(wikipedia.org)
As regards surface-to-surface mobile missile capabilities, the period before the kinetic conflict is critical, since mobile surface-to-surface systems with a range of 300 kilometers and more are such an important target for the adversary they become subject of intensive intelligence and reconnaissance (modern scouting battle in communication, command, situational awareness, the electromagnetic sphere and cyberspace). Such systems will also become a major strike asset for the Polish Armed Forces, because they can be used to strike an enemy deep in the operational theatre. In addition, the type of missiles and the entire architecture related to their homing is significant, i.e. their range, target recognition and targeting systems, and missile control systems (where the missile strikes and whether the target is destroyed, which is of great importance as it allows you to not waste missiles on the same target), the type of warhead (soft, hard targets, reinforced, bunkered targets, point targets, surface targets,) unit price.
That defines basic variables that should have an impact on the creation of the entire architecture of their use along with the new operational concept. These are: the strategic dimension and the operational dimension, the impact on the offensive side and the defensive side, the influence on the planning and on actions preceding open conflict.
THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION
The INF Treaty (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) did not allow the possession of surface-to-surface missiles with a range of over 500 kilometers. This was dictated by the fact that such systems, in particular mobile ones, are a very dangerous weapon, which cannot be completely eliminated preventively, and their strikes at the sensitive nodal or communication assets of the adversary can significantly change the outcome of the confrontation in a very short time.
Given Poland’s military geography the strategic dimension of future surface-to-surface systems will be limited. The most probable opponent being Russia and its allies (Belarus) and the Polish surface-to-surface systems will not (with minor exceptions) be able to strike (in heavy salvos) at targets in Russia proper except for the Kaliningrad Oblast and perhaps assets in the Gulf of Finland. Thus, all major political and military centres directing Russian military operations towards Poland, including all command and communication centres located outside the operational theatre of the conflict, will remain out of reach. The exception here are long-range radar observation systems located in Kaliningrad.
Each strike against them must be preceded by an appropriate reflection, as it could lead to an escalation with the participation of other countries if the Russians recognise that it is an allied attack on their systems monitoring the activities of NATO countries, including US. Such strikes, however, have the potential to make a significant strategic impact. Nevertheless, with this exception, in the strategic psychological game (which is what the whole issue of deterrence from the war against Poland comes down to), conducted in the period preceding the conflict, Polish systems will not play a strategic deterrence role, because they will not be considered as such by the opponent in his calculations. The system will have a potentially greater impression on our allies, including the USA, in terms of escalation of confrontation with the possibility of enhanced and growing US involvement.
Full and autonomous control over the systems (recognition, targeting, guidance, missile control) by the Polish armed forces is necessary for these systems to serve the security interests of Poland at any time preceding conflict and during the conflict itself. The strategic dimension of the surface-to-surface system could be dramatically strengthened if Poland had nuclear capabilities, but they always make for “strategic” dimension of the confrontation.
THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION
In contrast to the limited impact on the strategic dimension, Poland’s acquisition of mobile surface-to-surface missile systems would be of fundamental operational importance. The condition here is, of course, the appropriate saturation with these land-based systems, the proper training of units equipped with these systems, the appropriate operational concept of their use and the creation of the necessary surrounding architecture to ensure the uninterrupted use of the system’s features.
Acquiring strike capabilities with a range of 300 kilometers (and more) creates considerable opportunities to influence the opponent in the entire rear area and in the entire operational theatre, including combat impact on second and third echelon units, logistics bases, airports, equipment warehouses, electronic warfare systems, installations military-supporting operational activities, river crossings, logistics centres and supply system, etc. With adequate saturation of firepower and efficient and uninterrupted operation of the tracking and guidance system, it’s possible to extend the battlefield up to 300 kilometers deep into the enemy’s territory and thus significantly complicate planning, combat operations, and maybe even deprive the opponent of operational initiative including aviation, if air bases were in range of the system. This may somehow resemble a simplified version of the American concept of air-land battle (given that the degree of saturation and numbers of modern armed forces are much smaller than in the 1970s and 1980s).
The originator of the AirLand Battle concept was General Donn A. Starry, who served as commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1977 to 1981. The reason for working on this concept was the need to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining operational advantage in relation to numerical superiority by triggering successive waves of units pressing on the front (second and third echelon units). It required a simultaneous strike on primary and secondary units far into the opponent’s grouping. For this, cooperation of the Air Force and the Army (land forces) and close operational and tactical cooperation were needed. It was a combined doctrine of the armed forces for the European War Theatre, used in training and operational-tactical exercises. It is worth remembering that in the mid-1970s, the Soviets at the peak of their geopolitical power and were increasingly gaining conventional advantage. The US armed forces were still struggling with trauma of Vietnam, and after professionalising the military service, they were suffering problems filling staff and completing tasks (the “hollow army”). The situation on the so-called Central Front in Europe looked like this:
Therefore, the concept of AirLand Battle was conceived as a remedy involving an “extended battlefield” 150 km deep into enemy groupings through the development of reconnaissance systems (seeing further in depth) and strike systems (striking further in depth). Destroying the enemy at such depth would translate into a delay in action, thus restoring operational initiative to NATO forces. This was the essence of the concept of AirLand Battle. The concept was also the operational basis for acquiring new strike capabilities and military technologies: precision missiles and bombs, attack helicopters, reconnaissance systems that are used to this day in the US armed forces and are icons of modernity of these forces. It was successfully tested in battlefield conditions during the Kuwait War in 1991.
In the case of the Polish theater of war, it would be crucial to acquire such capabilities as part of our own active anti-access/area denial defense, plugged into a modern and (this is worth emphasising) proprietary situational awareness system – as part of a new operational concept – in the Belarusian operational direction up to the Dnieper and Daugava lines for the Smolensk Gate along with the impact on all communication nodes, bridges, bases and enemy nodes.
Obtaining such abilities would significantly improve the chance of preventing a strike towards Warsaw by hitting the depths of the theatre of operations, where a quick maneuver threatens the political center of the state in Warsaw. It would also complicate the Russians’ planning of smuggling and marching operations through Belarus. In cooperation with Ukraine, it is possible through active defence in the foreground to strengthen the chance of success in the war with Russia in the event of blockade of the rocaded crossings through the Pripyat, which would change the geometry of the front. Whilst it would require a Polish-Ukrainian alliance, this would even have the potential to change the ratio of strategic initiative in the war with Russia.
In the case of the Polish Armed Forces, the proper utilisation of mobile systems must be based on an approved and appropriate concept of use, which will be constantly practised. It will depend primarily on:
This will be a real challenge for the Polish Armed Forces in the face of a symmetrical and modern opponent like Russia. Without creating the above architecture that links the system’s capabilities together, it will not be possible to speak of a proper operational concept or of acquiring the capability itself in the first place. It is worth emphasising that in the virtual domain connecting the system (autonomous and dependent only on the Polish 300 km observation system based on unmanned platforms, AWACS, radars beyond the horizon, command systems, communication and broadband data transfer in real time including data corrections to the system) there will be a constantly-rolling modern ‘scouting battle’ and this before the first clash including the use of cybernetic and Electromagnetic Warfare tools in order to “take control” over the system that links our missile systems, making Poland potentially blind, or to “roll” this system (force it into retreat).
This battle will take place long before the conflict begins because of the combat value represented by the mobile surface-to-surface system, which is difficult to detect and destroy preventively using traditional military methods. It will also take place because of the fact that systems transmitting a huge portion of data over such large distances necessary for connecting architecture must be remapped again and again, both by Poland and by an opponent who will constantly try to do so in order – before the conflict – to find weaknesses and to disable architecture. Poland must make huge financial and organisational expenditures here to protect itself against losing the “reconnaissance battle”.
A noteworthy aspect of having such surface-to-surface mobile systems is that the opponent will prioritise the need to neutralise them. As already mentioned above, provided that the Polish architecture binding the operation of the system is not allowed to be “rolled” (forced into retreat), the Russians will strike the detected mobile sets as one of the first targets. This is a very difficult task, as the Americans found out during the war with Iraq, where in the desert, after all, they were not able to neutralise the Iraqis’ completely non-modern scuds. In woodlands full of potential hideouts, including the cities and villages of eastern and north-eastern Poland, hunting for sets will be even more difficult.
They cannot be fought substantially using long-range cruise missiles and precision stand-off because the mobility of the set means that the target must be tracked on an ongoing basis and eliminated by planes attacking the target directly. This necessitates the risky involvement of aviation striking directly on the set, which, with the skillful preparation of air defence systems, would facilitate the setting of traps for Russian aviation, which still does not have an arsenal of precision weapons or a technique to combat ground targets similar to that of the Americans. This would cause the involvement of Russian aviation in large numbers, exposing them to losses and, equally important, distracting them from performing other combat tasks. In addition, experience from recent conflicts shows that they will not be able to count on anything more than “suppression” (as opposed to destruction) of the Polish surface-to-surface system. Although Polish sets in constant motion caused by escape from destruction would not use the appropriate “connection” to the system and would not be able to hit targets with sufficient effectiveness.
The existence of firepower for 300 km and more, in particular if it was followed by the appropriate intensity, would significantly affect the planning of the enemy’s operations, which perhaps would not start offensive land operations without neutralising surface-to-surface systems, which would give Poland time for additional preparations and allied assistance. In connection with all the above, it is crucial to properly understand whether, within the future surface-to-surface systems, Poland needs more precise point-breaking abilities of single targets of high value, or rather the capacity for intense destruction.
SUMMARY
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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