The Scandinavian connection

(Source: needpix.com)

Polish strategic thinking has traditionally been trapped between Germany and Russia. An attempt to get out of this tangle of choosing between the options na Niemcy(“for Germany”) orna Rosję(“for Russia” – or the Soviet Union, as the Polish communists did) was an attempt to invite the Anglo-Saxon sea powers to play in our part of the world in accordance with Halford Mackinder’s proposals. Hence, the pro-independence party traditionally chose the geopolitical option of the USA and Great Britain. So it was during the Second World War and so it is now. This was to create the potential for resistance against continental consolidation under the command of Germany or Russia, or, worst of all, in cooperation between Russia and Germany, which was harmful to our self-determination. 

The Russians, launching the attack on Kyiv, precisely wanted to dot the i and determine, as they believed, the inevitability of a continental consolidation involving France and Germany, thus exposing the superficiality of American security guarantees in Central and Eastern Europe.

The war did not go as planned by the Russians, but it remains unresolved. The Germans and French, concerned about the emancipation of countries in our region, peripheral to the centre of the EU, strengthened by the support of the US and the successes of the Ukrainian army, are preparing for a political counterattack. They have no intention of relinquishing the power they de facto have over us thanks to the power of their economies, production chains, margin and value distribution, and through EU regulations and institutions. 

The last meeting between Scholz and Macron clearly showed this. It would not occur to them that our part of Europe would become a subject in European politics. One strategy on how to prevent this from happening and at the same time maintain one’s own dominant agency, — the Germans especially think so — is to position yourself as the main playing partner in Europe against the Americans, as demonstrated by the circumstances around the infamous transfer of German Leopard 2s to Ukraine. The Germans want to settle such matters with the Americans and not be forced by the states of their “Mitteleuropa”. Of course, this is not the only German idea.

It intrigues me how the Germans put on a mask of strangely free-thinking, and meanwhile I find more and more in this great cleverness and cunning, a calculated strategy.

While this idea presented above can still be called cooperative with the US, I am sure that Germany still has a continental consolidation plan in reserve. That is why they do not want to submit directly to US pressure, they have still not received a proposal from Washington that would give Germany a chance to develop at a level similar to the continental scenario. Exactly for this reason, the Germans also do not want Russia to lose in the war, because their room for manoeuvre will decrease, they will lose a convenient development option.

Neither do they want to give up lucrative trade with China (hence so much rhetoric about Europe’s strategic independence) and they certainly do not intend to empower Poland and the countries of our region in relation to themselves as the “core” of the EU, as they modestly think of themselves. In general, both the Germans and the French are not at all sure whether the Americans will get their way in Eurasia, and as they say, “Europe must develop in all circumstances.”

Therefore it may turn out (from Warsaw’s perspective) that just playing for the Americans may not be enough, and even if it is enough, the Americans may need the Germans more anyway. That’s why we must go beyond the usual patterns of thinking along the east-west axis in the main part of the continent and start taking action together with the Scandinavians. The more-so that they have something to offer us, and we them.

Traditionally, the Scandinavian states have been out of the mainstream of continental affairs. Sweden especially has succeeded in this: it was not too close to Russia, like Finland, to submit its policy to the Russian empire, and at the same time not directly on the open Atlantic to wage wars for sea communication routes in this ocean. It was more difficult for Finland and Norway, also during the Cold War, because Finland is too close to St. Petersburg (Leningrad) for the Russians to accept it without influencing the country’s foreign policy, and Norway is too important, as it gives access to the sea routes of the northern Atlantic from its numerous ports, which translates into GIUK inspections – i.e. exits from the Arctic seas to the full Atlantic.

For this reason, Norwegian ports offered the possibility of blocking Soviet sea traffic, and they can now do the same to Russia by locking it in a bastion of icy seas. On the other hand, free passage from the Russian bastion under the nose of the Norwegians gives Russia a chance to harm the US fleet and communication with Europe. So if they were taken over by powers pursuing a continental policy (as the Germans did in 1940), Norwegian ports would be an excellent starting point for crossing the Atlantic lines of communication from America to Europe. Now we know why our sailors and soldiers died at Narvik.

That’s why Norway had such an important role in NATO and during the Cold War. And Sweden could remain itself, somewhere peacefully on the sidelines of European affairs, but certainly armed to the teeth – if the Soviets thought to raise a hand against it. Finland, on the other hand, had to have its foreign policy … “Finlandized”, i.e. not to stand up to the Soviets so that they would not feel threatened.

Now both Sweden and Finland want to join NATO, and here the key role of the USA for the security of Europe is emphasised.

From the Scandinavian north through the Baltic Sea through the centre of the anti-Russian front in Poland to Romania and, of course, fighting Ukraine on the Black Sea, a cordon may be created to block Russia from European affairs. Together, all these countries have sufficient economic and ultimately military potential to stop and defeat Russia, cementing the transatlantic world, and thus be a convenient transmission belt for Washington’s influence on European affairs, and at low cost. This is an ideal situation for Washington, so it would be easy to get full US support for such cooperation.

There are many advantages of such cooperation: the development of north-south communication routes, and thus trade and exchange; a common front against Germany’s and France’s attempts to dominate Europe’s foreign and security policy; a common front to maintain the transatlantic world in opposition to the ideas of European strategic independence pushed by France, but also by Germany; NATO enlargement, a common security policy towards the Baltic states and Ukraine, and perhaps ultimately also Belarus; bilateral arrangements with the Americans for stationing and cooperation regardless of the increasingly sluggish NATO, which is already suggested by the Swedes changing their, one might even say, several hundred-year-old policy. This is especially important as NATO evolves in the face of Germany’s impotence or unwillingness to abandon plans for continental consolidation and cooperation in Eurasia. 

In addition, the aforementioned Scandinavian countries have considerable military capabilities and traditions, unlike many on the main continent. Sweden, Norway and Finland contribute a lot to the strategic calculation in northern Europe. This opens up great fields of military cooperation with Poland. The Baltic can be easily closed to Russian operations, the vast space of Scandinavia and the geometry of the theatre of war give the future Polish air force spectacular opportunities to operate and protect its bases by dispersal in the event of war with Russia. The situational awareness system that we can create together is also no trifle.

In addition, such strong cooperation makes it even more possible for the Americans to come from beyond the “line of the horizon,” which will be well received on the Potomac. Our neighbours across the Baltic Sea have modern technologies and military-trained societies, and the geography itself will result in the expansion of Russian troops in the western military district and resources in the northern fleet. Thanks to the new formula of cooperation, the Americans will be able to come to Europe and combine their military capabilities with the capabilities of the Intermarium alliance with Scandinavia, bypassing a sluggish France and Germany.

Sweden and Finland in NATO reduces the risk of a Russian attack scenario on the Suwałki isthmus, and the Baltic Sea becomes our common closed lake. Norway always links the US to Europe thanks to the weight of the GIUK. The axis of Europe’s military equilibrium would thus shift to the World Ocean via Scandinavia, which would be a link between American policy directly to our region without the unbearable and complete self-aggrandisement of Germany.

In this arrangement, Poland is the centre of gravity of a new security system and a renewed transatlantic order, and Scandinavia is the link with the USA, which makes it possible by eliminating the risk of continental consolidation.

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

Strategy&Future

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