Source: Pixabay
Firstly: the Russians have mastered the art of masking military intentions and abilities despite – it would seem – the current era of universal access to information. For many months, the Russians have acted in a way that perfectly misleads us, including making military transfers in such a way that it is impossible to guess repeated patterns of behaviour. It is such patterns that allow us to anticipate events. Currently, Western analysts, including American ones like “one husband”, do not know whether the Russians will “enter” Ukraine or not.
The victim is lonely, scared and afraid to take up the rivalry in such an act, looking at allies and supporting states, which, however, are not threatened by Russia. This breaks down cohesion and solidarity. The effective Russian maskirovka is a lesson for Poland.
Secondly: The Russians demanded guarantees for their security interests by putting forward (and how!) the idea of changing the security status of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. us. In other words, they want to diversify our status vis-à-vis the old NATO states. The Russians want to participate in the new security system in Europe and want to directly decide what weapons systems can be stationed on the Vistula, what military capabilities we can have and what allies can train with us.
Thirdly: after Biden’s declarations about the meeting with Russia with the group of “several large European countries” it smelled like the Munich Pact. However, in terms of the consequences for breaking the balance (by no means the scale of the victims in the last world war) on the continent, it may be worse than in Munich – it may be a kind of “Munich Plus”. Why? Because now such a deal would not be concluded in order to “buy time” for armaments and preparation for war – as before the last war, but in order to negotiate a new balance of power in Europe. Except that without the West buying their time for rearmament, because Western Europeans are simply not interested in this (and they want Russia as a partner in the era of competition for the global trade system) and the Americans are getting ready for the Pacific. The conclusion – as, like Cato the Elder, I keep tirelessly repeating – is that we need a New Model Forces in Warsaw, Siedlce, Radzyń, Białystok and Lublin.
Fourthly: it means asking yourself the question: what can Poland do for Ukraine in this situation? We will face this question soon. I will not answer you now, we have to think about it at S&F, I honestly admit. This is an extremely difficult matter in the face of changes in the security situation in our neighborhood. But we will think it over and share our thoughts. All the more so this week, now that the Ukrainians have started to mumble that they are not bound by the Budapest Memorandum, which deprives them of nuclear weapons. And the more so because the Polish state has wasted 30 years and has not built a force that would balance Russia in Ukraine, nor has it built (despite the capacity to do so) an army that would have an impact on the balance of power in the region.
Point number five: If the Russians play it out like the Cuban crisis, but à rebours, what is their price? Of course, Ukraine and Belarus and stopping NATO enlargement, but what else? In the 1960s, the price was, for example, the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and a few inconspicuous moves related to the deployment of US troops in Western Europe – concessions to the Soviets. So, are Polish interests already on the table of talks, and, of course, the interests of the Baltic states?
What could it be? The Allied presence here, Redzikowo, NATO’s forward presence in the Baltic states, exercises in Romania? How about arrivals of American planes for exercises? Perhaps abandoning the military reform will be a price demanded by the Russians, plus nuclear energy, a gas terminal, etc.
Until recently, I considered the possibility of Poland falling into the sphere of Russian influence again after 30 years as unrealistic. After all, I thought we always had the reverse option of anchoring with the Germans. However, due to the toothlessness of the Germans and Europeans, the strategic dilemmas of the US in the Pacific and the regional balance of power shifting to the benefit of the Russians, I am beginning to fear that we will fall back into the Russian sphere of influence. Now it is more “soft”, within the framework of a “pan-European cooperation and peace”. Now I’m starting to fear that, especially as our objectification continues to deepen.
Autor
Jacek Bartosiak
CEO and Founder of Strategy&Future, author of bestselling books.
Strategy&Future
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