The fundamental contribution that the Japanese potentially bring to the AirSea Battle Concept are conventional submarines, guarding the First Island Chain: quiet, modern and numerous. This should force Beijing to invest in the expansion of anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which is currently lacking, but such investment bleeds resources away from other modernization programs, in particular those relating to offensive capabilities, such as developing their own submarines or ballistic missiles, which could effectively disrupt the capability of the United States to project power in the region. A lack of maritime offensive capabilities will only help bottle the Chinese fleet up inside the First Island Chain in a defensive posture.
Any lack of counteraction on the part of China would mean the establishment of an enormous American-Japanese advantage in respect to submarine warfare inside the First Island Chain, which would have serious consequences for any movement on Chinese lines of communication, even those close to Chinese ports. In other words, the enlargement of the Japanese submarine fleet and its capacity for unhindered operation in the First Island Chain would weaken China. Whichever course they take, in the long term they will be in a weakened position. This is the recipe for the proper execution of the Japanese-American ‘competition-strategy’ towards China.
The second contribution provided by Japan is the capability of offensive minelaying of the passages between the islands of the Ryukyu archipelago, both by ships and planes. Mines in the shallow and narrow straits would essentially paralyse the operations of the Chinese fleet. At the same time, it is significant that the Chinese will not be able to respond for fear of incurring serious losses.
The majority of Japan’s towns, bases and ports are on Japan’s east coast. The Japanese fleet could easily get out into the Pacific from its sea bases at Sasebo and Kure. For the Chinese to be able to mine the entrances to these ports, they would have to cover several hundred nautical miles across the open ocean inside the Second Island Chain, vulnerable to attacks from the air and the sea (and undersea), close to Japanese territory, and the poorly armed ships, designated for and without a powerful escort, might not have a chance to survive such engagement.
Another contribution is stationing military personnel and shoring up the defences on the Ryukyu Islands which, with the exception of Okinawa and Miyako are not defended. For this reason, Japanese amphibious infantry units, capable of defending or recapturing occupied islands by assault are currently being expanded. The islands themselves, being defended, may create A2AD bubbles, hampering China’s maritime and airborne penetration of the Ryukyu islands perimeter. Deploying anti-ship missiles, just as during the Cold War on Hokkaido, would ensure deep defence against any Chinese landings aimed at breaking through the Ryukyu and attempts by China’s Oceanic Fleet to get to the open Pacific. The Chinese ships would probably pass within range of missile systems stationed at different islands of the archipelago, making sea transit a very risky venture, vulnerable to attack. An additional argument in favour of this would be the provocation of China to attack the reinforced positions and mobile missile launchers on the islands using ballistic and cruise missiles, which would cause the Chinese to use up expensive missiles on relatively insignificant targets, thereby increasing the survival rate and minimizing destruction of more important targets, such as port and airfields in Japan proper.
To this end, the war plans prescribe that the Japanese fleet moves deep into the Pacific, making use of the American supply ports in Guam and Hawaii, performing a strategic withdrawal in order to avoid destruction in a missile salvo, and also to provoke the Chinese fleet and drawing it out beyond the Second Island Chain soon after the beginning of the war, forcing it to operate along extended lines of communication and with disrupted communication between the components of the fleet, enabling it to be isolated and destroyed. The plans foresee a rotating deployment of elements of the Japanese Navy on Guam, likewise in peacetime, in order to practice procedures and to ensure that they avoid destruction in the event of a pre-emptive Chinese strike. Were such a situation to arise, the redeployment of Japanese Self-Defence Forces to Guam or even Hawaii would be a harbinger of the tangible danger of the outbreak of kinetic war in the Western Pacific.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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