This is why we have come up with a new proposition – the Intermarium Weekly, where we are going to monitor daily developments in the region that might have a bearing on geostrategic landscape of Europe and Eurasia in their entirety.
For centuries, this part of Europe has been a playground for great power competition, witnessing devastating wars, excessive turmoil and revolutions. Just as importantly, in times of stability and power consolidation, it has also tended to foster its own strategic culture. Being traditionally squeezed between the sea and continental powers in a crush zone composed of a 1200 km long belt of multiple nations, it stretches from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea forming the European Intermarium, right along the main geopolitical crossroads of strategic flows, between a vibrant European peninsula and the formidable militaries of the Eurasian landmass.
At Strategy&Future, we have sought to cultivate a lively tradition of strategic thought and mental mapping that is unique to the region and its inhabitants.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former satellite states of the Soviet empire joined the international community, with its system of free strategic flows underpinned by the power of the United States. Notably, it was a system characterised by a lack of systemic tensions and competition between major powers. This in turn allowed for the rapid onset of globalisation after 1991. Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries opened their markets to capital, commodity and technological flows, with all the consequences that came with it.
Poland’s accession to the EU likewise ensured free flows of people, knowledge and data. Furthermore, Poland joined NATO, expanding the Northern Atlantic Alliance’s sphere of influence deeper into the Old Continent and much further from the World Ocean.
In doing so, Central and Eastern European nations were provided with US security guarantees. Everybody should remember that guarantees to all US allies in Eurasia depend entirely on US capability to effectively project power in Eurasia in places that are far away from the US mainland and across the vast expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
While Halford Mackinder’s thesis is revered until this day by the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the US in the aftermath of the Second World War did not heed Mackinder’s grand designs of supporting the independence of Intermarium nations situated between the Black and Baltic Seas in order to counter and undermine the Soviets’ Heartland-based continental power.
A division of Europe into zones of influence sanctioned in the Yalta and Potsdam arrangements was the outcome.
There are few places as important within the entire Eurasia as that which Poland and her neighbours – Belarus and Ukraine – occupy. Hence it is of little surprise that the tale of Polish statehood is one of constant struggle for non-interference of neighbouring continental powers, which have inevitably tried to subordinate this crossroad between Western and Eastern Europe and harness its potential to best serve their own strategic flows.
Because of its pivotal geographic location, Poland’s strategic interests extend beyond its own borders, whatever they may be at a given moment in history.
The fate of the country was always inextricably linked to thinking in terms of geopolitics. This way of thinking was imposed upon by requirements of survival in the borderland between the sea-faring European peninsula and continental Europe, more akin to the endless swathes of Eurasia and vastly different from the vibrant coastal regions of the Atlantic. Being located at the heart of Europe – on the Northern European Plain that forms a natural conduit between the world’s most prominent land powers of the recent past, driven by the desire to assure free access to the World Ocean via the Baltic ports, meant that whoever ruled the country faced pressure from not only powerful neighbors to its east and west, but virtually the heft of entire continents from both sides.
Nations of the Intermarium are trying to make a living between the Baltic and Black Seas.
Between the perennial industrial powerhouse of Germany, often in the past facing away from the maritime world dominated by the English-speaking peoples, embarking on the continental expansion towards the interior of the Eurasian supercontinent. And between the Russians or the Soviets – a land empire par excellence, locked in the merciless, relentless geography of northern Eurasia, eternally dreaming the dream of warm water ports somewhere at the coast of the World Ocean. Incidentally, this geopolitical constellation allowed the sea powers to play and use the Intermarium nations to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany.
At the same time, any past designs of the continental powers in Eurasia did not provide the nations of the Intermarium with the much-desired access to the World Ocean and to its allies, thus depriving them of their independence.
In this context it is easy to understand why Warsaw and other CEE capitals wanted to see the unipolar moment of post-1991 Pax Americana last forever.
This desire also helps us better understand nowadays the motivation behind Polish investment in the LNG terminal in the coastal town of Świnoujście or the Baltic Pipe LNG pipeline, as well as the continuous efforts aimed at increasing the US military footprint in Poland. It is also the rationale for encouraging the independence of countries to Poland’s east, that make for buffer states separating Poland from Russia.
We are now entering a chaotic period of reshaping and restructuring of the global order.
The post-Cold War order has now ended, but the contours of the forthcoming one are still largely vague at best. Will the rise of China transform into some sort of a multipolar affair, marking a return to tried and tested arrangements we know from virtually the entirety of recorded history – with empires balancing one another? Or will the new Pax Americana 2.0., reformed and reinforced once again reign victorious?
We will be monitoring developments in the region to find answers.
A TURBULENT BEGINNING TO THE NEW YEAR IN 2020
Intermarium in Polish strategic agenda for next year: Three Seas’ Regional Initiative; Solidarity Transport Hub; canal across the Vistula Spit and the outpost on the NATO Eastern Flank.
The events in Croatia namely the demise of President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic and her replacement by the left’s Zoran Milanovic stirred serious concerns in Poland due to the implications for the Three Seas’ Initiative. The Three Seas’ initiative was initiated by President Grabar-Kitarovic with Polish President Andrzej Duda. The new President of Croatia wants a less diversified foreign policy and will likely pursue much deeper integration with the European Union meaning alignment with the interests of Germany which may jeopardize the interests of the Initiative.
Three Seas’ Initiative brings together 12 EU member states, located between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas (actively supported by the US) that were not historically part of Western Europe and were underdeveloped for the last 400 years in comparison to the western rimland European countries (for more see: S&F Hero: A Cursed dualism and the Nobel prize for Olga Tokarczuk). This cooperation in the region was by the way discussed recently with the American delegation that visited Bulgaria led by Matthew Boyce – US Deputy-Assistant Secretary of State.
Poland’s Solidarity Transport Hub (the largest infrastructure project in CEE ever) that is to create the modern network for the region’s strategic flows is in progress as the Polish administration of the project announced an ambitious roadmap with the first flight departing in 2027 and the railroad component being well on track. The project has the potential to reshare the connectivity shortcomings in the entire Intermarium and CEE and to address the region’s needs. And that is its primary goal.
The Polish government announced in 2019 the building of the canal across the Vistula Spit that will allow ships to enter the Vistula Lagoon and the port of Elbląg, avoiding transit through the Russian Strait of Baltiysk. In the next two years, the Besix/NDI consortium must deal with the main investment phase. The schedule provides for the opening of the channel in 2022.
Polish military is actively getting ready for the major Defender 2020 strategic military mobility exercises in early spring that will host US deployments transiting across the Atlantic and Germany to the NATO Eastern Flank. This is going to be the largest military exercise since REFORGER in the 1980s and a major show of US and NATO capabilities to project power into the landlocked Intermarium countries facing Russian pressure and military strategic posturing/signaling.
BELARUS LOOKS WEST
On 15th January Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko hosted a meeting in Minsk between himself and Latvian Prime Minister Krishjanis Karins. It is hard not to interpret this meeting as a byproduct of the ongoing oil dispute between Russia and Belarus, which in turn is a byproduct of Moscow’s attempt to draw Belarus closer to itself, en route to forming a truly unitary state. During the meeting Latvians have underscored their readiness to provide Belarus with much needed alternatives to Russian oil supply. The visit of the Latvian PM, as well as other actions undertaken by Minsk in recent days are a fallout of another round of failed negotiations between it and Moscow, regarding the creation of a more tightly integrated political entity.
With the integration talks yielding no result, Russia reverted to its well established policy of exerting economic pressure on Belarus by using oil and gas shipments as a means of coercion.
After last minute oil shipment negotiations failed to produce an agreement, on January 1st Russian companies have ceased to ship crude oil to Belarussian refineries of Novopolotsk and Mozyrz, forcing them to operate at minimum capacity. On January 4th the situation improved somewhat for the Belarussians, with oil companies belonging to Mikhail Gutseriyev announcing, that they will ship 750.000 (roughly half of monthly Belarussian demand) of crude to Belarussian refineries in January, without levying any suppliers charge. Then on January 10th Minsk announced that it would levy a 50% tax on all profits (or revenue, depending on source) stemming from oil transport through Belarussian territory. On the same day it was announced, that Belarus would pause oil shipments to German refinery PCK Raffinerie (German mainly in name, as 51.4% of its shares are owned by Rosneft). Three days later another round of negotiations between Russia and Minsk took place, once again not resulting in any agreement being signed. This has prompted Lukashenko to instruct the government to seek alternative suppliers as of 14th January. According to Belarus’ vice-minister Dmitry Kurtoy, Belarus has sent inquiries to suppliers in Ukraine, Poland, Baltic States, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on the same day.
This is not the first time Minsk has entertained such possibility; as recently as September last year, Lukashenko has stated, that Belarus could “easily” obtain its oil via maritime shipments from the Gdansk port, that would then be transported to Belarus via reverse flow through the Druzhba pipeline. Interestingly, this mechanism has already been used in the spring last year, when contaminated oil that was sent via Druzhba has been pumped back to Russia. More interestingly still, Poland’s oil transport infrastructure operator PERN has its storage facility located in the town of Adamowo, located less than 3 miles away from the Belarussian border. In theory then orchestrating a reverse flow of oil into Belarus is a viable option. The problem is, however, that at this point in time, oil from Druzhba could only flow one way, i.e. it can either be pumped from Belarus, or into Belarus, but not both ways simultaneously. PERN has even conducted a feasibility study to investigate creating a permanent capability to send oil to Belarus via reverse flow back in 2016, but its result have not been published.
Since the beginning of January Polish authorities have offered little respite to Belarus with regards to its spat with Russia. The only relatively high level meeting held was between Belarussian Ambassador to Poland Vladimir Chushev and speaker of the Polish Senate (upper chamber of the Polish Parliament), Tomasz Grodzki. This meeting should not, however, be construed as an initiative mandated by the Polish government; Grodzki is a member of the opposition coalition, which holds a majority in the Senate, and has recently organized a number of meetings between himself and ambassadors of foreign countries. So far then, Poland’s response to Lukashenko’s plight has been lukewarm.
Belarus could also feasibly obtain at least some of its oil through the Ukrainian Black Sea port in Odessa, as well as Klaipeda in Lithuania, and ports of Būtingė and Ventspils. Moreover, because Belarussian refineries can refine sour crude, it could realistically entertain shipments from places like Venezuela, or Iran. Which brings us back to last Wednesday’s visit of Karins. During the meeting Lukashenko stated, that both countries should “seize this opportunity”, and engage in a more animated economic cooperation. The talks have obviously centered around oil, with Karins underscoring Latvia’s readiness to provide Belarus with oil shipped via Latvian ports, which could also serve as means of exporting Belarussian good globally. Lithuania has also offered to provide some of it’s port capacity to ship oil to Belarus – according to the Klaipeda port authority, up to 3 million tons of crude could be transported to Belarus from the largest Lithuanian seaport. This, coupled with 12 million tons of crude that Poland could (according to the Belarussians) sent via reverse flow through Druzhba could satisfy most of Belarussian demand for oil (Belarus’ oil imports from Russia are estimated to be around 18 million tons per annum).
The problem here is, however, that providing shipments of oil from overseas would require significant investments in infrastructure, which Belarus is seemingly not willing to fund, as well as the fact, that oil obtained that way would cost more than what Belarus is willing to pay. This, apparently has too been a stumbling block in negotiations between Poland and Belarus regarding potential alternative arrangements to oil shipments from Russian oilfields. Belarus has indeed been buying crude oil from Russia below market price, and reexporting it for many years now, making it a significant source of revenue. Why exactly has Russia agreed to sell oil to Belarus well below market price for decades on end, and why is Belarus insistent on keeping it this way?
Lukashenko has been the President of Belarus for nearly 26 years now, and is fully aware of the geopolitical significance Belarus has in the overall balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe aka Intermarium. One needs to look no further than an interview the Belarussian strongman gave to the Echo of Moscow radio station in December last year. For the sake of context: the interview took place on December 24th, four days after the most recent rounds of negotiations that had centered around tightening the relationship between Belarus and Russia, the end result of which would ultimately be the creation of a unitary state. With the December 7th and December 20th talks yielding no tangible results, Lukashenko took to Echo of Moscow to transmit his rationale.
The conversation included a number of striking moments; from Lukashenko stating, that he and Putin had agreed not to discuss political integration, noting, that NATO would intervene if Russia attempted a forceful takeover of Belarus, and pointing out, that Belarus does not receive “a single dollar” from Russia for stationing her troops in Belarussian territory.
The most interesting element of Lukashenko’s intervention was his observation (bona fide geopolitical in nature), that he is well aware, that from geopolitical standpoint Belarus is more important to Russia than some parts of Russia proper – and losing Minsk as an ally would be catastrophic for Moscow.
Lukashenko has therefore underscored is aware of the sentience of his country’s geographic location, both to Moscow and to the broadly understood West – and Poland in particular. Both in very practical and symbolic terms Russia losing hold of Belarus would put it on a path to further decline. Symbolically, Moscow’s inability to control its western buffers would be a telltale of faltering. Geospatially, Belarus holds a key to Russia’s (and Poland’s) heartland – the convergence of the Daugava and the Dnieper rivers hold an opening to the Smolensk gate – one of the very few significant chokepoints along the vast flatlands of the Northern European Plains.
Historically, whoever wrestled control of those lands had gained initiative all along the Intermarium. Poland first gaining and subsequently losing control over the Smolensk stronghold in XVII century first spelled the time of the Trouble for Russians, and then, after the Polish-Lithuanian Empire lost control over the stronghold, created an opening for the Russians for further expansion and paved the way to further increase in the Russian power over the Northern European plain, and subsequent partitions of Poland (and the Polish-Lithuanian Empire). It was through Smolensk gate that the Napoleon’s and Hitler’s forces advanced, and it was through this very same narrow pass between the cities of Vitebsk and Orsha, that the the Russian armies (be it Soviet, or Tsarist) advanced west.
Whoever therefore controls Smolensk stronghold, and the Smolensk gate leading to and from it, retains the initiative, putting its rival on the defensive – in a largely indefensible terrain.
Therefore, as long as Belarus retains at least a semblance of sovereignty, the balance of power in the Eastern Europe remains relatively stable; Russia could sleep relatively easy, knowing, that the Smolensk gate is controlled by an ally tightly integrated economically and politically.
Poland also did not feel the urgent need to address the issue, since as long as Belarus retained its statehood, Russia was kept at bay. However, any significant change in this landscape is bound to unravel this – imperfect as it may be – equilibrium. If Belarus was to be incorporated into Russia, the Polish capital of Warsaw would be located just over 140 kilometers from the Belarussian (or new Russian border), over a relatively flat terrain, very conducive to large scale military operations (for more see: S&F Hero: The Eastern Part of the Polish War Theatre).
If, however, Belarus would sway westwards, away from Moscow, Russia would too find itself in a critically dangerous position, with a road to its capital city of Moscow wide open.
DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INTERMARIUM…
The events in the Middle East triggered serious concerns in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, during the Cold War the topmost regions of the superpowers’ competition were traditionally two: Central and Eastern Europe and the Near and Middle East. This time, especially after the Arab Spring the interconnectivity of those two regions in terms of geopolitical changes namely migration, trade, energy flows, turmoils, forms a new reality for both regions. With the end of the liberal world order underpinned by the United States power and influence the regional players become more independent and bent on crafting the ability to project their own regional agenda thereby emerging as “regional centers” of power. As for the global players the nature of competition has changed due to the growing presence of China and its tangible achievements.
The tragic incident with the Ukrainian airplane in Iran has become a considerable international scandal. Ukraine again is engaged into global politics as recently the Ukrainian factor was exploited inside American internal political struggle. This time, Vladimir Zelensky would try to avoid deep involvement; but for him it would be a difficult choice because on the one hand, he is attempting to improve (stabilize) relations with Moscow and on the other hand, he has commitments towards his western partners. Zelensky’s Administration recently even voiced conviction that Iran had shot down the Ukrainian airplane intentionally.
The network of system of the international oil and gas pipelines year by year brings the two regions closer together. Ukrainian reaction to the “Turkish Stream” was based on considerations that Ukraine may lose money in contracts up to 450 million dollars. However, Ukraine is looking for new opportunities to use the existing infrastructure (the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline) and to create on its basis a new corridor for gas supplies to Ukraine from Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. Many experts in Ukraine agreed that the situation will become dangerous when Russia finishes the second part of the “Turkish Stream” project, but this most likely is not going to happen earlier than in five years’ time. For instance, the first line of “Turkish Stream” has been not affecting directly Romania, nevertheless it will have serious implications. The existing Trans-Balkans pipeline that is delivering Russian gas from the territory of Ukraine through Moldavia, Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey has lost its strategic value for Turkey.
In the case of Bulgaria, the head of Bulgaria’s gas pipeline operator Bulgartransgaz, Vladimir Malinov, said his country is now being supplied with Russian gas from Turkey, with no interruptions expected due to the change of the supply map. Bulgaria can become a regional gas distribution hub in the Balkans.
Plus, Russian energy company “Lukoil” is planning to buy a 50 per cent stake of the Neptun Deep gas project in the Romanian zone of the Black Sea (from ExxonMobil). This is still uncertain because Bucharest hopes that they will eventually find a western partner.
Turkey is becoming one of the biggest energy hubs in the entire Eurasia. But it should be noted that on August 31 2019, Washington, Kiev and Warsaw expanded their trilateral cooperation in gas supplies. They signed a memorandum to reduce the dependence of Ukraine and Poland on the Russian gas imports. This implies, in particular, the expansion of supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States to Poland, and from there to Ukraine along a north-south axis of pipeline connectivity that is to consolidate the resilience and potential of the Intermarium countries.
RUSSIA AS A SWORD OF DAMOCLES FOR THE INTERMARIUM…
Putin’s speech on 16 January and the following resignation of Medvedev’s government triggered an interesting reaction in Eastern Europe. The main direction of regional discussion was an attempt to find an answer to what Putin is actually planning. The main supposition was that Putin tries to accumulate in own hands as much as power as possible. Lithianian Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius pointed out: Russia has changed the “geometry” but not the nature of the current Russia, it is actually still the same beast.
Intermarium elites closely and carefully followed the Putin-Merkel meeting in Moscow held on January 11. Eastern Europe was part of the agenda and consisted of two main blocks of issues for the upcoming summit of Normandy Format in Berlin and the “Nord Stream.” Merkel publicly once again reiterated German commitment for finishing construction of the “Nord Stream.” This is highly disappointing for the Intermarium countries and always raises concerns over “close relations” between Moscow and Berlin that usually bring adverse pressure into the region. Putin stressed that the pipeline will be finished by the end of 2020.
American sanctions that were imposed in relation to Nord Stream created upset in Berlin and divided Washington and Berlin; it is still to be seen what will be the final outcome of the sanctions.
ESTONIA IS DIVIDED OVER RUSSIA… THE CONSERVATIVES IN PARLIAMENT AGAINST THE LIBERAL PRESIDENT
In Estonia, the hottest topic is a decision of the Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid to invite Russian leader Vladimir Putin to the World Congress of Finno-Ugric Peoples, which will be held in the summer in Tartu. The speaker of the Riigikogu Henn Põlluaas (Conservative Party) believes that the Estonian President made a mistake by such a decision. First of all, he does not believe that Putin will come to Tallinn, and secondly under Putin’s rule a tough Russification of small nations, including Finno-Ugric is being undertaken. If he comes to Congress, then this will be “a spit in the face of all the small nations that he represses”. Henn Põlluaas during his New Year speech stated that Estonia has territorial demands to Russia and he added that the Tartu Peace Treaty, concluded by his country with Soviet Russia in 1920, is still valid on the issue of the border between states. Estonia is not going to ratify the border agreement even if Russia will do so first.
MISSED CHANCES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND UKRAINE…
Ukraine throughout the entire period of the Soviet Union was one of the most important republics of the empire. Kiev was receiving the most precious technologies. All these technologies, weaponry and equipment became the aim for many countries that were looking for cheap and alternative sources of technology and weaponry, especially for China and in general for the entire developing world. In Ukraine there is a debate about the future of Ukrainian industrial giant “Motor Sich.” China has not apparently given up on its attempt to buy this legendary enterprise. So far, the Americans are successfully blocking this acquisition by encouraging Ukrainians to halt the deal. The Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine keeps the issue frozen.
Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation is on the rise. Turkish turbojet unmanned aerial vehicle – Goksungur will make its first flight in 2020. The drone will be equipped with modernized AI-25 Ukrainian turbojet engines. Goksungur will have high maneuverability and decent speed, albeit its final design is not yet known. The Ukrainian State Enterprise “Ivchenko-Progress” is engaged in the development and production of the engine, already having experience in cooperation with Turkish companies in a number of projects. First of all, a heavy drone Akinci, which is equipped with Ukrainian AI-450T engines, that made its first flight in 2019. Over the next few years, the Zaporizhzhya-based Ivchenko-Progress enterprise will supply aircraft engines worth more than $ 600 million to Turkey (500 engines). Akıncı is an operational-strategic reconnaissance and strike UAV. It has a wingspan of 20 m. and a length of 12.3 m. The maximum take-off weight of the drone is 5500 kg. Akıncı has a maximum flight altitude of 40,000 feet (12,000 m) and a working altitude of 30,000 feet (9,000 m) with flight duration of more than 24 hours. Both types of Turkish drones were used in the Libyan conflict.
What is the role of Poland in this regard? Has Poland missed a chance to exploit the situation that Turkey is exploiting now in Ukraine? Ukrainian enterprises are in severe need for the capital money for developing projects that Poland seems to have, while Poland needs technologies that it is lacking. This seems like a perfect match. Recently the Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine stated that: “the decision to develop infrastructure between Ukraine and Poland must be taken now, because later it will be too late.” He stressed that between the two states already there had been meetings where they had discussed opportunities for building a modern highway from Odessa to Katowice and to Gdansk; to “connect” the Black Sea with the Baltic Sea spanning the entire Intermarium.
Jacek Bartosiak has contributed to this Intermarium Brief.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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