About Vinogradov and his book
The first period covers the times when Tehran was under the control of the Shah’s regime. The Second is the period of transformation or precisely the Iranian Revolution and finally the third is the period in which the revolution created a new code of conduct in the country, new rules. Vladimir Vinogradov (1921-1997) is a famous Soviet diplomat. He worked as a diplomat in Great Britain, Japan, was deputy of the Foreign Minister of the USSR and for many years was the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian SFSR. After the Cold War he was a lecturer at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and, from 1992, headed the Russian Committee of Public Organizations on Assistance to the Arab-Israeli settlement. He used his informal connection to the Middle East for different reasons and consulted the Russian government in the 1990s. Additionally he was Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Egypt (from October 1970 to April 1974) and Iran (from January 1977 to June 1982). Ambassador Vinogradov will be known in the history books as a diplomat that witnessed two of the most important events in the Middle East in the XX century from within: The War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He managed to establish constant meetings with Nasser, Sadat, the Shah, and finally with Ayatollah Khomeini and other leaders of the Iranian Revolution. For the historical events in Iran, he dedicated his book „Our Middle East. Notes of the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt and Iran”. The book was published in 2016 (circulation 1500 copies), almost 20 years after his death, but they shed light on the very interesting events in Iran that are little known in the West or even in Russia itself.
The Agony of Shah Reza Pahlavi
As a committed Communist, Vonogradov saw the development of history as a dialectical process and the fact that the people wanted to overthrow the Shah was not a surprise for him. He explained it as the logic of history, that the old conservative regime must exit the historical arena. The British or the Americans always expressed great concerns to the Shah that the Soviet Embassy was sponsoring and supporting the revolutionary “Muslim Marxists” and other insurgents. Special attention must be paid, writes Vinogradov, to the fact that the Shah’s regime had alienated the clerics that felt themselves isolated under the Shah. The Shia clergy’s traditional influence and position was limited by the new “way of life” of the Western model, which was strenuously imposed by the Shah. In history, this process is known as a “White Revolution.” An additional pillar of the Shah’s regime was the powerful apparatus SAVAK that opened the way for massive repressions against the opposition.
About his first personal meetings with the Shah, Vinogradov writes: “The shah received the Soviet ambassador rather readily, and in his conversations, a variety of questions were raised, whether he liked them or not. The Shah was well-versed in international problems, was informed in general, although often showed bias, about the state of affairs in the country; he knew some issues, including economic ones, in some detail. In a word, he had his own point of view, tried to show it; if necessary, in many cases he made decisions immediately, sometimes he could say that he would consult before making a decision. He always behaved calmly, showed confidence, and only in his last meetings – in the fall of 1978, when the country was shaken by revolutionary unrest, did his obvious confusion and lack of understanding of the depth of the events become visible.”
The events in Afghanistan when the socialist government came to power were received calmly by the Shah, but he gradually became opposed to the revolution in Kabul and turned openly into aggressive mode. He said to the Soviet Ambassador – “How can you not be afraid of the events in Afghanistan if your army has only about 400 km left to the warm seas?” The Shah was never naive. For example he gave some interesting impressions to the Ambassador when said to him that Iran could “Let the Americans teach us how to use weapons of their production – after that we will expel them.” Thus, in the 1970s many Middle Eastern countries used and learned to expiate the Cold War and the superpowers for their own favor. The Shah really didn’t like the close relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and he saw it as a threat to his country. Vinogradov gives a striking verdict on the Shah’s role when he writes that the Shah sought to pursue an active foreign policy, relying on the United States, maneuvering in his relations with the Soviet Union and other countries. The idea of creating a “great civilization” possessed him, perhaps, until the last months before his exile.
The Ambassador blames the Shah for his non-democratic conduct against the opposition and it is even possible to conclude that he liked the Shah, comparing him favourably with those who came to power after the Iranian Revolution. The opposition demanded the revision of the Constitution and constraints on the power of the Shah. They wanted the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Iran. The last time Vinogradov met with the Shah was in October 1978 when he was in desperate conditions and he recognized that his plans to build the “Great Iranian Civilization” were over, stillborn. An interesting moment from this conversation comes when the Ambassador pays the same attention to the strange answers of the Shah: “I tried to stop speculation in houses, and they cancel these measures. I plant speculators who inflate prices, and they set them free!” Who are “they”, is it possible that the Shah is not omnipotent? – asked Ambassador. Finally, the Shah emotionally replied in a whisper, with a hysterical note in his voice: “But I don’t want more blood, too much of it has already been spilled.” The Shah’s biggest problem was that he was not ready for consensus, when it was still possible. It should be noted that the Soviet Union supported the opposition because it demanded changes in the internal political and economic course in a socialist direction, Iran’s withdrawal from the CENTO military bloc and its entry into the non-aligned movement.
The Ambassador spoke with the Prime Minister of the country Amir Abbas Hoveida. Once he said to the Ambassador that he foresaw that the US national security adviser Brzezinski would prevail over Secretary of State Vance. “Well, it’s good,” he joked, “that Brzezinski is of Polish, and not German, origin, like Kissinger.” The topic of Iran’s relations with the United States was very often raised in conversations with Hoveida. He assured, like the Shah, that Iran needed the US “temporarily”: until it gained the mastery of military and industrial technology, Iran would not become a dependent country. The Ambassador indicates that Hoveida had not been happy with the presence of the Anglo-Saxons in his country from his childhood.
Observations on Shia Islam
At the end of the 1970s, there were about 86,3 million Shia Muslims worldwide and 1200 ayatollahs. In this period only four Great Ayatollahs lived, including Khomeini. The Ambassador concludes that unlike Sunnism, one of the most important features of Shiism is the doctrine that wisdom is above tradition. This presents tremendous opportunities for the Shiites to respond to any phenomenon in an explicit political manner. Therefore, the Ayatollahs play a huge role in the life of society. They can use their authority both to support and to boycott any decision of the authorities or actions of the people. The division in Shia society came in 1906 when revolutionary reforms were conducted that pushed the clergy aside from political life, but created the Clergy Council to Oversee the Enactment of Laws which was abolished by the Shah in the 1940s. The Shah had plans to undermine the Shia clergy through the creation of alternative religious institutions and by entering into the global scene as a protector of Islam. The Ambassador once asked the Shah about his position regarding the clergy and he replied that he was sure that this is an obscurantist force that can only delay the development of Iran; with the growth of the education of the population, the power of its influence should weaken.
The Beginning of the Revolution
Vinogradov believed that revolution was inevitable, but nobody could have expected when and where precisely it was going to start. As he writes “Apparently, the internal conditions for an explosion in Iran, so far invisible to anyone, have matured so much that they have become fertile ground for the further powerful spread of the opposition movement throughout the country, beyond the control of the authorities, both inward and outward.” The Ambassador expresses a connection between the beginning of the protests and the aggressive approach of the Government towards the Soviet Union. He denied any allegation that the USSR was behind the protests. The impact of the Afghan Revolution was indispensable. During these disturbing days for Iran, the Shah spoke a lot about the “great civilization” towards which Iran was moving, about the danger of losing its independence and being turned into “Iranistan.” In one of his last meetings, the Shah complained to the Ambassador about why European leftists were supporting Khomeini if he “pulls towards feudalism and towards the rule of religion!” The Shah again asked the Ambassador’s opinion regarding the situation. He replied that influential forces, which had arisen as a result of the accelerated development of society, demanded real participation in political life, that is, they demanded a share of power. The Ambassador insisted on opening the way for a multiparty system. He was lobbying for a place for Iranian communists in the new political system of the country. Pehlevi said that the return to such a political system was impossible. Vinogradov made his final conclusion that the Shah was doomed.
Vinogradov provides a very important picture of the historical processes. The revolution started as a democratic and secular movement, where religious forces were only one of many. Over a longer period of time, the correlation of forces in the revolutionary process turned in their favor. After the tragic events in September 1978, power was transferred to the military. Again, the Ambassador denied the allegations that the Soviet Union was behind the events. Enormous and chaotic democratic movements came to the fore, which the Shah was not able to grasp and Vinogradov was amazed by the fact that Iran’s leaders refused to understand that it was over, that if they wanted to survive they had to accept their opponents. The Shah began pushing Iraq for the deportation of Khomeini from the country. Khomenei would remember this fact. The total ban on press freedoms did not help the regime: it only allowed Khomenei and other opposition leaders to monopolize the informational space of Iran. Soviet companies faced big problems on the Iranian-Soviet border, halting supplies of the gas to the USSR, and eventually the entire export of oil, the country gradually collapsing. The Western countries claimed that religious fanatics and left-wing groups were going to come to power and raised the possibility of open political and military interference of the Soviet Union to Iran. Brezhnev published an official letter stating that Moscow was not going to interfere in Iran, but that if the U.S. interfered in the revolutionary process in Iran, Moscow “would consider such actions as affecting its own security interests.” The situation therefore took on a geopolitical dimension.
In the autumn, strikes contaminated the entire country. All countries evacuated their own citizens, including the Soviet Embassy. In Iran there were about 8,000 Soviet citizens. The Ambassador writes positively that at this moment the popularity of the USSR increased and Moscow’s Radio became very popular. The Soviet Union became the main route home for all foreigners in the country through the Caspian ports to the Soviet Union or through the Southern Caucasus. The process of de-westernization started in Tehran when the number of movie theaters fell from 125 to 15 within weeks. The military forces were not capable of stopping the protests. The escalation only increased and the number of dead and injured rose massively.
The US aircraft carrier “USS Constellation” arrives in the Persian Gulf. Moscow views this as a dangerous move that can create a serious confrontation between the two superpowers, writes Vinogradov. In the final weeks, the Shah gives an ultimatum to the protesters and proclaims that he is ready to transfer power to his son, but it is too late. Khomenei appoints a Revolutionary Council – the Provisional Government. In January 1979, people are already shouting “death to the Shah”, the time for compromises is over.
Vinogradov’s observations remain useful to us today regarding the situation in Belarus – on the side of the Shah was still the largest and most formidable force – the army, well-armed by the Americans, its higher officers dedicated to the Shah and the monarchy – a privileged caste of Iranian society. With the fall of the monarchy, the higher officers will lose everything.
The Revolution
In the country, martial law is announced, the military takes full control over the capital. The new slogans on the streets “Freedom, Equality, Islamic Republic!” or “China, USA and USSR – enemies of Islam” and “Foreign policy: “neither the West, nor the East, but Islam.” The rise of the clergy is crystal clear for the Ambassador now. Everywhere in the country “Muslim Soviets (councils)” are created, which substitute for the police and other law-enforcement institutions. Khomenei arrives from Paris to take his place as the main leader in the Revolutionary Council. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini arrives in Tehran. One million Iranians are gathered just to be near him. The Soviet diplomats try to be everywhere at once. The Ambassador writes that when Khomeini arrived, he started a campaign to destroy the last pieces of the previous regime and for this reason blockaded the legitimate government. Interesting for him was the fact that Khomeini hid any information about what the Islamic Republic was about.
The Army declares neutrality between the Government and the Revolutionary Council – Vinogradov sees this as a sign of victory for the protesters. Tehran radio broadcasts an appeal from Khomeini: he gives a fatwa (sacred decree) to the troops, all military personnel, withdrawing their oath of allegiance to the Shah. This is a strong move – disobedience is threatened with religious punishment. On 13th February, Moscow was the first state to recognize the new revolutionary government when it became clear that the revolution had won. About this moment Vinogradov writes that “The British ambassador came to me on an urgent visit. He wanted to clarify whether there was really an official recognition by the Soviet Union of the new Iranian government. It should be noted that the Soviet embassy had established contact with the illegal headquarters of the strike movement even before the revolution, thereby making it clear that it considered the victory of the revolution inevitable. Having received an affirmative answer, he said with a sigh that now the English government would have to do the same.”
The leader of the new Government, Mehdi Bazargan, said to Vinogradov “you taught us how to make a revolution, and Iran is well aware of the revolution in Russia in 1917.” Already in the first days there had appeared serious fractures between religious and democratic groups. The Kurds hoped that they would be granted autonomy due to the democratic changes. A circular was sent to the owners of cinemas not to show films about sex, violence, karate, and also … Soviet films! On 24th February, Vinogradov had a cursory meeting with Khomeini, but a more interesting meeting was held in December 1979 when Vinogradov had to tell him that Moscow had plans to send its troops into Afghanistan.
Khomeini said that he did not accept these plans but wished the USSR as soon as to fulfil them and return home, but at the same time asked to block any attempts to isolate Iran in the UN, especially an economic blockade and he asked for permission to use Soviet territories for the transit of Iranian goods to Europe. Moreover, he writes that Iran had plans to seize the Soviet embassy, but Khomeini didn’t accept this idea.
After the revolution, the country started to understand what a monster they had brought to power. Khomeini said that we had fought not for anything else, but for Islam. Khomeini made a skillful move: first he established the name of the republic without defining its content, and then, after the people had approved the name, he summed up the content he needed under the name. In the referendum there was only one question: Are you in favor of an Islamic republic? “Yes”, in green (the color of Islam) bulletin and “No” in pink. Everyone was able to see the bulletin hence the political position. The next stage was the new constitution that gave him full power in the country. Concurrently, attacks were started on women and national minorities. Khomeini stated that the definition of nation did not exist in Islam. These assaults occurred simultaneously with attacks on the last remnants of liberal and socialist opposition in the country with the use of revolutionary tribunals. For the army, the clergy found a way to undermine its influence in the Iranian-Iraqi War. During this war, Khomeini called for patriotism and allegiance to the nation. He thus adjusted to the logic of war.
Gradually aggressive attacks began to be made on the Soviet Union and the Soviet Embassy. Despite these moves, Tehran had an understanding that Moscow would react to any military intrusion against Iran. The Ambassador met positively with the news that mujahedins had taken control over the American radio-electronic stations near the Soviet Union. This meant that Islamization had its own positive aspects for the USSR, but there were negative moments when Tehran denounced the 1921 agreement that had allowed Moscow’s military involvement. Vinogradov blamed the US for the death of the Shah, because whilst alive, he put many restraints on Washington and its attempts to restore relationships.
The new Iranian Government had an anti-Russian attitude. Once in the 1960s Khomeini said that “The USA is worse than England, England is worse than the USA, and Russia is the worst.” But when he came to power, geopolitics restrained his behavior. At the end of his book, he comes to the sad conclusion that “It seemed as if the gilding had been scraped off from the Iranian nation and something rusty and rough was left underneath.” A year after Khomeini’s death, the Iranian government personally invited Vinogradov to Tehran for a related event – the only non-Muslim foreigner who was so engaged into these historical events.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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