(Photo from the author’s collection)
Turkey is changing its geopolitical posture in the region and her strategy is omnidirectional. For the last five years, Turkey has been very busy with the military conflicts in Syria and Iraq, but the situation is slowly evolving into one that is stable and manageable for Turkey. Ankara is achieving its geopolitical goals with a talented combination of diplomatic and military instruments. In 2019-2020, Turkey intensified its revisionist activities in the western direction, namely on the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The military option is not excluded by either of the two belligerent sides. Even if Greece together with its European allies seeks to push Turkey to give up its ambitions by the threat of economic sanctions (i.e. the use of “old colonial tactics”), it seems likely that war will still be on the horizon. The reason for this is that Turkey desires, according to her official ideological narrative, the fair-revision of the borders which were imposed on her by the western powers. Thus, as long as a strong pro-Turkish party is in power, the issue of geopolitical revision of current Turkish borderland will be on the agenda.
The key question is, on what scale will this revision or full-fledged war be happening: will there be a limited war or something closer to the Crimean or Donbass scenarios.
Since 1974, Greece and Turkey have based their doctrines upon the presumption that they have to prepare their armies for war between the two states. Thus, the two armies have been living under the condition that eventually they will have to fight against one other, for almost 50 years. If at previous times Washington has been intervening, this time it is less likely to umpire. However, from now on, it is already obvious that the two countries and their allies are conducting the following measures:
At this juncture, it is important to understand the potential theaters of war between Greece and Turkey in terms of their military geography; the military potential of either side; and the potential systems of coalitions of state- and non-state actors and proxies.
(Source: Wikimedia)
Military Geography and the Operational Theaters of a Potential Greco-Turkish War
The general military theater of a possible war between Greece and Turkey is exceptionally unique, because it encompasses all known traditional military mediums:
To operate in such a complicated theater of war, the commander and the General Staff of each country must be well-prepared and understand the geography of the theater in perfect detail. The command-and-control in this narrow area which is physically sophisticated, with the use of advanced technologies is going to create the conditions for a dramatic and bloody conflict. Nevertheless, from a military point of view, the dense concentration of forces and materiel has a practical value for the rest of the armies in the world. Usually, since the end of the Second World War, world history has faced only the wars which happened between primitive armies of former colonial people or the situations when a superior European nation (from two sides of different ideological camps) were invading or fighting against nations much less advanced in military terms: Afghanistan, Vietnam or Iraq. Since 1945, no middle-size European nation with well-developed military forces has had any war against each other.
As for the Aegean Sea and its islands, it is a unique region for the world, both in terms of physical geography and as one of the most militarized seas in the world. It is home to an enormous concentration of men-at-arms, high-tech weaponry and other military technology and materiel. Turkey and Greece potentially possess the most sophisticated weaponry and technologies in order to make all military domains according to the military standards of the XX century.
The Lausanne Conference in 1923 made Athens the main stakeholder of the Aegean Sea and its islands, as a main asset. 6,000 islands belong to Greece (almost 2,000 in Aegean) and islets, only 227 of which are inhabited (they comprise 20% of Greek territory). According to the international agreements which regulate the legal status of these islands, they must be demilitarized. In the Aegean Sea, Greece has only 483 sizable islands, with a total surface area of 214,000 sq. km. The maximum length is about 700 km and maximal width 400 km. The area of territorial cohesion of all islands is about 17,458 sq. km. with more than one million inhabitants. The Aegean Sea is additionally home to Gokceada (Imroz), Bozca Ada (Tenedos) and the small islands of Tavsan Adalari, all of which belong to Turkey and are near the entrance to the Dardanelles.
The biggest islands of Aegean are located near the Turkish coastline: Chios and Lesvos near Izmir, Rhodes (Dodecanese) and Kos near Marmaris; Samos near Kuşadası city; Limnos and Samothraki near the entrance to the Dardanelles and some other important islands: Symi, Leros, Kalymnos, Astypalaia, Nesyros, Tilos, Halki, Karpathos and Kasos. The CIA reports that in 1984 in all these islands were stationed about 25,000 soldiers. In general, in these main islands around 350,000 people live. Several cities are located on or near the Turkish shores: including Marmaris and Kuşadası, but in the Izmir region alone are concentrated almost 4.5 million people. Izmir is the third biggest agglomeration of Turkey after Istanbul and Ankara, and it is the third largest regional economy of Turkey with a well-diversified, buoyant local economy as the economic hub on the Aegean cost. It is important to note that Izmir is the second after Athens in the Aegean economy and agglomeration, but with the crucial difference that Izmir is only 7,5 km from Chios and 33km from Lesvos; at the same time, Athens is about 200 km by sea from these islands. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the Greek geoeconomic development is presented in this part of the Aegean, disproportionately against the Turkish.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
Turkey believes that Greece has 16 out of 23 islands armed (that have non-military status), in violation of agreements in the Aegean Sea, and should act in accordance with international law. In this regard, the Turkish MFA have officially declared that Greece was violating by the militarization of the islands following agreements: the 1913 Treaty of London, the 1914 Decision of the Six Powers, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, the 1936 Montreux Convention and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Finally, Turkey sees the actions undertaken by the “inimical countries” (Greece, Israel, Egypt, France and the U.S.) to complete an encirclement around the country. Recently, a former Turkish Minister of National Defence put it straightforwardly that Greece must evacuate the citizens and its army and hand them over to Turkey.
Compared with Turkey, Greece does not have strategic depth – if Turkey was able to control the airspace and to destroy the naval and air-defense systems of Greece, the country’s capital would be open to the Turkish Army. It is impossible to imagine such a situation with regard to Turkey, because Ankara is located more than 500 km from Izmir. However, it is always a threat from the air and over land to Istanbul, which is about 200 km from Western Thrace. As for Istanbul, the naval option will be an insurmountable task, as the Dardanelles need to be passed and its line of defense. Such a scenario is possible to imagine only in the case of the coalition war. Turkey would immediately close the straits and mine them to any vessels.
The military geography suggests that in the possible war between Greece and Turkey, there emerge several theaters of war. Of course, everything will depend on the chain of events and different factors, but in the theoretical framework I would rather take the maximalist scenario which is that of a big war between two states, albeit on a lesser scale. A total war is merely impossible, but the involvement of all theater of wars into the direct one I would not exclude. History and military geography provides the data which permits us to construct the models (theater of war) in case of war between Greece and Turkey.
The Aegean and Anatolian Theaters of War
After a careful examination of the concentration of military forces and the military geography of Turkey and Greece, it might theoretically be important to present the following Aegean theaters of operations: Thrace, Cilician, Megisti (Kastellorizo); Syrian, and Eastern Anatolia. It should be noted here that Turkey has a big concentration of forces in the Syrian and Iraqi war theaters, and it is very important for Turkey to establish and develop an effective and mobile system of deployment of troops from one theater of war or operation to another.
The first and the most important theater of war is the “Aegean Theater”. This theater is traditional for both states. The military campaign of Greece against the Ottoman Empire during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) shows that Izmir is the gateway to Anatolia from the west. The Greeks firstly invaded Izmir and only afterwards undertook further offensives into the Turkish mainland in three directions in order to establish control over Ionia (1919); in 1920, the attack was conducted towards two main directions – the north and the east into the Anatolian heartland. Maybe it was the biggest mistake of the Hellenic General Staff to go as deep against an opponent which enjoyed such strategic depth. They used only two possible communication lines – the roads from Izmir to Bursa and Izmir-Afyonkarahisar which are connected near Kütahya city. In 1921, during the Battle of Kütahya–Eskişehir, the Greek Army managed to establish control over a territory of around 50,000 sq. km., but the Greek Army was exhausted and overstretched in the front and they fell into Ataturk’s trap, continuing a suicidal move deeply into the Turkish mainland. Afterwards, there was a total debacle of the Hellenic Army, where they eventually gained nothing. Interestingly, the Turkish and Bolsheviks armies brilliantly used strategic depth in order to win the war against their enemies.
Aegean islands accession (source: Wikimedia)
In the XXI century, the balance of power between Greece and Turkey shifted tremendously in favor of Ankara. Hence, it would be impossible to see the same Greek advance into Anatolia as there was a hundred years ago. Even the concentration of forces from both sides seems scattered on the map according to previous experiences of the two armies. Nevertheless, the situation is changing, putting some corrections on the historically stable doctrines. For example, the greatest impact on the revisionist power in this world had the situation with the annexation of Crimea. The case of Crimea and Russia’s conduct provided such countries as Turkey with big hope that it is possible to restore “justice” by conducting a small yet effective operation and after it immediately bare all teeth against the West and demonstrate the readiness to fight until the very last moment. This kind of tactic worked in Cyprus when Turkey invaded half of the island and in the case of Crimea. Turks and Russians are the inventors of this tactic and in all likelihood, they are going to continue this “struggle for justice.”
Turkey can impose exactly this scenario on the Aegean and towards the Greek islands. In order to understand the dynamics of the Aegean theater of war, in Part 2 and 3, we will examine in more detail each of the various theaters of operation. In Part 4, we will look at the military strength of each of the two sides and in Part 5, we will place all of this within the international context.
Map of Greece (source: Wikimedia)
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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