Strategy&Future

On Sunday 27th February (the day before the meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating teams), President Vladimir Putin announced that the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation would be under increased readiness. Let’s add that Putin did not specify whether it is a strategic or a non-strategic force.

Jacek Bartosiak and Nicholas Myers discuss the war in Ukraine, situation as of morning 27 Feb 2022.

Jacek Bartosiak and Nicholas Myers discuss the operational and tactical details of the war in Ukraine, as of afternoon 25 Feb 2022.

The main take-away points from the events in Belarus from the summer of 2020 (the unrest of the pro-Western factions of Belarusian civil society) until the current refugee crisis on the Belarusian border with the EU are the following:

Since the publication of my guide calculating how many battalion tactical groups (BTGs) the Russian Armed Forces could generate against Poland, a couple critiques have been levelled at whether this is the best way to understand how Russia would fight Poland and/or NATO at large. My guide was intended only to demonstrate how many of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s declared 168 BTGs [1] were available to mass on the Polish border and has been taken somewhat out of context. Nevertheless, some of the critiques raise important points worth addressing.

“I asked my opponents the question, ‘Who are our weapons aimed at?’ If we are to retarget our missiles, we must choose a target to aim the missiles at. Let’s suppose that we choose a target. What will the reaction be in a situation where no one aims their missiles at us while we choose an ‘enemy’ to target our missiles? What will be the international reaction and attitude toward Ukraine?” Leonid Kravchuk, 1993 TV-statement

The Russian Armed Forces implemented many reforms after the 2008 Georgian War, consolidating military districts, streamlining command-and-control structure, and switching from a division- to a brigade-centric order of battle. Overall, these reforms acknowledged the futility of retaining a theoretically mass mobilization-capable force in a time when the political conditions for using it are almost impossible to fathom. Instead, the reforms aimed for a military capable of rapidly generating force of flexible size in any of the multitudinous peripheries of the Russian sphere of influence.

It seems that 2022 may not be easy, bringing many challenges to the world and Poland. We at S&F will list a few of them, focusing on the absolute most important issues.

The current crisis related to Russian political and military maneuvering, and the West’s reaction to it, forces us to reflect on several issues concerning Poland’s vital interests.

For the Russians, a military tragedy, a catastrophe; for the Poles, a strategic victory; for the Ukrainians, a human and civil tragedy

It is very puzzling, the calmness with which public opinion received the statements of the most important politician in the country on the real possibility of a war with Russia (and Belarus) and the need to start major preparations for it.

The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 was not a challenge for the Georgian Armed Forces exclusively, but also for Russia. In fact, the consequences of the war triggered the process of the modernisation of the Russian Armed Forces. Moscow found many mistakes and operational malfunctions in the actions of its army against the Georgian Army. However, one Russian military community insider is particularly proud of the operation that was conducted during the war in the Georgian cities of Poti and Senaki. This operation was accomplished by the 45th Guards Spetsnaz (Special Purpose) Brigade.