Strategy&Future

Jacek Bartosiak talks to Adm. (ret.) William McRaven (retired United States Navy four-star admiral who served as the ninth commander of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (2011-2014), commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (2008-2011), commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) (2006-2008), chancellor of The University of Texas System (2015-2018)) on the evolution of modern battlefield.

The decision of Beijing to publicly propose a peace resolution plan for the war in Ukraine was determined by many factors, however, the key component was that China decided to act as a global-scale arbiter. As a hegemon, Beijing stays above the belligerent sides.

Tiers for Rears: A General Classification of Military Logistics in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Part 2

The war in Ukraine is a unique geopolitical event that resembles and combines many previous international and revolutionary wars that changed the course of history. It has every chance to surpass many other wars the West and Russia have faced, both offensive and defensive, since 1945. This is a protracted global war, the winner of which will be defined as the one who is able to sustain social cohesiveness, economic and industrial power the longest and who can most effectively gain friends beyond the system of satellites.

Toshi Yoshihara (a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Author of “Mao’s Army Goes to Sea” (2023) and Albert Świdziński discuss Chinese naval strategy.

The year-long war in Ukraine doesn’t demonstrate any sign of ending soon. On the contrary, everything indicates that the war hasn’t yet reached its apogee and that this year we will witness the next act within a long geopolitical drama that will resonate throughout the European continent.

This part of the series is a record of conclusions and observations resulting directly from conversations with the participants of this war — soldiers and officers.

Despite receiving enormous military, economic, social, and financial assistance from the West, the Ukrainian economy and social situation is going to deteriorate. If we see a continuation of the war for the next half a year and the Kremlin decides to continue its systematic attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure as part of its winter military operations, there is a great danger that Ukraine is going to join the group of disaster zones that have appeared in Syria, Yemen and Libya as a result of the geopolitical confrontation between East and West. If the situation with electricity does not stabilize in the near future, the greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since 1945 might be inevitable.

Thus, Moscow was preparing for an offensive operation in Eastern Europe. It was planned to get acquainted with questions of defence only to the extent that they arose during the course of the games...

In February this year, war broke out in the east. Russia attacked Ukraine. A certain stage in the history of our region and in the history of the world has come to an end. For years, we have been talking and writing here at Strategy&Future about the need to prepare for new times, and to prepare for the reform of the Polish military. These new times have come. Today – part three about lessons from the war, for Poland and for our military.

Miscalculations, according to Zakharov, were also made during the games with the creation of an advantageous aspect ratio – an important factor in the preparation, conduct and successful completion of any operations...

Marek Budzisz and Ridvan Bari Urcosta talk to Dr. Pavel Luzin (a visiting scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, a regular contributor at The Jamestown Foundation, Riddle and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a specialist in international relations and an expert on the Russian Armed Forces) on Russian military-industrial complex and the war in Ukraine.