(Photo from the author’s collection)
View on Turkish mainland (Source: flickr.com)
The Megisti (Kastellorizo) theater of operation
This is the most interesting and the most attractive island to Turkey, against which the operation with the most strategically advantageous perspectives can be undertaken. Exactly these islands are a linchpin of Turkish argumentation of its maritime deal with the Libyan Government. Near the Turkish town of Kaş are located three Greek tiny islands (Municipality Megisti): Kastellorizo (2,9 km from Turkish mainland), Ro (6 km) and Stroggili (4 km). In total the island is home to no more than half a thousand people. It is one of the most remote islands (from Athens almost 580 km, from Rhodes 136 km, 270 km to Cyprus and 316 km to Crete). The Greek military force in this part of the Mediterranean Sea is concentrated in Rhodes, Crete and Kos. In Rhodes, the Greeks have two air bases and one air squadron. In Crete, there are several airdromes where Greek air forces are located and the naval base in the very east of the island. A perplexing situation appears when we try to analyze the Turkish forces near Megisti. Turkey has one naval base in Marmaris which would actually be immediately blocked by the Greek Navy and Air Forces between the city of Rhodes and Sarigerme (Turkey). It looks like the primary goal of the Greek facilities in Rhodes is to control the Marmaris naval base of Turkey. In case of a positional decision, Ankara would use the combination of the different forces, but the primary element in this theater of operation is going to be airborne and seaborne operations. The navy and air forces are going to be supplementary and will take responsibility for providing security in the entire theater of war. The remote location of the islands gives perfect conditions to Turkey for undertaking the operation and blocking any enforcement to the small Greek troops in these islands. Turkey has military bases in Antalya (the 3rd Infantry Training Brigade) and in Denizli (the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade), 138 km and 185 km from Kaş respectively.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
The Ionian or Izmir theater of operation
This is historically and geostrategically the most important theater and the outcome of the war would be totally dependent on the results in this theater of war. The two sides have concentrated the most sophisticated weaponry and troops here. In this theater of operation, as in the Megisti theater, Greece are a threat, but in Ionia Turkey threatens to attack the big Aegean islands of Chios and Lesvos near Izmir; Rhodes, Symi (Dodecanese) and Kos near Marmaris; Samos near Kuşadası city; Limnos and Samothraki near the entrance to the Dardanelles. The most interesting situation in terms of representation of the balance of military power in this theater of operation is the zone near Izmir. The Izmir bay is a perfect harbor for any navies, with the only condition that the state must control not only the bay itself, but the neighboring islands as well in case of war on the adjusted islands (Lesvos and Chios). The distance between these two islands is about 50 km, which allows for the establishment of an effective coastal defense with the use of mines and coastal artillery. In these islands, Greece has naval stations and in case of Lesvos, the 98th Senior Management Orders Militia “Archipelago”. Turkish resources state that Athens has been deploying troops to many of the islands. To Lesbos and Rhodes, army divisions, brigades to Chios and Symi together with several infantry, anti-tanks and tank battalions. In Chios and Symi alone, Greece have deployed 7,500 soldiers and commandos in Rhodes.
The war theater in the Aegean in case of war would need the engagement of all forces, especially air forces and navy. However, a meticulous study of the map and the positions of the Turkish and Greek armies makes it possible to conclude that Turkey in case of a limited war or a mid-scale war has a strong superiority. Airborne and seaborne forces would try to land and to establish control over the islands, under the cover of the air and air-defense forces. The strategic priority would be given as soon as they destroy the Greek forces in the island, or at least isolate them from the line of supply and reinforcement. This particular task would be given to the air forces and the Turkish navy. Many times, the Greek generals and politicians stated that they were not excluding the preventive strike option, but this would rather trigger a big war than appease Turkey.
Ankara has concentrated the following forces within a radius of 300 km. The ground forces represent the whole army known as the Aegean Army (4th Army). The CIA in 1977, two years after the creation of this army, wrote a secret report which indicated that it is a political instrument, as much as a military one, that because of geography the Greeks simply cannot defend all their islands in the Eastern Aegean. This army, as the CIA writes, has a capability for a sudden, unprovoked attack. It should be cited as it has been written that “the precise number of landing craft supporting the Aegean Army is a good deal less important than the Turkish capability to bring to bear an overwhelming preponderance of strength against the Greek islands nearest the Turkish mainland.” The initial number of troops in this army was 30,000-40,000 combat-qualified troops (a 3,000-man marine regiment trained for amphibious operations) with a high level of combat readiness, in a matter of days. To the army there were assigned vessels for amphibious operations which is enough for a secret operation without being detected by the U.S. or the Greeks. Turkey is capable of occupying the Aegean islands without big problems which are possible for the Turks, in Thrace, where ground forces (enormous for Greece) are concentrated. Turkey has two air bases in the Izmir zone and two in relatively remote areas in Banderma (221 km from Izmir) and one in Belikesir (143 km). Just 40 km from Izmir, a Turkish naval base is located in Foça, home to an amphibious Marines Brigade consisting of 4,500 men, three amphibious battalions, a main battle tank battalion, an artillery battalion, a support battalion and other company-sized units, including an Underwater Attack Commando Detachment. As we can see, since 1977, there has been a sufficient augmentation of the marine’s forces in the Aegean Army. Therefore, it is a principal concern of Greece that eventually these forces will be used for the tasks which they have been assigned for. Lesvos compared to Chios can be attacked from the south, the east and the north of the Turkish mainland. Especially from the north – because the shores of Turkish mainland are just 10 km away from Lesvos and 12 km from the east.
Particularly interesting is the concentration of Greek forces in the Aegean theater of war. This suggests that the only hope the Greeks have is to achieve naval and air force superiority over the Turks. The main air base of Greece is in Skyros island, an air base that has a strategic importance owing to its location almost right in the middle of the Aegean. Such a location allows them to react to any threat from the Turkish side and in any location of the Aegean. The rest of the naval bases and air bases are located in the Greek mainland or in Attica.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
(Photo from the author’s collection)
The Strait Zone theater of operation
The military tasks are going to be more or less similar to those which have already been analyzed, yet in case of this theater it is important to understand that it is the most precious zone of Turkey. The main threat to Istanbul can come from two directions: from Thrace and from the Dardanelles. The Gallipoli and Canakkale campaign shows that Turks are ready to fight to the death and to the last breath in order to keep this land under Turkish rule. During this competition the Ottomans were fighting against a coalition of European countries. The scenario in which Greece is going to enter into the strait zone is unlikely to occur, only in the most bizarre of scenarios is it possible to imagine. However, for the Greeks it would be existentially important to establish control over the entrance to the Dardanelles and to keep the Turkish fleet inside the Sea of Marmara. In this sea, the Turks have the Erdek Naval Base and it is a principal base for mine warfare vessels and from the Gölcük naval base in the Gulf of Gemlik near Istanbul. Despite allegations from both sides, Turkey and Greece are preparing for war in the near future, which is levitating in the Aegean air. Militarization of all islands is inevitable. Near the Dardanelles, there are three islands, two of which belong to Greece Samothraki and Limos (60 km from the entrance to the strait) and one to Turkish Gökçeada. In Samothraki, Greece is developing ground forces (41st Infantry Regiment) and a naval station. The Greek naval base Myrina is located in Limos. Additionally, an important task of these Greek islands and the military regiments there is to make it impossible to use this zone of the Aegean to organize seaborne missions in order to encircle the Greek troops keeping the defense in the Rhodope Mountains. Subsequently, all the theaters of operation are interrelated and interdependent from each other, the weakness of one creating a chain of events that would immediately undermine the defense communications and joint systems of defense as a general concept.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
(Photo from the author’s collection)
The Thrace theater of operation
This is the only theater which would totally rely on ground forces. The military geography of Thrace is quite different: the Turkish side (or Eastern Thrace) is less mountainous and is covered by plains and forests. The only mountain massif located in the east of the region is known as Strandzha. If the Turkish army organizes the defense in these forestry mountains, it may create big problems for any army which would decide to attack the European part of Turkey. At the same time, the area of the Eastern Thrace is quite welcoming for big assault operations. The distance from the Maritsa (formerly Evros) river, which divides Thrace into Turkish and Greek sides, to Istanbul is about 180 km. Two main roads are the ones leading to Istanbul from Edirne (E 80) and from Ipsala (E 84). The history of war in these regions teaches us that any advance closer to Istanbul would be hard to achieve without the sieging the Edirne which is some sort of the gateway to Istanbul.
The Greek ground forces are situated along the borderline from the north near Bulgaria to the Aegean shores. The Rhodope Mountains create a natural obstacle to the attacking army, and the disposition of the Greek army near the Turkish border says that they are preparing for a “Thermopylae strategy”. They are prone to halt the advance of Turkish positions into a very narrow pass in Thrace. The map postulates that the Greeks are afraid that the Turks are going to delve deeper into the Balkans and the Greek mainland, the danger being that if the Turkish Army was able to pass the fortifications and resistance of the Greek Army in the Rhodope Mountains, which block the free movement through the Greek terrains, the Turks could reach the coastal plain areas of Lower Macedonia. Of course, it is just a projection of possible scenarios in this theater of war and I can clearly understand the fulminations, but it is nothing more than an intellectual game which in certain cases can become partially reality.
From a geopolitical point of view, the advance of Turkish troops would endanger not only Greek sovereignty but more importantly, the possible return of Turkey to the Balkans. The western countries created a “cordon sanitaire” between Turkey and the Balkan Muslims, but the advance of the Turkish army to Lower Macedonia could create a temptation in Ankara to reach Northern Macedonia because from Lower Macedonia to Kosovo (through Northern Macedonia) the distance is just 150km, and to Albania about 145 km. The Western Balkans is home to a large number of Muslims: Kosovo (90%), Albania (80%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40%) and the Republic of Macedonia (33%). The likelihood of such a scenario is very low, especially because the Turkish Army would need to pass three big cities: Alexandroupolis, Kavala and Thessaloniki. Moreover, the U.S. is increasing its presence in the region. In Albania, Turkey has its own naval installations near Greece.
Above all else, it is important to look at the American positions in this region, they are concentrating their forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Special attention is paid by the Turkish media to the plans of the Americans to create a permanent military base in Alexandropoulos by acquiring the local port (30 km from Turkey). Turkey presents this as nothing but a measure against Turkey to create a “buffer zone” between Turkey and Russia and to have a naval base closer to Western Thrace. The militarization of Western Thrace and Cyprus and the invitation of the U.S. to the Eastern Mediterranean is only drastically increasing the conflict possibility. The Greek side assesses the situation differently. The political establishment is desperately inviting the U.S. in Alexandroupolis, but Greek public opinion is dissatisfied with Trump’s policy towards Turkey. Washington has responded to this invitation from Greece by heralding the shift in its balancing policy in the Aegean. In March, the U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt stated that the U.S. is “to continue to demonstrate American presence, American engagement in Northern Greece.” The U.S. has military and commercial plans for all three ports in Kavala, Alexandroupolis and Thessaloniki. The American military bases in Thrace and Macedonia almost make it impossible for the Turks to consider any military possibility to reach the territories that are populated by Muslims. This is becoming an existential task and a plain duty of national security of Turkey is to prevent the creation of a permanent American base near its borders. The only option is to use proxies and non-state actors, but neither the U.S. nor Greece would allow it.
The specific facet of this theater is that it requires hard-military equipment (tanks, etc), but Turkey needs the same tanks in the plain of Cyprus, in Iraq and Syria. The theater balance is a crucial element of success. From Cyprus to Thrace there is more than nine hundred kilometers and 1100 km from the Idlib zone to Thrace and so forth. Here Greece is relatively mobile because it does not need any stretching of its fronts.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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