War in the Pacific, Autumn 2024, and the Prigozhin rebellion

(Source: pxfuel.com)

One such destabilising factor may be the elections in Taiwan, and to be precise a result that is inconsistent with US interests. Of course, these can be incidents in the South China Sea or a quarrel between Chinese and Japanese fishermen in the Ryukyu archipelago. Not to mention all the completely surprising events that can suddenly or unexpectedly change the perception of the balance of power between Beijing and Washington. This can cause violent instability in the relationship by escalating or destabilising the fragile balance. Such violently destabilising events in relations between the great powers include, for example, Prigozhin’s rebellion and the march of his Wagnerians to Rostov-on-Don and their would-be march on Moscow. 

We’ve been writing for a long time at S&F about the structural differences between the US and China. It is difficult to enumerate in the summer of 2023 which ones do not differ. Potential de-risking or its harder version — de-coupling — seems like enough of a rollback on China’s hard economic and strategic interests to sleep peacefully and not be afraid of entering a spiral of competition that may end in a full technological war, trade war, financial war, raw material war and ultimately kinetic war.

It’s like in a stormy relationship: he and she mean well, i.e. they want some kind of stabilisation of the relationship, without too frequent “imba(s)” [ed. imbalances], they obviously have good intentions, but each side wants the relationship to function in accordance with the interests (and these even in love are different, everyone has their own personal and professional or financial situation — that is, their own structural issues in which they live every day) or “mine” and not “your” desires because “I know better” what “our relationship” should look like. This is supposedly the “breaking in” or the “struggle of characters” between people, which often ends in parting, unless the parties finally “break in” (i.e. adapt to one another). The world, for lovers, is wide and each of the former lovers will find their place in the world. With great powers, it’s not so straightforward. They cannot relocate and of course there are no feelings between countries, although there is a similar psychological process of fighting over what the “relationship” is supposed to look like. 
Almost no leader ever wants a big war, but conflicts do flare up when the interest structure leads to them. Both parties in the relationship try to behave rationally and predictably, but gently build their advantages over the other party (even pretending to themselves that they aren’t doing so). But just like in a lovers’ relationship, they are often destabilised by a situation that affects how they perceive each other in this relationship. There doesn’t even have to be a third person involved, it’s enough that something changes in lifestyle, daily routine, behaviour, etc.

This is what the so-called brinkmanship between countries is all about, which the Americans want to do towards China. While maintaining a strategic manoeuvre as a recognised world leader (world opinion is used to the Americans doing this and it can as a hegemon and this does not spoil the daily life of the world public or disturb it), they test and check the limits of China’s interests and how far they can go in this way, hoping, in turn, that they will shape relations with Beijing to their advantage (embargoes, sanctions, sailing in waters that Beijing considers its own, etc.). Washington also believes that Beijing’s reaction can always be considered disproportionate, changing the status quo, and thus the perception of world opinion, which will cause its anxiety and automatically anti-Chinese sentiment. This would help Washington assemble an anti-China coalition. Such a game requires a skillful and stable leader in Washington. Most importantly, even when tilting the relationship to its side, both parties must be relatively predictable in their reactions to maintain fragile stability even within the framework of rivalry.

There can be no unpredictability here, because the whole process of maintaining a fragile but “strengthened” balance is important and difficult at the same time. Hence the visits of Jake Sullivan and Antony Blinken to Beijing, “massaging” relations, “shaping” and constant appeals from Washington for joint procedures to de-escalate possible incidents. However, the Chinese do not want such a procedure because they rightly believe that the Americans are playing them by testing the borders, at the same time being able to sell the story to the world that the behaviour of the USA is OK (they always behaved like this as a hegemon and everyone was fine with it), and these Chinese, full of sick ambitions, are strange and dangerous because unpredictable. In fact, the Americans are thus gathering the anti-Chinese coalition around themselves and stimulating world, and certainly Western, public opinion against China.  

The Chinese, in turn, do not want to have the aforementioned de-escalation procedures, because they would rather the Americans think twice about testing the borders, not being sure how the Chinese will react. It is better for Beijing that there is a lack of clarity here, so that the Americans do not have a fuse for their — as the Chinese believe — aggressive behaviour, and that Washington is afraid to test China.

That is why Donald Trump was a difficult leader to keep in balance in international affairs, because he deliberately introduced US unpredictability. This is a good strategy if the dominance of the unpredictable player is unquestionable because it causes fear and quenches the claims of others. If the dominance is not full or undisputed, such an attitude leads to conflict and war because the perception of the balance of power is different and forces the side against which it is used to test the unpredictability bluff. That’s why I’m concerned about 2024 in the Western Pacific. There may be events that affect the balance of power. Prigozhin’s rebellion was just such a potentially destabilising relationship in the US-Russia-China triangle. There are indications that Washington feared Putin’s loss of power in this way and pressured the Ukrainians not to do anything that would have made Putin’s situation worse. After all, it is not known how Prigozin would behave if he had taken power in Moscow, what about his attitude to strategic stability, the nuclear balance, the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine or the orientation of Russia’s policy — whether to side with China or the West. I think Washington was looking on in horror at what was happening on the Rostov-Moscow highway, because the Pentagon was not in control of a situation that was becoming unpredictable.

Two very potentially destabilising things will happen in 2024: the Taiwan election and the US election. They will overlap with the structural issues between the US and China and the whole world — increasingly divided, buried behind protectionist measures, behind embargoes and tariffs, in the middle of a technological revolution that will lift some and push others down.

If the Kuomintang wins the elections in Taiwan, it may start secret talks with China on the mainland about a peaceful (albeit long-term and probably very slow) reunification, because the KMT leaders will want to avoid the fate of Ukraine, especially since they live well in Taiwan thanks to cooperation with China across the straits. They may not like the role of an American grinding mill, with their semiconductor factories destroyed and the constant risk of war. If such secret negotiations between Taipei and Beijing began, then of course the Americans would find out the next day and it would destabilise the American perception of China’s intentions and the balance of power in the region, which would collapse rapidly to Washington’s disadvantage. They would feel very threatened. This in itself would destabilise relations as well as US relations with Taiwan and perhaps with some allies who may not share Washington’s concerns that such developments are unfavourable. It may well be less unfavourable for them than for the US. Certainly, such an attitude of Taipei would weaken the US in the Pacific. It would be very much disliked in Washington. So they might, as they usually do, respond with increased economic sanctions against China.

China has so far not responded proportionately to US sanctions. Now, this may change — it is too important for Beijing. This could be a very quick escalation due to US concerns about their control of the situation with Taiwan, the belief that as the world’s hegemon, they can escalate. In addition, if a candidate in the US wins, who believes that unpredictability is a virtue of the stronger (when de facto it is not stronger or this is at least uncertain) and who decides to wave unpredictability before Beijing’s eyes, it will cause fear in Beijing and uncertainty about the stability of the system. The nerves then let go and there may be an escalation and an incident that triggers war. Any behaviour by Washington will be regarded as escalating and oppressive towards China, and vice versa. There may be a repeat of Sarajevo and war breaks out. 

So much depends on the leadership and the handling of things by both sides. Structural issues are pushing us to war as early as 2024. May the leadership of both sides prevent it. This is the first time I am writing about it so openly, in recent days I have started to be afraid of 2024. I wish I was wrong. Especially since the holidays are coming and we all want a break from war and geopolitics.

Autor

Jacek Bartosiak

CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.

Strategy&Future

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