The Coming Pacific War. Part 5. Criticism

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Its primary aim is to help create the conditions that would allow the United States to win a war in the maritime part of the eastern Asian Rimland, and to propose a method of conducting operational activities to this end; the United States is currently being pushed out of the region thanks to China’s A2AD capabilities. In particular, the concept aims to restore to the US Navy the capability to freely project force, the US Navy being the foundation for the security architecture of this region, currently the most important for the world’s economy.

It is to support a broader American strategy in the Pacific, aimed at ensuring the stability of the security architecture. The essential elements are the protection of American ports and installations, the defence of key allies, protection of American and allied trade routes, blockading China’s maritime trade, the neutralization/elimination of China’s armed forces and the unhindered projection of force in the Western Pacific, according to the whim of the United States. In addition, the existence of the concept itself should contribute to imposing a cost-strategy on the Chinese, encouraging China to invest in costly armaments in areas less dangerous to American forces and their operations.

 

Any military operational concept can turn out to be a catastrophic mistake, if there is no clear strategy supporting a specific operational concept. The Germans became convinced of this during the Second World War, when they introduced the famous operational concept of a ‘lightning war’, known as Blitzkrieg, into ground-based operations in the European Rimland, in an extraordinarily effective way.

 

This concept met with unprecedented success up until the war with the Soviet Union.  Thereafter, despite further successes in individual battles and operations on the Eastern Front (which of itself proved the validity of the assumptions of the operational concept), it ultimately proved ineffective in the depths of the vast expanses of the European Heartland in the Soviet Union. From a German perspective, the Eastern War turned into a succession of ‘lost operational combat victories’ ensured by the brilliance of Blitzkrieg (and the effectiveness of Wehrmacht personnel), but without the final strategic victory, since the Germans lacked a comprehensive and effective war-winning strategy, of which Blitzkrieg could be only the operational fulfillment.

Consequently, the fundamental criticism levied against the AirSea Battle Concept is that it is not actually a strategy, but merely an idea supporting the Joint Operational Access Concept(JOAC), the United States force projection doctrine in future conflicts in a situation of the development of advanced precision munitions by the adversaries of the United States. Such capabilities might hinder the sea and air forces of the American superpower from reaching the conflict zone and hinder or even prevent them from overcoming the enemy with minimal losses of their own. In past wars fought by the United States after the Second World War, that was the norm; in the future, it will probably become a distant memory.

 

Meanwhile, critics state that the AirSea Battle Concept fails to fulfil several key elements of a true strategy, namely: the definition of clear and legitimate initial assumptions, a coherent correlation between the means used and the objectives envisaged, strategic priorities and, most importantly, an answer to the question of what would actually constitute an American victory in the event of an armed confrontation.  This applies in particular to the ‘direct approach’ version of the concept

 

The specific criticism is made that it is ‘an operational concept looking for a strategy’, which does not include a ‘theory of victory’ in an eventual war with China. On the other hand, it must be admitted that supporters of the concept do not argue with this. The official documents also do not aspire for the concept to be a strategy. JOAC describes it as a ‘warfighting concept’ and focuses on identifying the actions required to neutralize the threats inherent in China’s A2ADcapability and the changes that need to be implemented to achieve those actions effectively. In other words, the concept is merely a blueprint for planners as to how to resolve the specific operational problem arising from the expulsion of American force projection from the Western Pacific. It talks only about how to ‘kick in the door’ that has been slammed in the Americans’ faces, but gives no clue as to what to do next, once the door is open.

 

It is also for this reason that the AirSea Battle Concept can only be one element of a broader strategy that covers plans and preparations for an eventual war with China and will enable the connection of the achievement of the military objectives (which the concept is to serve) and the political aims of the conflict, in the understanding of war as a political measure according to von Clausewitz’s classic aphorism.

 

The fundamental objection to the AirSea Battle Concept, which is raised primarily by the influential Australian analyst, Hugh White, is the argument that American political and military leaders are psychologically incapable of entertaining the fact that the United States no longer enjoys a military advantage over China in the Western Pacific.

This in turn enables another sober assertion: that the area between the ports of mainland China and the First Island Chain belongs to no one and is – making a comparison with the experiences of the Western Front during the First World War – no man’s land, or better – no man’s sea, where neither the Americans nor the Chinese can freely project their force.  The Western Pacific is subject to an operational balance, with defined strategic consequences.  Awareness of this fact changes all war plans. There is no guarantee of success at an operational level, since achieving a sufficient level of destruction or neutralization of Chinese A2AD capabilities is impossible, whereas the risk to American maritime operations in the zone remains extremely high.

According to White, this is a typical strategic overestimation of one’s own capabilities. In the Western Pacific, these are significantly asymmetrical. The gravitational centre of the conflict will lie in the littoral waters off China – in China’s backyard – and the Americans will have to operate far from their own ports. In this case, geography favours the Chinese. In addition, on a psychological level, China really cares about what is going on in their littoral seas, since they are the direct lifeblood of their economy and their security zone; the region is important to the Americans too, but not to the same extent. Furthermore, A2AD capabilities (in particular those denying the Americans free navigation, such as mines, submarine and missile warfare etc.) are, at their current level of technical development, much more easily applied than control of the seas – ‘mastery of the seas’ as it were – which is the ambition of the United States. The latter requires a visible and permanent naval presence – when employing the asymmetrical A2AD, this is not necessary.

The Americans, in addition to the operational difficulties that we have shown, have too few capital warships. A visible presence on the sea is of enormous significance in exercising control of it and the seas and oceans are vast areas. The current state-of-the-art in technological developments also favours A2AD capabilities, such as mines, submarines, aircraft and precision rockets launched from land or from platforms at sea that can destroy naval forces from a concealed position and at distance.

 

The sheer scale and size of China itself also work in its favour, both geographically and due to the industrial and shipbuilding facilities, as well as the naval, mercantile and fishing fleets, constituting a true maritime reconnaissance and situational awareness network in China’s littoral waters.

 

Hugh White further argues that China is not an adversary like Iraq, Serbia or Libya, but a mighty power immersed in the global trade system and the strongest opponent, culturally and militarily, that the United States has had to face since it became a power itself. According to White, the AirSea Battle Concept by itself will not achieve the strategic objective, even if it were to fulfil its operational aims, which is doubtful. It will not be possible to exchange the achieved operational objectives for strategic ones and then for political effects, contrary to the Chinese position and, therefore, there is no assured ‘theory of victory in war’.

 

White goes on to say that any war between the United States and China would be very intensive.  Striking at targets in mainland China would have an escalatory effect, and such a war would undoubtedly be the largest war in the world since 1945. The economic effects would touch the whole world.

 

According to White, the Americans do not understand that the balance of power has shifted and that they ought to propose a new regional security arrangement to the Chinese. Indeed, from the point of view of the grand strategy, to prevent China’s aggressive expansion and to maintain peace in Asia, it should be enough to ensure the status of Corbett’s ‘uncommanded sea’, which would effectively block China’s expansion and revisionist policies. At the same time, a proposal should be made to the Chinese to construct an Asian concert of equal powers, which right now seems totally realistic and achievable, and which would ensure peace for decades ahead, and also in all probability providing the region with further prosperity and reducing the tensions of rivalry.

Yet, White claims that American strategic culture does not comprehend the concept of a concert of powers, and always strives to secure American dominance, and consequently, this will be difficult to change. In his conclusion, White points out that the Chinese do not consider the AirSea Battle Concept sufficiently effective, and therefore, they become even more confident. Despite the implementation of the concept, China continues to test America’s determination and capability to project force in the South China Sea, which, in the event of an unfortunate coincidence or disrupted strategic communications between the powers may lead to open war; this situation was barely avoided between the United States and The Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin Blockade in the 20th century.

Critics further believe that the design of the concept did not consider the fact that, with the exception of Japan, America’s allies in Asia are a strategic burden to which the United States are committed (proximity of bases to China, the legal obligation of defence, the potential of accommodating China due to economic dependence on them, and the attendant strategic instability, lack of significant military capabilities of their own). Added to this is the complexity of relations with allies that are trading partners of Beijing, which benefits China, and certainly makes it easier for them to separate and divide partners and their interests and to ensure the gradual erosion of American influence in the region; this can be seen in the relations of the United States with the ASEAN member states.

A thorough concept regarding war with China in the Western Pacific must achieve the following aims: to deter/dissuade China from confrontation, to secure and strengthen the positions of regional allies, to stimulate the technological development of the United States armed forces and, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities – facilitate its resolution on favourable terms to the United States.

 

What is a victory in a conflict between two great powers like the United States and China anyway? Does it mean the occupation of Chinese territory, which is a continent in itself, comparable in size to Europe? Or is it maybe the overthrow of the Communist Party of China (CPC)? The absence of a definition of what constitutes success in a war, that is, the lack of a theory of victory prevents any methodologically valid conceptual discussion about war aims, the way it is to be conducted, and the means used to achieve success. The basic task of a strategy is to provide a complete answer to this issue, especially in the event of ever-more restricted financial capabilities, a very real threat for the Pentagon to consider in the near future.

 

A true strategy should seek American advantages that can arise from the geography of the Western Pacific, using the existing strengths of the American armed forces at the cost of Chinese weaknesses. It must also be financially reasonable and must allow for Chinese culture in the way they wage war.

One of the criticisms most commonly put forward of the direct option of the AirSea Battle Concept is the argument that in the event of war, the Chinese will be attempting to change the status quo in the balance of power and security architecture in the Western Pacific. According to supporters of this argument, it is sufficient, therefore, in order to win the confrontation, to prevent the Chinese from attaining these objectives by adopting a defensive strategy, consistent with the concept of defending the First Island Chain (Offshore Control).

In this strategy, there will be no need to fulfil ambitious offensive missions, aimed at throwing China to its knees by destroying its infrastructure, command, reconnaissance and combat management systems or units located in mainland China. Most probably, therefore, it would be enough to concentrate on the defence of the First Island Chain (Japan, Ryukyu, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia), whilst at the same time combatting all Chinese ships and aircraft between it and the Middle Kingdom (the intermediate version –  offshore control/maritime denial).

The US Navy continues to enjoy an overall superiority which would allow them to attain American dominance over the waters beyond the First Island Chain as far as the Second Island Chain (Guam, Saipan, the Carolinas, the Marianas, the Indonesian straits) and on the open Pacific. Such a strategy would not require the capitulation of China, the occupation or the overthrow of the government in the Middle Kingdom. Rather it would be aimed at forcing China to recognise that they are not in a position to win a conflict, yet allowing the Chinese side to announce an honourable victory and an end to hostilities, without a de facto change in the balance of power in the region. In practice, this would maintain American supremacy and the existing security architecture. The situation would revert to that in force before the war, and the Chinese would understand that they are not capable of achieving their goals through armed conflict.

However, in the event of the implementation of the First Island Chain defence concept (offshore control/maritime denial), within the First Island Chain, a long, drawn-out conflict is to be expected. In any case, in the event of any war with China, it will be essential to consider the possibility that it will be long and exhausting. The interruption or interference of trade with China, which is currently the world’s largest producer of goods in the world, will be enormous.

 

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak 

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

 

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