Territorial expansion of Greece (1832–1947) (wikimedia.org)
There have been many wars between the two countries, but the rivalry can be divided into three periods: The first covers the period lasting from the Byzantine–Seljuq Wars (1048 to 1308) and Byzantine–Ottoman Wars (1265–1479) to the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829). It includes the Ottoman invasion of Mani (1770-1815) and arguably the most tragic incident of the Greek struggle for independence, the Souliote War (1803).
The second period is based on the Greek geopolitical doctrine known as the “Megali Idea,” an irredentist plan targeted at an Ottoman Empire in decline to restore all former territories of the Byzantium Empire and the areas populated by Greeks, i.e. Eastern Thrace and almost the entire area of Anatolia. This doctrine dominated the Greek political establishment in the XIX and the beginning of the XX century. The Great Powers in the XIX century pushed Greece to restrain its geopolitical ambitions and they managed to do it until the end of the XIX century. In 1897-1898, the first the Greco-Turkish War started, the main reason for which was the status of the island of Crete. Greece was not prepared for the war and was defeated by the Ottoman Army. The main theater of war was in the Greek mainland. However, Turkey’s victory did not halt its further dissolution and weakening. In addition to this, the domestic policy of the Young Turks which increased the plight of the indigenous Greek population under Ottoman rule. The Young Turks aimed at the creation of an ethnically homogenous state based upon Turkish nationalism.
The third important period which helps us understand the nature of war in this region is the First Balkan War (1912-1913). This saw a coalition of forces of the countries neighboring Turkey (the Balkan League), Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, supported by Russia and Italy. Turkey was supported by the Austro-Hungarians and Germany. The weakening Porta raised appetites for the Balkan League to attach additional territories to its own countries. It was a continuation of the Italo-Turkish War when Italy conquered Libya and the island of Rhodes from the Ottomans.
The main war theater was in the Balkan peninsula, with still larger territories under the Ottoman rule, and for the first time the war occurred in the seas. Greece had its own naval forces with submarines. Success in the war inspired amongst every member of the League regional geopolitical projects: for example, the Bulgarians dreamed about a Greater Bulgaria in the Balkan peninsula. The bone of contention was a strategically important city Adrianople, which Bulgaria considered part of the historical territory of Greater Bulgaria, providing access to the Mediterranean Sea. During the war, two big armies of the Ottomans (Western and Eastern) which defended Turkish territories in the Balkans of Turkey were eliminated. In December 1912, the London Conference was summoned. This aimed to end the war (which it is better to call a “civil war” or “fratricidal war”), but two important events made this impossible.
The first factor was the “Young Turks Revolution” in 1908, which changed the political landscape of the empire. The humiliation of the Turkish army during the Balkan War pushed them to act and in January 1913 they made it impossible to sign the treaty. They simply intervened by force and killed the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister. The Young Turks called for the resignation of the government, and after an actual coup d’état, they gained total control over the country under the leadership of Enver Pasha. In his speech in front of the ministers, he stressed that “Whilst you stand for a shameful peace with the concession of Edirne and almost all European possessions, the nation is ready to die and requires the war.”
Thus, both sides demanded the continuation of the war and it restarted in February. In 1913, there was a relatively successful attempt to sign a peace treaty in London. The aftermath of the First Balkan War for the Ottomans turned out to be a total geopolitical disaster – losing almost all of their European territories in the Balkans. In the Second Balkan War, it was clear that a strong Bulgaria would not satisfy any of the regional powers, and this time the regional powers were united against a Bulgaria that was eventually prostrated. Turkey retained control over the city of Edirne and some other territories in Europe when the Treaty of Constantinople (1913) was signed.
A second factor is that Greece did not sign the London Treaty in 1912 because it had undertaken a sophisticated strategy against the Turks. They combined the military effort in the Balkans (the Macedonian and Epirus Fronts) and the naval effort in the Aegean Sea. The most interesting is the Aegean theater. Before the war, Greece had developed its own navy, which was comparatively weaker than the Ottoman Empire’s, but the business of the Ottoman Navy in the Black Sea against the Bulgarians made it possible for the Greeks to develop a strategic positioning in the Aegean Sea. The most important element of their strategy was a decision to establish control over the Dardanelles by controlling three islands: Tedenos, Imbros, and establishing anchorages in Moudros Bay in Lemnos. This made it difficult if not impossible for the Turkish fleet to pass through the Greek system of defense in the Aegean. The blockade of the Turkish Straits left the Turkish fortress in the Aegean alone and cut the supply chain with Turkish forces in the Balkans. The only supply route left was through Romania. The blockade was established not only in the Aegean but in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to prevent supplies from the Near Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek fleet achieved full control over the Eastern Mediterranean zone by a blockade of the Turkish Straits. The Suez Canal was under constant supervision of the Greek Navy. Istanbul attempted to break the blockade by coercive assaults but the Greek fleet was able to withstand them.
This period ends with the last direct war between Greece and Turkey, and maybe the most dramatic, known as the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22). In the First World War Greece was fighting on the side of the Triple Entente. As a result of the war, Greece was able to fulfill its geopolitical ambitions. It only joined the war in 1917 but this meant the opportunity to take part in the post-war conferences as a member of the winning side. In 1919 by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Greece obtained and incorporated to its territory the areas of the Eastern and Western Thrace and Ionia in Anatolia (Izmir). The treaty of Sevres 1920 enshrined these territorial gains. Interestingly, according to this treaty, Turkey was deprived of access to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean (except the Black Sea). Constantinople was to become an international city. In the Greco-Turkish War, Greece’s strategic aims were:
Until August 1921, Greece conducted a successful offensive operation in Asia Minor against the Turkish Army. The operational plan consisted of two main fronts. The first, an advance from Eastern Thrace, was supposed to reach Constantinople. The second was an advance into the depths of Anatolia following a landing in the Greek zone of responsibility at Izmir (Smyrna), but the Greek army would become overstretched in large areas of Anatolia.
In history, this period is known as the Turkish War of Independence. The war with Greece was only a part of it, the Turks merely named it “front.” The war had several key fronts: The Western Front (Eastern Thrace), the route to the Constantinople and The Izmir Front with the aim of reaching the Heartland of Anatolia – Ankara (the Greco-Turkish War); The Eastern Front (the Turkish-Armenian War). The Southern Front (the Franco-Turkish War) which shed a light on the geostrategic situation in the region. France according to secret agreements received access to lands in the Levant and in Southern Anatolia. The French targeted the Ottoman ports in order to blockade their access to sea. Kemal Ataturk believed that the Greek threat to the country was existential and the rest of the fronts were not so important as the war against Greece, hence he concentrated all efforts on the Western Front. The threat of Bolshevism prevailed in Paris over territorial ambitions in Anatolia and support of the Armenians. Moreover, Ataturk turned a blind eye to the creation of a French mandate over Syria and Lebanon.
In 1922, with the support of the Soviet Union, a new Turkish Republic managed to alter the military balance of power in Anatolia and pushed the Greeks out of Asia Minor. The Armistice of Mudanya and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 was a victory for Turkish nationalism and the Turkish struggle for Anatolia, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. The Turkish Army was surrounded from every corner of Anatolia but the core of the country was under Turkish control. Two strategically important islands, able to blockade the exit and entrance to the Dardanelles – Imbros and Tenedos – were ceded to Turkey by the treaty. This was the main strategic advantage of Turkey against the allies. In order to establish peace in future, Greece and Turkey initiated a population exchange, except Constantinople (the last Greeks would be evacuated in the 1950s due to pogroms). Nevertheless, the Turks of the Western Thrace remained in the cities Evros, Komotini and Xanthi, around 50 000 to 130 000 people. This is one of the reasons for constant escalation of tensions between the two countries.
Ethnic map of Asia Minor in 1910 (wikipedia.org)
Kemal Ataturk by his brave military and diplomatic actions almost destroyed the doctrine of the “Megali Idea.” In front of Greece there had appeared a new Turkish Republic which was strong and ready to react to any military aggression.
Furthermore, the millennial presence of the Greek people in Anatolia was eradicated within a couple of years, and in 1947 the Italians ceded the Dodecanese Islands to the Greeks. Thus, Athens was relatively satisfied by the territorial gains, until the 1950s when the dispute over the future of Cyprus created a new period of Greco-Turkish confrontation. The Megali Idea this time evolved into the idea of Enosis – “the union” of Greece with Cyprus – that ended up with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1975. The recent decision of Erdogan to resume the prayers in the Hagia Sophia mosque only restores the old historical and religious grievances in Greece.
The historical experience of confrontation between Greece and Turkey shows that the possibility of war will be determined by the following factors:
The Great Powers are closely following the situation in the Aegean Sea; for them, a war in the Aegean would put at stake many strategic economic assets. China, Russia and the U.K. all place particular importance on stability in this region. According to the Montreux Convention, Turkey has a right in the case of war to close the straits and for Russia this would be a major economic blow owing to the fact that the Black Sea route has existential importance for the Russian economy. From the military point of view, Russia would be deprived of access to its assets in Syria and therefore its ability to maintain its policy in the Middle East. The U.K and U.S. would be cut off from its allies in the Black Sea like Ukraine, Georgia and Romania. Too many things are at stake in case of war, and the Great Powers will try to convince Turkey to stop its revanchist policy. However, more likely, this is not going to work, Turkey has taken the “Russian” pattern of geopolitical conduct and won’t stop.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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