(Photo from the author’s collection)
The Cilicia war theater
This theater existed during the Franco-Turkish War (1918-1921). In Turkish military historiography, it is known as the “southern front.” During the French “Cilicia Campaign”, the French Army together with the Armenian Legion landed in Mersin and tried to occupy the zone of the historical region of Cilicia. The strategic interest of the French Army was to control the gateway from Anatolia to Syria, especially to the Alexandretta region (Hatay Province) and Lebanon that belonged to France according to the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. There are two strategically crucial cities here: Adana and Gaziantep. While the French and the Armenians managed to conquer Adana, they failed to win the battle for Gaziantep (known as the Siege of Aintab). This provides two crucial strategic maxims. Firstly, France used the ethnic factor as a precondition of occupation. Throughout the war, the Armenians were the basis of their military presence in the region. They even promised the creation of a partially independent Armenian State of Cilicia. Secondly, France participated in this war for geostrategic purposes in the Levant and it was strategically important to control Cilicia to secure the Levant. The war demonstrated that immediately after the failure to establish control over Cilicia, the control over the Sanjak Alexandretta became questionable.
Interestingly, this region is the home to the famous Cilician Gates, which are a pass through the Taurus Mountains to the Anatolian Plateau. It has a military and strategic meaning for all states that controlled Cilicia beginning from the Romans.
France is currently returning to the Middle East, namely to Lebanon. French support for Greece and Cyprus along with its attempts at increasing its influence in Lebanon has put Ankara on high alert. If during the French-Turkish War the Armenians were the crucial ethnic element of French manpower against the Turks, it is now possible to anticipate that France can openly support the Kurds. The ethnic map of Turkey shows that the only entrance to Turkish Kurdistan from the sea (the Southern Anatolian and Eastern Anatolia Regions) might be set through the low plains of Cilicia (Çukurova fertile plain) to Gaziantep (200 km from Mersin), the last Turkish fortress before Turkish Kurdistan. In recent years, France activated its geopolitical efforts in the direction of support of Kurdish separatist groups in Syria and increased its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, with particular attention to Lebanon. The issue of the French military base in Lebanon will be raised sooner or later. Recently France has gifted to the Lebanese navy four warships.
France and its allies are able to undertake airborne and seaborne operations in Cilicia only if the Turkish troops in Cyprus are going to be isolated without naval and air force support. This is the biggest weakness of Turkey in Cyprus. Therefore, Ankara is a fervent supporter of the idea of building a naval base in Northern Cyprus. This is logical because the distance between the Turkish naval bases in Marmaris and Iskenderun is around 700 km, i.e. 13 hours at an average speed of 30 knots and 6 hours from the areas near Cyprus, while in the times of contemporary warfare every minute is important. The armies can pay big prices if they decide to remain dormant. This scenario is possible only in the case of a big war and given that France will fully participate in the war. In such a scenario, France would return to Lebanon as the main geopolitical stakeholder of the region. The Kurds would use the war as an opportunity to take advantage of the situation as they are attempting to achieve in Syria and Iraq.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
Source: Ibrahim Sirkeci, “Exploring the Kurdish population in the Turkish context”, Genus, Vol. 56, No. 1/2 (Gennaio – Giugno 2000), p. 158
(Photo from the author’s collection)
The Cilicia theater of operation is sealed off by the Turkish forces. Turkey guards this zone more than anything. The Amanian (Nur) mountains that isolate Southern Anatolia and Syria from the rest of the country have two strategically important passes. One is located south of Hatay Province: the Syrian Gates (or Belen Pass). This pass has geostrategic importance to Turkey – the highway from Iskenderun to Kirikhan is the only logistic and supply line of Turkey with Aleppo and Idlib. From the Turkish border, Idlib is about 32 km and Aleppo is 37 km away. It is striking that in 1832 there was a major battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Army of Mohammad Ali Pasha. In July 2020, Egypt deployed forces near Aleppo (Khan Al-Asal), 30 km from the Turkish border.
The next pass is known as the Amanian Gate, which goes through the Nur Mountains and connects Cilicia with Southern Anatolia and Northern Syria. The regions are connected by the second largest motorway in Turkey (the O-52 motorway). Turkey has concentrated serious forces in this part of Anatolia. The General Staff of Turkey has developed a comprehensive system of defense in this region: 6th Army Corps is based in Adana; the NATO and U.S. air base Incirlik is 72 km from Mersin and 160 km from Idlib. In Northern Syria, Turkey deployed large military formations that are sufficiently impacting on the other theaters of operation, due to the fact that in Syria the Turkish Army is engaged in an open military conflict against the Kurds and the Syrian Army. 140 km away is the Turkish naval base in Iskenderun. Finally, Turkey has air forces bases in Konya, Kayseri and Malatya.
The Cyprus theater of operation
As has already been discussed, the Cyprus theater is very remote from Greece and the proximity to Turkey is the biggest disadvantage to the Greek Army. The communication, control and command would be very challenging to the Greek and Cypriot armies. Cyprus has about 15,000 soldiers against Turkish forces counting around 33,800 soldiers. The same misbalance pertains in weaponry. Furthermore, the TRNC Army has 3,000 personnel and 15,000 reserves. In this theater, Turkey does not have plans to simply invade the island. It is a baffling enigma what to do in the case of Great Britain because it has military bases and installations known as Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Interestingly, during the military operation by Turkey in Cyprus in 1974 the point of “enough” was exactly when the Turkish advance reached the edge of the Dhekelia Sovereign base Area in the east of the island.
Nicosia, like Athens, is trying to convince the Americans that they must be more committed to the Greek Cypriots. Some signs of this are visible on the horizon. For example, in January the two sides agreed to host a US rapid response team and in September the US lifted a decades-long arms embargo on Cyprus, which it still maintains against Turkey.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
It is important to point out that since 2017 between Cyprus, Greece and Israel, the process of trilateral military cooperation has actively been evolving. Mostly, the cooperation is happening between the countries’ navies, commandos and air forces and can also be seen in the decision of Israel to build a radar station on Crete that is able to monitor the area most of Turkey’s coast. Greece stationed the S-300 there, but it is unlikely that it can help Cyprus. Any attempt by Greece to establish communication lines can easily be disrupted by Turkey.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
Turkey effortlessly supplies and deploys to Cyprus from its mainland (from Anamur to Girne, 90 km, and from Mersin, 200 km.) However, if Greece and its allies were to win dominance at sea, the deployment of reinforcement to Cyprus would be impossible. Moreover, Israel and Egypt can help with supplies and reinforcement to Cyprus. For the Turkish navy and air forces, it would be difficult to control the area south of Cyprus.
A couple of words about the terrain of Cyprus
The topography of Cyprus suggests some important observations. Firstly, that the war in 1974 had a crystal clear geographical expression, as the advance of the Turkish army ended in the east right near the British base and secondly, if we look carefully at the map, it is possible to see that the Turkish army abstained from going further and deeper into the Troodos Mountains. Actually, Greek Cyprus is only Troodos itself. In the east, a small piece of flat terrain is under the control of the British, near Famagusta. Northern Cyprus is home to the Kyrenia Mountain Range which is 160 km long. However, they are too narrow (with an average width of 5 km) to be used as a natural defense range. If any army is going to take control over the mountains from the island side, it would give total control over the small coast line near Girne (Kyrenia).
The only serious advantage Turkey has in Cyprus is control over the Mesaoria. This is a broad tract of plain which is scattered in the northern center, with a length of 96 km, the breadth varying from 16 to 32 km. In this plain and others in the west of the island, Turkey can use tanks and artillery. This explains the delivery of a big number of tanks to Turkish Cyprus. In July 2019, Turkey deployed to Northern Cyprus (Kythera) 42 Leopard-2A4 tanks.
The Cyprus Army and the Hellenic Force in Cyprus (ELDYK) is about 1000 personnel concentrated in its own military regiments near Nicosia. But it is possible to conclude that both Turkish and Greek forces are scattered from the east of the islands to the very west, alone the UN buffer zone. Neither the US nor the UK allows Turkey to go beyond the buffer zone. The place is too important to Washington and London; hence, they won’t put such a precious piece of land at stake. Further to this, Turkey can be attacked in Cyprus in case of a big war or if the strategic position of Cyprus can allow it to fit the strategic gap in the Eastern Mediterranean between Iskenderun and Marmaris.
(Photo from the author’s collection)
An additional theater of operation
It is impossible to predict in detail a political process. What a human being is able to do is merely to logically forecast the possible scenarios or spots where the actions are going to occur, by the use of analytical skills. In case of a full-scale conflict against Turkey of all her former territories which are now independent countries, a multi-front war would be launched against her. It is possible to imagine that in the big war there will be opened fronts in the South Caucasus, in the entire zone of Kurdistan; as well as in the Balkans, in the Greece rears and of course in Libya and Syria.
The Syrian government is an unofficial ally of Greece and in case of war, Assad would definitely try to push back the Turks until the Syrian-Turkish border and end the occupation from Idlib to Al-Malikyah in the East of the country. However, recently, there was news that Turkey had sent to Syria about 4 thousand servicemen and about 450 armored vehicles, as well as air defense systems. In September, there was controversial news that Turkey had deployed dozens of tanks to Thrace from Southern Turkey near the Evros River. Hopefully, neither of these fronts is ever going to be opened, and even a mid-scale war will never happen.
Autor
Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Senior Analyst at Strategy&Future
Strategy&Future
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