(centardomovinskograta.hr)
In terms of military strategy and theory of warfare on the European continent, the post-Cold War period has had one specific feature. Namely, it has typically been a fight between unequal forces. Europe had two main and the most violent wars – in Chechnya, where a great power fought against irregulars, and the wars for succession in former Yugoslavia. The most interesting and at the same time highly dramatic military operation in 1995 was the operation carried out under the code name “Storm.” This was the last and the most crucial stage of Croatian War of Independence.
The book at hand by Davor Marijan is the first one on the topic with such an enormous basis of archival military materials. It was written by a famous military historian in Croatia, who had previously been working in the Military Archives of the MOD of Croatia for six years, as well as in the archives of the Croatian Security and Intelligence Service. Thus, he was able to collect documents from a diverse range of sources (including those from the Serbian side), both rebels and regular army.
The book is almost deprived of any speculation, while citations are taken fully from official military archives. It is not even a book – it is some sort of excellently documented military report with some short strategic conclusions.
We can divide it into three main parts:
The final preparations for operation “Storm” in the HV General Staff were already underway on June 30, 1995. These were undertaken with the highest level of secrecy meaning that it was only on 2 August that the HV General Staff established the Staff of the Operational Centre as the brain of the coming war. The battlefield required serious preparations and a deep understanding of geographical factors (e.g. the mountainous area and stretched Croatian territory with no strategic depth for the most part). The General Staff’s first task was to gain a political and psychological victory over their enemy.
Therefore, they demanded that the army in Northern Dalmatia cut Serbian communications leading from the important city of Knin and eventually surround and seize this city. The auxiliary forces were supported to roll back Serbian forces and penetrate the territory, thereby facilitating the mission of the main forces. The operation was planned in two to three phases and in the duration of three to four days. In the first phase, as it was to the last day, the plan envisioned the smashing of the Serbian forces along the first line of defense and the capture of important landmarks and communications in the tactical depth of the enemy. In the second phase, there was also planned the execution in a single day, when the main forces of North Dalmatian Corps August had to be cut up, and the conditions created for engaging the second combat echelon. The plan for the third, two-day phase included the elimination of the main enemy forces, gaining control over key defence points and establishing a situation in which hostile units could only surrender or pull out. In order to achieve these strategic purposes, the General Staff provided very precise aims and tasks for every unit.
Once the Storm began, Serbian forces and proxies attempted to hold the city of Knin but were not able to do it. Plus, the decision to evacuate civilians from Dalmatia and Lika turned out to be a total collapse. The liberation of Knin was the main military and political development not only on 5th August, but also throughout the entire operation. This had great symbolic meaning, because it spelt the collapse of Serbian rebellion in Croatia.
Particularly interesting is the international factor throughout the entire war, especially the factor of the UN Mission UNCRO. UN peacekeepers had been in Croatia since 1992 and Zagreb was not satisfied with this fact. The UN was informed about the operation on 4th August and they immediately demanded the cessation of all military actions. Russia and the EU were against the operation. Eventually, all international and domestic problems associated with the execution of “Storm” were superseded by its success. As the writer concludes, “In many aspects, this was a classical land force operation with air force involvement. Its actual execution departed considerably on the original idea. It was an infantry operation with strong artillery support. Penetration of enemy lines was followed by enhanced commitment of armoured and mechanized units for pursuit and the exploitation of achieved success. The operation “Storm” ensured that 10,400 sq.km or 18% of the total area of Croatia was restored to Croatia. Total losses of Croatian Forces were: 196 killed and 1,100 wounded.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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